2021 State of the Commonwealth Report by Agarwal, Vinod et al.
2021 State of the Commonwealth Report






This is Old Dominion University’s seventh annual State of the Commonwealth Report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university, the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, its president, Brian O. Hemphill, Ph.D., the Board of Visitors, the Strome College of Business or the generous donors who support the activities of the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy.
With the 2021 election in the rearview mirror, the question now becomes: Where does Virginia go from here? Our work seeks to contribute to this conversation 
without glossing over the challenges we face. We want to encourage the difficult conversations to help Virginia improve the outcomes for all its residents in the 
coming years.
The 2021 State of the Commonwealth Report is divided into six parts:
Inflection Point? COVID-19, Vaccines and the Recovery 
To say that most Virginians would prefer to forget 2020 might be an 
understatement. The COVID-19 pandemic threw tens of thousands of 
Virginians out of work, shuttered businesses and abruptly transitioned much 
of education into the world of remote learning. As 2021 draws to a close, the 
story has changed from one of shock to one of recovery. In this chapter, we 
examine the impact of the pandemic, the ongoing recovery and prospects for 
continued growth in 2022.
A Recovery at Different Speeds: Virginia’s Metropolitan Areas 
Virginia’s economic recovery in 2021 has been driven by the performance 
of some, but not all, of its metropolitan areas. While Hampton Roads and 
Richmond have lagged the performance of the state and nation since the 
onset of the pandemic, smaller metros like Blacksburg and Winchester 
have recovered jobs more quickly. As we near the end of 2021, we discuss 
how Virginia’s metros have fared over the last 24 months and present the 
challenges for creating growth across the Commonwealth in the coming years.
Bounce Back? The Pandemic and Tourism in Virginia 
For the Virginia hotel industry, the last 24 months have been challenging in 
a number of ways. The pandemic and associated social distancing measures 
resulted in a collapse of visitors and revenue in the spring and summer of 
2020. In 2021, the Hampton Roads market set records for hotel revenue, 
but other markets continued to struggle. In this chapter, we look at how the 
markets in Virginia have performed over the past two years and how 2022 
may bring good news for the hotel industry.
Let It Ride: Casinos, Online Betting and the Future of 
Gambling in Virginia  
In 1987, Virginia voters approved the state lottery, bringing legalized gambling 
to the Commonwealth. By 2021, Virginians could buy lottery tickets online, 
place sports bets on their phones, wager in historical horse racing parlors and 
play “gray machines” in convenience stores, restaurants and bars. Now, with 
casinos opening soon in Bristol, Danville, Norfolk and Portsmouth, we discuss 
the benefits and costs of casinos in the Commonwealth. 
Viewed Through a Different Lens: Evaluating Virginia Higher Education 
The University of Virginia, Virginia Tech and William & Mary historically 
have played important roles in the Commonwealth. They have assembled 
impressive records in admitting and graduating talented students who 
(predictably) do well after they leave these campuses. Except for our 
historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) and the University 
of Virginia’s College at Wise, no public four-year institution in Virginia 
enrolls a significant percentage of low-income students. We discuss what the 
Commonwealth and its public colleges and universities can do to make higher 
education more affordable. 
The Winchester Metropolitan Area Outperforms the Commonwealth 
Conversations about growth in Virginia primarily focus on the metropolitan 
areas of Northern Virginia, Hampton Roads and Richmond. Often forgotten 
in these discussions is how the smaller metropolitan area of Winchester has 
outperformed many of the larger metros in the Commonwealth. We explore 
why Winchester is growing and how this growth could change the quality of 
life of its residents in the future.
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You were sick, but now you’re well again, and 
there’s work to do.




o say that most Virginians would 
prefer to forget 2020 might be an 
understatement. The COVID-19 
pandemic not only presented a historic public 
health challenge, but it also brought the 
fractures of our economic and social lives into 
full display. Over the course of two months, 1 in 
10 Virginia workers found themselves cast onto 
the unemployment rolls, businesses struggled 
to adapt to social distancing requirements and 
many schools switched to virtual learning. 
Social media amplified disinformation about the 
benefits of masking, purported cures (such as 
hydroxychloroquine) for COVID-19 and, in late 
2020, the safety and efficacy of the COVID-19 
vaccines. Supply chain disruptions roiled 
retailers and consumers (and continued to do 
so in 2021). To borrow a phrase from Queen 
Elizabeth II, 2020 was not a year on which we 
shall look back with undiluted pleasure.
2021 has not been without its high and low 
points. While the Commonwealth initially 
struggled to provide COVID-19 vaccines to 
Virginians, by late fall more than 70% of the 
population had received at least one dose, 
and over 63% were fully vaccinated. The 
delta variant surge in other Southern states 
in the summer of 2021 proved the wisdom of 
Virginia’s response, as hospitals here were 
not overwhelmed with COVID-19 cases, and 
deaths per capita were significantly lower than 
in states such as Florida and Texas. Economic 
activity has rebounded from its 2020 lows, and 
the Commonwealth has continued to regain 
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jobs in 2021. However, mismatches between labor supply and labor demand 
have left some employers scrambling to fill open positions. Hyper-partisan 
political discourse, fueled, in part, by a desire to gain traction on social 
media, continues to threaten the “Virginia Way” of fiscal discipline, civility 
and democracy.
As Virginia prepares to enter 2022 with a new governor and 
new majority in the House of Delegates, the challenge is to build 
upon the recovery of 2021 and address fractures that exist in the 
Commonwealth’s economy. Population and economic activity are 
increasingly concentrated in the urban crescent of Northern Virginia, 
Richmond and Hampton Roads. Fostering an environment that 
creates incentives for entrepreneurship and job creation outside these 
major urban areas remains an unaddressed challenge. Improving 
the performance of our public schools and investing in public 
infrastructure are necessary steps to enhance the business climate in 
the state. If people follow jobs, then Virginia must increase private-
sector job creation. Diversification of the Commonwealth economy 
will not only spark higher rates of economic growth, but it will also 
reduce Virginia’s economic dependence on decisions made in the halls 
of Congress and the White House. The Virginia Way has served the 
Commonwealth well. Now is not the time to abandon this ideology by 
succumbing to our baser instincts.
To understand where Virginia is going, we must review where it has been. 
This chapter looks back on the performance of the state economy over the 
past 24 months and identifies impediments to growth in 2022 and beyond. 
We discuss how the pandemic affected Virginia workers and businesses. 
We also explore the disproportionate burden of the pandemic on 
minorities. Lastly, we conclude with thoughts on how the Commonwealth 
can address its challenges in the coming years.
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Gross Domestic Product: 
Shock, Rebound, Relapse 
And Recovery
Real gross domestic product (GDP) is one of the headline measures of 
economic performance, as it estimates the real (after-inflation) dollar 
value of final goods and services produced in an area during a given 
period of time. GDP is an imperfect measure in that it does not capture 
nonmarket transactions (barter, for example), may understate the extent 
of the “gig economy” and does not place a value on household production. 
National data typically lag two to three months from the end of the most 
recent quarter. State data can lag four to six months from the end of the 
previous quarter. Quarterly data are also somewhat volatile and subject to 
revision, especially at the state level.1
To say Virginia’s economy faced turbulence over the last two years 
would be an understatement. The COVID-19 shock in 2020 caused 
an unprecedented contraction in economic activity. However, with 
the introduction of vaccines and a steady decline in infections in the 
spring of 2021, economic activity picked up the pace. The delta variant 
created another wave of infections this summer, primarily among the 
unvaccinated. The most severe consequences from the pandemic in 
2021 were increasingly concentrated among the unvaccinated. Rising 
vaccination rates and the promise of new anti-viral treatments for 
COVID-19 offer hope that future infection cycles will have lower peaks 
than those observed previously. As Winston Churchill aptly observed in 
November 1942, “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning 
of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
1  We revisit Graph 1 in each State of the Commonwealth Report. In the 2018 report, for example, estimated real GDP growth in 2017 Q1 was 0.8%, but this was later revised downward to -1.0%. In the 2021 report, this was revised down 
again to -2.3%, illustrating how revisions can affect the data.
Graph 1 shows the annualized quarterly change in real GDP for Virginia 
from the first quarter of 2017 to the second quarter of 2021. Prior to the 
pandemic, the Virginia economy had grown during 10 of the previous 12 
quarters. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a 2.9% contraction 
in real GDP in the first quarter of 2020, followed by a historic 28.6% 
decline in the second quarter of 2020. The historic decline was followed 
by a historic expansion in economic activity as Virginia “reopened” in the 
third quarter of 2020. After growing by 5.2% in the last quarter of 2020, 
however, the fall 2020-winter 2021 wave of infections, hospitalizations 
and deaths led to a slowdown in the recovery during the first quarter of 
2021 (1.4%). As infections eventually subsided and vaccinations increased, 
growth ticked upward by 5.8% in the second quarter of 2021.
While forecasting economic activity in 2021 (and 2022) remains somewhat 
of an exercise in futility, we project that the Commonwealth will continue 
to rebound in the third and fourth quarters of this year (Table 1). As we 
highlight throughout the chapter, the recovery slowed in the third quarter 
of 2021 when the delta variant created another wave of infections. But 
with rising vaccination rates and declining infections, it is reasonable to 
expect an uptick in economic growth in the fourth quarter and into 2022. 
However, ongoing global supply chain disruptions are likely to continue 
to constrain business activity and push prices higher. New variants may 
lead to surges in infections, hospitalizations and deaths, further clouding 
prospects for 2022. If inflationary expectations harden in 2022, then the 
prospects for a sustained recovery will certainly dim.
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TABLE 1
QUARTERLY REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2019 Q1-2021 Q4 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)






2019 Q1 18,833,195 2.4% 483,714 3.4%
2019 Q2 18,982,528 3.2% 485,816 1.7%
2019 Q3 19,112,653 2.8% 488,911 2.6%
2019 Q4 19,202,310 1.9% 490,566 1.4%
2020 Q1 18,951,992 -5.1% 486,994 -2.9%
2020 Q2 17,258,205 -31.2% 447,669 -28.6%
2020 Q3 18,560,774 33.8% 477,279 29.2%
2020 Q4 18,767,778 4.5% 483,327 5.2%
2021 Q1 19,055,655 6.3% 484,974 1.4%
2021 Q2 19,368,310 6.7% 491,838 5.8%
2021 Q3 19,465,195 2.0% 494,521 2.2%
2021 Q4 19,633,325 3.5% 498,672 3.4%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. U.S. data from Table T10106 of the National Income and Product Accounts. Virginia data from Table 
SQGDP9, real GDP by state. Forecasted values for U.S. real GDP for 2021 Q4 and Virginia real GDP for 2021 Q3 and 2021 Q4.
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GRAPH 1
ANNUALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN QUARTERLY REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: 
VIRGINIA, 2017 Q1-2021 Q2
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Table SQGDP9, real GDP by state. Millions of chained 2012 dollars. 
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GRAPH 1 
Annualized Percentage Change in Quarterly Real Gross Domestic Product: 
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Where Are The Workers?
To understand the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on workers in the 
Commonwealth, we first focus on measures from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS). The CPS asks the civilian noninstitutionalized population 
whether they are working, looking for work or not attached to the labor 
force. The civilian labor force represents the civilian noninstitutionalized 
population that is either working or actively looking for work, while 
individual employment reflects those in the labor force who are working.  
An individual can only be counted once in the CPS – that is, one either is 
working, unemployed or not seeking to work. 
Graph 2 illustrates the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
civilian labor force and individual employment in the Commonwealth. 
Before the onset of the pandemic in February 2020, both the labor force 
and individual employment had risen to their highest levels on record. 
From February 2020 to the trough in May 2020, the civilian labor force 
fell by 3.9% and individual employment declined by 9.8%. 
While individual employment has been on a relatively steady path toward 
recovery, the same cannot be said about the civilian labor force in Virginia. 
Although some individuals came back to work in the summer of 2020, 
the labor force trended downward in the ensuing months. From February 
2020 to October 2021, the size of Virginia’s labor force was down 4.3%, 
approximately 191,989 fewer individuals. Simply put, there were fewer 
Virginians willing to work than there were prior to the start of the 
pandemic.
While pundits and politicians prefer simple explanations of why the 
labor force has declined in Virginia (and the United States) when 
compared to the start of the pandemic, the reasons are more nuanced. 
Surveys suggest that child care availability, pandemic-related health 
concerns and transitions to other forms of employment influence exits 
from the labor force. Estimated retirements have also noticeably ticked 
upward. We do know one thing: People who have left the labor force 
do not qualify for unemployment insurance and blaming expanded 
unemployment benefits (which ended in early September) for the 
decline in the labor force is misleading.
National-level data on labor force participation by gender help shed some 
light on who has left the labor force over the last 20 months. Male and 
female labor force participation declined as the pandemic’s economic 
shock disrupted labor markets. Neither has returned to prepandemic 
levels. Compared to February 2020, the male labor force participation 
rate in October 2021 was down 1.6 percentage points, while the female 
participation rate had declined 1.8 percentage points (Graph 3). Looking 
forward to 2022, a continued recovery will be, in part, constrained by 
the smaller labor force in the Commonwealth and nation. Rising wages, 
however, may induce some of those who have left the labor force to return.
9
GRAPH 2
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2019-OCTOBER 2021
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GRAPH 3
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY GENDER: UNITED STATES, 
OCTOBER 2019-OCTOBER 2021





Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender: United States, 
































































































































The headline unemployment rate measures the ratio of unemployed 
individuals to the civilian labor force. In Virginia, the unemployment rate 
jumped from 2.5% in February 2020 to 11.3% in April 2020. This was 
the highest recorded unemployment rate for the Commonwealth since 
recording began in 1990. However, the sharp increase was short-lived. By 
January 2021, the rate had declined to 5.3% and was below 4% in the fall 
of 2021.
It is important to note, however, that the unemployment rate can 
misrepresent the state of the labor market. In the best case, the civilian 
labor force is expanding, and the number of unemployed individuals is 
contracting. The unemployment rate can also decline when the civilian 
labor force declines and the number of unemployed individuals falls. This 
is what has occurred in Virginia and also nationally. A smaller labor force 
and a smaller number of unemployed individuals mask the actual extent of 
unemployment.
In Graph 4 we also suggest an alternative measure of unemployment that 
provides insight into this phenomenon. We treat those who exit the labor 
force as unemployed individuals instead of removing them from the labor 
force entirely. While we understand that some departures from the labor 
force may be permanent (retirees, health conditions), this alternative 
measure provides an upper-bound view of the extent of unemployment in 
the Commonwealth. In October 2021, the official unemployment rate was 
3.6%. Treating departures from the labor force as unemployed yields an 
alternative measure of 7.9%. The true extent of unemployment in Virginia 
likely lies between these two data points.
The unemployment rate can obscure the difficulties in employment 
transitions for some Virginians. In 2018, Ernest Ray found himself laid 
off after 26 years of employment at a company in southwest Virginia. 
He applied for and received about $9,000 in unemployment benefits. 
Today, the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) is attempting to 
take these payments back. The dispute centers on a doctor’s note 
Ray provided the VEC during a brief illness that prevented him from 
searching for a new job. The VEC interpreted the note as Ray was 
unable to work and therefore ineligible for benefits. Complicating the 
dispute is the fact that Ray is deaf and only fluent in American Sign 
Language and, like many others, had difficulty understanding the fine 
print of the appeals process. The pandemic overwhelmed the VEC and 
a state audit found numerous deficiencies. As of December 2021, Ray 
finds himself still embroiled in the appeals process, a process that has 
weighed significantly on his mental health.
Source: https://www.dailypress.com/virginia/vp-nw-unemployment-benefit-battle-virginia-20211125-
fknwenabozevbojmlgtiqrlqla-story.html
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GRAPH 4
HEADLINE (U3) AND ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Adjusted unemployment rate includes departures in the labor force. Data are seasonally adjusted.
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GRAPH 4 
Headline (U3) and Adjusted Unemployment Rate: 
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Initial Unemployment Claims 
Trend Downward
At the peak of the COVID-19 economic shock in May 2020, more 
than 1 in 10 workers in Virginia had filed an initial claim to receive 
unemployment benefits. By the end of 2020, initial unemployment 
claims had declined significantly but were historically high when 
compared to previous recessions. By October 2021, however, initial 
claims were only slightly above prepandemic levels observed in 2019, a 
positive signal of economic recovery in the Commonwealth.
Graph 5 provides context for the pandemic’s economic shock. Immediately 
prior to the Great Recession of 2007-09, slightly more than 11,000 
Virginians filed an initial claim for unemployment benefits in September 
2007. Initial unemployment claims in the Commonwealth peaked after 
the recession was officially over, with more than 58,500 workers filing 
an initial claim in January 2010. While initial claims are volatile, the 
downward trend over the succeeding decade is apparent, with initial 
claims declining to just over 9,000 by February 2020. 
Graph 6 displays the historic shock and recovery from COVID-19 in 
initial unemployment claims in Virginia. Initial unemployment claims 
rose from 9,214 in February 2020 to 371,411 in April 2020. In the 
span of two months, initial claims jumped to more than six times the 
previous peak observed during the Great Recession. While initial 
claims declined in the summer of 2020, claims remained elevated 
through the spring of 2021. However, the summer of 2021 saw a 
marked decline in the number of initial claims, dropping from over 
160,000 in March 2021 to slightly less than 18,000 in October 2021. 
While monthly initial claims in October 2021 were 1.5 times higher 
than February 2020 (showing there is still work to be done), the 
level of monthly initial claims had fallen by 80.4% when compared to 
October 2020 (showing much has been accomplished).
Initial unemployment claims represent the number of people who 
have filed a request for benefits after separation from an employer. 
Continued claims, or what is known as insured unemployment, 
reflect those who have already filed their initial claims, had the 
claims accepted by the government and continue to file claims to 
receive benefits for the current week of unemployment. In other 
words, continuing claims show the number of insured unemployed 
individuals, while initial claims reflect the number of initial requests 
for unemployment benefits in a given week.
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GRAPH 5
MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: 
VIRGINIA, SEPTEMBER 2007-FEBRUARY 2020
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
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GRAPH 5 
Monthly Initial Unemployment Claims: 




































































































































































































MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021
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Continued Claims Spike 
And Decline
Initial unemployment claims are one part of the story. Temporary 
furloughs may not remain on the unemployment rolls for an extended 
period of time, as workers are recalled to work when economic conditions 
improve. If layoffs become permanent, however, workers may claim 
unemployment for an extended duration. Graph 7 illustrates monthly 
continuing unemployment claims in Virginia from August 2007 to 
February 2020. 
Immediately prior to the Great Recession, approximately 34,000 
Virginians received continued unemployment benefits in October 2007. 
Continued claims increased to over 104,000 in March 2009 and then 
declined over the subsequent decade. In February 2020, more than 26,000 
Virginians received continued unemployment benefits. The relatively low 
level of continued claims was a strong signal of the need for labor in the 
Commonwealth and contributed to expectations of a continued economic 
expansion in 2020. Those expectations, however, were quickly dashed by 
the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Graph 8 displays the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
federal response to the surge in unemployment claims. Three 
programs – Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA), Federal 
Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) and Pandemic 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) – expanded the scope of 
state run unemployment insurance programs, provided an additional $600 
(later, $300) in weekly benefits and an additional 13 weeks of benefits 
for those who exhausted their original benefits. While some states ended 
participation in these federal programs in early summer 2021, Virginia 
continued to participate until these programs lapsed on Sept. 4, 2021. 
2  “States That Cut Unemployment Benefits Saw Limited Impact on Job Growth,” The Wall Street Journal (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-that-cut-unemployment-benefits-saw-limited-impact-on-job-
growth-11630488601.
Continued unemployment claims in Virginia increased 39-fold from 
the week ending March 14, 2020, to the week ending July 11, 2020. 
Adjectives fail to describe the magnitude of this increase. More than 1 
in 6 Virginia workers received some form of unemployment benefits at 
the peak of the COVID-19 shock. However, and fortunately, the peak 
was relatively short-lived, and the level of continued claims had fallen 
by 60.1% by the last week of 2020. By October 30, 2021, continued 
claims filed under state programs were only 1.4 times higher when 
compared to the same week in 2019.
Some pundits and politicians have pointed to the enhanced federal 
unemployment benefits as a culprit for mismatches in labor markets. This 
theory, however, is not borne out in the data. From April 2021 to July 
2021, jobs in the 25 states that ended benefits early rose 1.33%, and for 
the 25 states that didn’t, jobs rose 1.37%.2 Data for Virginia show that for 
the week ending Sept. 4, 2021, the final number of continued claims for 
unemployment benefits covered under state programs was 40,624. Over 




MONTHLY REGULAR CONTINUING UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: 
VIRGINIA, AUGUST 2007-FEBRUARY 2020
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted. 
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GRAPH 7 
Monthly Regular Continuing Unemployment Claims: 
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GRAPH 8
WEEKLY CONTINUED UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: 
VIRGINIA, JAN. 4, 2020-OCT. 30, 2021
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted. PUA and PEUC continuing claims filed after Sept. 6, 2021, are delayed 




Weekly Continued Unemployment Claims: 







Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted. PUA and PEUC continuing claims filed after 



























































































From the trough of the Great Recession in February 2010 to February 
2020, Virginia added approximately 492,100 jobs (Graph 9). Within 
two months, the COVID-19 pandemic and associated social distancing 
measures wiped out nearly a decade of job gains. Initially, jobs rebounded 
quickly. Of the 480,000 jobs lost between February 2020 and April 2020, 
approximately 213,000 jobs returned by October 2020. The recovery in 
the year since, however, has slowed considerably. From October 2020 to 
October 2021, the Commonwealth added only about 79,500 jobs.
Graph 10 displays job openings in Virginia from January 2006 to 
September 2021. As one might expect, the number of openings declined in 
the aftermath of the Great Recession, falling to 72,000 in January 2010. 
As the Commonwealth economy recovered from the Great Recession 
and budget sequestration, the number of job openings increased, with 
an estimated 217,000 openings in February 2020. The job openings rate, 
which is the ratio of job openings to total possible jobs (current jobs + job 
openings), increased from 2.0 in January 2010 to 5.0 in February 2020.
The number of job openings fell from 217,000 in February 2020 to 
152,000 in May 2020, reflecting the surge in layoffs and reductions, 
if not outright closure, of businesses. As Virginia reopened, the 
number of job openings has surged. In September 2021, the latest data 
available, job openings rose to a record 328,000. The job openings 
rate increased from 5.0 in February 2020 to 7.7 in September 2021. 
Simply put, there has been a historic number of job openings in 2021 in 
the Commonwealth.
At the same time, the number of Virginians quitting their jobs also rose 
to the highest level on record. Graph 11 illustrates the number of job quits 
in Virginia from January 2006 to September 2021. Prior to the Great 
Recession, there were roughly 80,000 job quits in a given month. Following 
the recession, job quits declined (not surprisingly) to 31,000 in August 
2009.  The number of job quits increased over the decade and reached 
83,000 in February 2020. The job quits rate, which is equal to the ratio of 
job quits to total employment, peaked to 2.8 in August 2019 before falling 
to 2.0 in February 2020.
The decline in job quits in the spring of 2020 was short-lived. As 
economic activity picked up in the Commonwealth, job quits surged, 
peaking at 127,000 in April 2021. Workers in Virginia quit 3.3% of all 
jobs in April 2021. Through the fall of 2021, job quits have remained 
near record levels. In September 2021, workers quit 3.1% of all jobs.
The recent trend in workers quitting their jobs in record numbers 
is not unique to Virginia. In what has been dubbed “The Great 
Resignation,” workers across the country are leaving their jobs. 
National data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) show that the 
resignation wave is also not isolated to one industry. Quit rates have 
increased across virtually all major industries. Accommodation and 
food services (6.6), arts, entertainment and recreation (5.7) and retail 
trade (4.4) had the highest average quit rates in September 2021. 
Employers are having to raise wages to compete and retain workers. 
According to the BLS, from September 2020 to September 2021, total 
compensation costs for service occupations (e.g., server, bartender, 
housekeeper, accountant, financial manager) rose 5.3% compared with 
3.7% for all workers. Accommodation and food service compensation 
costs rose by 7.2% over the same period.
There are a few possible explanations for the recent wave in resignations. 
First, unstable in-person schooling, a shortage of available child care 
and pandemic-related health concerns probably continue to play a role. 
Second, with the existing labor shortages, workers, especially those in 
lower-wage industries, are quitting their jobs for higher wages elsewhere. 
Third, and harder to measure, the pandemic’s public and economic shocks 
have led some workers to reevaluate their life choices and seek their 
fortunes elsewhere.
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GRAPH 9
CUMULATIVE GROWTH IN NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
VIRGINIA, FEBRUARY 2010-OCTOBER 2021




Cumulative Growth in Nonfarm Payrolls (Jobs): 
















































































































JOB OPENINGS:  
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2006-SEPTEMBER 2021
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GRAPH 11
JOB QUITS: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2006-SEPTEMBER 2021
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). Quits include employees who left voluntarily, with the exception of retirements. The quits rate is the number of quits during the entire month as a 
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Department Of Defense 
Spending In Virginia
In fiscal year 2020, total Department of Defense (DOD) spending 
accounted for approximately 11.3% of Virginia’s GDP, the highest share in 
the nation. DOD contract spending in the Commonwealth climbed to $44.9 
billion in FY 2020, the second-highest level in the nation behind Texas 
(Graph 12). While DOD spending provides fuel to the regional economies 
of Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads, the question is whether these 
regions and the Commonwealth can continue to rely on this spending in 
the future.
President Joe Biden proposed a base DOD budget of $715 billion for FY 
2022, a 1.6% increase from FY 2021 (Graph 13).3 In inflation-adjusted 
terms, this represented a real decline in the DOD base budget. However, 
congressional appropriators appear likely to increase the DOD’s base 
budget, perhaps as high as the $740 billion authorized in the recently 
passed National Defense Authorization Act. 
Graph 14 presents data on military employment in Virginia from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and highlights the differences between the 
2019 and 2020 estimates. In the most recent release, the BEA utilized 
data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to estimate 
military employment at the state and metropolitan-area levels. Unlike 
previous years, the data on military employment no longer include military 
personnel on temporary duty assignments. In other words, deployed 
service members are no longer included in the military employment 
estimates. Furthermore, the BEA did not make the revisions backward 
compatible, revising the data only from 2016 forward. In other words, 
prior to 2016, the military employment data reflect the BEA’s estimates, 
while data from 2016 to 2020 are based on DMDC data. We caution the 
reader that comparing specific employment estimates prior to 2016 and 
after 2016 is not possible, and the best one may be able to accomplish is an 
examination of the trends in the data. 
3  We note that the DOD now presents the base budget as the combination of what used to be the base budget and the overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget.
What is clear, even with the change in methodology, is that the number of 
military jobs in the Commonwealth of Virginia has declined this century. 
Discounting the structural break in the series in 2016, we note that the 
newest data series suggests that the number of military jobs ticked upward 
slightly in 2020 to 121,549. The open question is whether Virginia will 
continue to observe a downward trend in the number of military jobs in 
the coming years.
We can examine other trends to provide insight into military personnel 
trends. Military personnel costs continue to increase, driven by the 
increasing cost of health care and other benefits. At the same time, 
procurement costs of new weapons have marched upward while delivery 
schedules have slipped forward in time. Each of the military services has 
proposed to reduce current capabilities (ships, tanks, planes, helicopters) 
to fund modernization efforts. Retiring current platforms now in the 
expectation of replacing them in the future with newer, more capable (and 
more expensive) versions also impacts the stationing of personnel. The 
Navy’s plan to retire seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers as well as 15 other 
ships, would, if enacted, disproportionately impact Virginia. While funds 
are being added to defense appropriations bills to reduce or forestall these 
retirements outright, it is merely kicking the proverbial can down the 
road. These ships are increasingly expensive to operate, and the Navy (as 
well as the other services) can’t operate, maintain and build new systems 
simultaneously.
At the same time, the rise of China is likely to continue the shift in U.S. 
national security policy towards the Pacific. At some point, assets will 
follow policy. When this happens, Virginia is likely to see departures 
of a Carrier Battle Group and other assets and the thousands of 
military personnel and civilian contractors that work on and support 
these systems. Such shifts would reduce DoD spending growth in the 
Commonwealth or, in the most likely case, lead to a smaller DoD footprint 
in Virginia. To ignore this possibility is to invite economic peril, especially 
in regions heavily dependent on DoD spending, such as Hampton Roads.
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Even relatively modest increases in the DOD budget in the coming 
years could well be constrained by the unbridled spending habits of 
Congress and the president. The last time the federal government 
ran a surplus was FY 2001, and that was quickly undone by tax 
cuts in 2001 and 2003, as well as the fiscal impact of wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Graph 15). After the fiscal response to the Great 
Recession, budget discipline (to some extent) and economic growth 
reduced the deficit to $442 billion in FY 2015. By FY 2019, the 
deficit had reached $984 billion as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017 reduced revenue growth, and the discretionary spending caps 
were abandoned. The fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic was 
relatively swift and large in magnitude and likely staved off an ever-
greater economic shock. However, the deficit rocketed to $3.1 trillion 
in FY 2020 and declined to only $2.8 trillion in FY 2021.
While we cannot say for certain when markets will demand higher rates 
of return for U.S. treasuries, we do know that the federal debt held by the 
public was 125% of GDP in the second quarter of 2021. Even if we exclude 
holdings of the Federal Reserve, the federal government owes the public 
over $17 trillion. At some point, the butcher’s bill will come due, and when 
it does, the federal government will find itself having to raise taxes and 
cut expenditures. The DOD, as the largest discretionary program in the 
federal government, would be an obvious target in such a scenario.  
25
GRAPH 12
DOD CONTRACT DEFENSE SPENDING: 
VIRGINIA, FY 2013-FY 2020
Source: U.S. Department of Defense Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation, Defense Spending by State - Fiscal Year 2020
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DOD Contract Defense Spending: 
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GRAPH 13
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY, 
FY 2010-FY 2026
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; Office of Management and Budget FY 2022 Presidential Budget (Table 20-1 Policy); and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Department 
of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request (May 2021). The FY 2022 budget presentation includes overseas contingency operations (OCO) in the DOD base budget. For backward comparison, we present the DOD base as the sum of 
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TOTAL FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME MILITARY JOBS IN VIRGINIA, 
2000-2020
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GRAPH 15
FEDERAL BUDGET SURPLUS OR DEFICIT IN BILLIONS OF NOMINAL DOLLARS, 
FY 2000-FY 2021
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and Office of Management and Budget FY 2022 Presidential Budget (Table 1.1 – Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits: 1789 - 2026). 
Estimated deficit for FY 2021.
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Real Estate Prices Continue 
To Climb Higher
In previous recessions, layoffs and business closures typically reverberated 
throughout housing markets, depressing prices and increasing 
foreclosures. However, we have not observed a similar impact in the 
aftermath of the short-lived COVID-19 recession. Low interest rates, 
coupled with the ability of many high-salaried workers to shift to remote 
work, appeared to insulate the housing market in the Commonwealth from 
the impact of the pandemic.
As illustrated in Graph 16, the number of building permits fell in the 
spring of 2020 but rebounded throughout the summer of 2020. By 
December 2020, building permits issued in Virginia rose to 2,425, the 
highest level in a decade. The level of single-family housing permits 
declined from a record high in 2021, but 1,885 building permits were 
issued in the Commonwealth in September 2021. Graph 17 shows the value 
of permits dipped slightly in January and February 2021 before rising to 
a pandemic high in March 2021. Both indicators suggest that the volume 
of single-family residential housing construction was largely unaffected by 
the pandemic.
Median housing values reflect the interaction between housing supply and 
demand. In December 2011, the nominal median value of single-family 
homes was $232,220 in Virginia. By February 2020, the median home 
value in the Commonwealth had risen to $293,990 (Graph 18), an increase 
of 26.2%. By October 2021, the median home value in Virginia had jumped 
to $348,259, an increase of 18.8% in about 21 months. The rise in median 
housing values in Virginia was reflected in the national average, with 
median housing values accelerating during the pandemic.
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GRAPH 16
NUMBER OF ONE-UNIT SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL BUILDING PERMITS: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2019-SEPTEMBER 2021
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits: 1-Unit Structures for Virginia [VABP1FHSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Data are seasonally adjusted. 
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GRAPH 16 
Number of One-Unit Single-Family Residential Building Permits: 
Virginia, January 2019-September 2021 





Source: U.S. Census Bureau, New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits: 1-Unit Structures for Virginia [VABP1FHSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 



















































































































































































VALUE OF SINGLE-FAMILY BUILDING PERMITS: 
VIRGINIA, 
NOVEMBER 2019-AUGUST 2021




Value of Single-Family Building Permits: 
Virginia, 
November 2019-August 2021 






Sources: U.S. Census Bureau and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not 
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GRAPH 18
ZILLOW HOME VALUE INDEX OF SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL HOMES: 
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA, 
OCTOBER 2010-OCTOBER 2021




Zillow Home Value Index of Single-Family Residential Homes: 
United States and Virginia, 






















































































































































































The Burden Of COVID-19
In 2020, 19.1% of Virginians identified as Black or African American 
(subsequently referred to as Black), while 60.8% identified as white. 
As of Nov. 13, 2021, Black Virginians accounted for 24.8% of all 
COVID-19 deaths in the Commonwealth, compared to 64.7% for white 
Virginians (Graph 19). While the proportion of Black Virginians 
dying from COVID-19 has remained relatively steady over the past 12 
months, the proportion of white Virginians has steadily increased over 
time. 
National and Virginia data show Black Virginians are less likely to be 
vaccinated against COVID-19, although this gap narrowed in 2021.4 
Vaccination rates at the county level in Virginia were also negatively 
correlated with the share of Republican votes in the 2020 presidential 
election. Data from the Virginia Department of Health show that, 
at the health region level, the rate of hospitalizations per 100,000 
Virginians was 13 to 15 times higher in September 2021 among 
unvaccinated individuals.5
As illustrated in Graph 20, from February 2020 to October 2021, the 
proportion of white workers (-2.1%) that have left the labor force is 
higher than the proportion of Black (1.7%) and Hispanic (-0.4%) workers. 
Compared to February 2020, there were 2% more Asian workers in the 
civilian labor force. However, if we examine individual employment by 
race, a different story emerges. While the number of Black individuals 
in the labor force has declined by 1.7%, Black or African American 
employment has shrunk by 3.8%. Hispanic employment has fallen by 1.9% 
relative to a 0.4% decline in the labor force. In other words, while white 
workers left the labor force at greater rates than Black, Hispanic or Asian 
workers, the declines in white employment relative to white departures 
from the labor force were smaller. This helps explain, in part, why the 
unemployment rate for whites has declined faster than other races. 
Graph 21 provides data on the change in the labor force and 
employment by race and gender. The number of white men in the labor 
force declined by 1.8% from February 2020 to October 2021. Over the 
4 https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-by-race-ethnicity/.
5 https://www.vdh.virginia.gov/coronavirus/covid-19-in-virginia/covid-19-cases-by-vaccination-status/.
same period, the number of Black men in the labor force rose by 0.3%. 
However, employment dropped by 2.6% and 1.8% for white and Black 
men, respectively. For women, the declines were more pronounced. 
The number of white and Black women in the labor force declined by 
2.5% and 3.5%, respectively, over the same period. While employment 
for white women declined by 3.6% from February 2020 to October 
2021, the number of Black women employed dropped by 5.4%. In other 
words, Black employment has experienced a more significant economic 
shock, especially when compared to the faster recovery in the Black 
labor force relative to the white labor force.
Table 2 presents the distribution of continuing claims for unemployment 
insurance in October 2019, 2020 and 2021. White workers experienced a 
smaller increase in continuing claims in the initial pandemic impact period 
compared to Black and Hispanic workers but have had a slower recovery. 
Compared to October 2019, continuing claims in October 2020 rose faster 
among Black and Hispanic workers relative to white workers. By October 
2021, continuing claims among white workers were 113.3% above the level 
of claims observed in October 2019, higher than those of Black workers 
(47.6%). 
If we examine continuing unemployment claims by gender, the disparities 
in both the initial pandemic impact period and recent recovery are 
apparent. Women comprised 50.8% of the total population in 2020 and 
accounted for 49.3% of all continuing claims in October 2019. The share 
of continuing claims filed by women rose to 54.3% in October 2020. By 
October 2021, their share had declined slightly to 53.6%. There are a few 
possible reasons why women continue to face a disproportionate burden 
in the labor market. While in-person schooling largely resumed in 2021, 
the delta variant-induced wave in infections in early spring 2021 led 
some women to hold off on returning to the workforce due to child care 
concerns. Also impeding the recovery for women was the decline in the 
availability of child care, with daycare centers struggling to fill positions. 
Unfortunately, child care constraints are unlikely to ease in 2022 as 
employers will continue to struggle to attract and retain labor.
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GRAPH 19
SARS-COV-2 (COVID-19) DEATHS BY RACE: 
VIRGINIA, JAN. 1, 2020-NOV. 13, 2021
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CHANGE IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY RACE: 
UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021
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GRAPH 21
CHANGE IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY SELECTED RACE AND GENDER: 
UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021





GRA H 21 
Change in Civilian Labor Force and Employment by Selected Race and Gender: 
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TABLE 2
CONTINUING CLAIMS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BY SELECTED DEMOGRAPHICS: VIRGINIA, 
OCTOBER 2019, OCTOBER 2020 AND OCTOBER 2021
Demographic Category








Percent of October 2021 
Continuing Claims
RACE/ETHNICITY
White 60.8% 9,557 55,165 20,386 43.6%
Black or African 
American
19.1% 7,434 51,524 10,975 23.4%
American Indian and 
Alaska Native
0.3% 94 602 170 0.4%
Asian 7.0% 517 7,476 926 2.0%
Hispanic or Latino 10.0% 168 613 7 0.0%
Other Races 2.9% 1,328 10,945 14,340 30.6%
AGE
16 to 22 years 6.6% 234 6,661 1,985 4.2%
22 to 24 years 4.0% 537 8,423 3,946 8.4%
25 to 34 years 13.9% 4,001 33,810 13,341 28.5%
35 to 44 years 13.1% 4,448 27,042 10,009 21.4%
45 to 54 years 12.6% 4,678 22,367 8,306 17.7%
55 to 64 years 13.0% 4,194 19,529 7,162 15.3%
65 years and over 16.3% 1,006 8,493 2,055 4.4%
GENDER
Male 49.2% 9,676 57,791 21,724 46.4%
Female 50.8% 9,422 68,534 25,080 53.6%
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Continuing claims cover 100% of total continuing claims for each month. U.S. Census Bureau, Vintage 
2020 Population Estimates. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and were created without incorporation or consideration of the 2020 Census results.
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Final Thoughts
With 2021 coming to a close, it is a good time to pause and reflect on the 
economic performance of the Commonwealth over the last 24 months. 
While conditions have dramatically improved from the depths of the 
pandemic’s economic shock in the spring of 2020, work remains to be 
done. In the short term, the task is to continue the recovery and establish 
the conditions whereby Virginia can grow faster in the coming years. 
In the longer term, we should examine the lessons and impacts of the 
pandemic and build our resilience in preparation for the next economic 
downturn. We can hope that the next economic shock is years away, but 
hope is not policy. 
What, then, should be done?
First, the Commonwealth must avoid the temptation to rapidly 
expand public spending and/or cut taxes without clear analysis of 
the costs and benefits. While some may point to the current state 
surplus as a windfall, we remind the reader that the surplus is, in 
part, due to conservative revenue projections formulated during the 
depths of the pandemic’s economic shock. The best courses of action 
are to direct any surplus to the revenue stabilization fund and to 
make productive public investments (such as continued investments 
in the Port of Virginia and the expansion of broadband throughout 
the Commonwealth). While the federal government may lack fiscal 
discipline or foresight, that is no reason for Virginia to follow in its 
footsteps.
Second, Virginia must continue to focus on improving its business climate 
and avoid increasing the regulatory burden on businesses that operate 
in the Commonwealth. The state should modernize its antiquated tax 
system to harmonize tax administration at the state and local level across 
Virginia. In the longer term, continued investments in human capital 
through the K-12 and public university systems will provide employers 
with a high-talent workforce. Building an apprentice system for those 
Virginians whose skills naturally lend themselves to the trades also 
benefits individuals, employers and the state.
Third, a continued focus on vaccinations and public health will benefit 
all of Virginia. With an estimated 162 COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 
residents, Virginia’s toll is the lowest among neighboring states. While 
the Commonwealth has not been perfect, it has avoided some of the 
rancor that has pervaded the discourse over COVID-19 in other states. 
Virginia should continue to allow employers to decide whether vaccine 
requirements are in their best interest and provide resources so that 
trusted representatives of the community can work to increase vaccination 
rates across the state. 
Lastly, a renewed focus on the Virginia Way will benefit us all. 
Fiscal discipline, comity and a commitment to democracy have proven 
successful in the Commonwealth for over 400 years. Not every step 
has been perfect, but the general arc of progress in the state has been 
moving forward. While we may disagree on many things, we should 
always keep in mind the ties that bind us and not be distracted by the 






If you ain’t first, you’re last.




n assessing the performance of Virginia’s 
metropolitan-area economies, one may 
be reminded of a car race. Throughout 
the race, cars jostle for position, but not all 
the competitors are equal. Some teams have 
multiple sponsors, cars and drivers. Others 
barely make it onto the track on race day. Yet, 
there is no guarantee that the best-resourced 
team will win on a given day. An ill-timed 
accident can change the entire complexion of 
the race, and an unexpected storm can cancel 
the entire event. Fans who boast how well their 
favorite cars are doing mid-race might find 
themselves regretting their braggadocio when 
the checkered flag drops. Sometimes, against 
the odds, an underdog can win the day.
The last two years have challenged observers 
of Virginia’s metropolitan areas. The 
expectations for strong growth in 2020 were 
dashed in the spring of 2020 by the COVID-19 
pandemic. The pandemic’s economic shock 
cast tens of thousands of Virginians onto 
the unemployment rolls, led to the closure of 
businesses and challenged our perceptions of 
how we should work and play. Now, as we near 
the close of 2021, the open question remains: 
How have Virginia’s metropolitan areas fared 
during the pandemic, and what are their 
prospects for recovery? Can we look forward to 
a proverbial fast track and accident-free race, 
or are some metros still back in the garage 
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Many indicators of economic performance suggest that Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas contracted in 2020 and began growing again, 
albeit at different speeds, in 2021. While metro-area measures of 
economic output for 2020 and 2021 are not yet available, we do know 
that individual employment peaked in early 2020, fell precipitously in 
the spring of 2020 and climbed out of the trough over the intervening 
months. The unemployment rate has declined from the pandemic peak 
in each of Virginia’s metros, and jobs have also increased from their 
lows. Population growth was uneven among the metro areas and 
well below the national average for most. Population and economic 
activity continue to shift toward Virginia’s urban crescent, defined 
by Northern Virginia, Richmond and Hampton Roads. These shifts, 
along with political currents, suggest that the Commonwealth is pulling 
apart, creating a challenge for current and future decision makers on 
how to spur development in those areas of the state that have been left 
behind.
The road ahead is neither straight nor lacking potential hazards. Northern 
Virginia and Hampton Roads are closely tied to the size and composition 
of federal government spending. While the federal government plans 
to spend more in 2022 (especially on defense), the question remains: 
How long can increases in defense spending continue? A shift in defense 
strategy toward the Pacific and the increasing vulnerability of large 
weapons systems (including carriers) threaten the level of defense 
spending in the Commonwealth. Even if one believes this spending will 
stay the same, there is the question of why some Virginians have chosen to 
seek their fortunes elsewhere. Domestic migration was negative for much 
of the last decade. The COVID-19 pandemic also reduced international 
tourism and migration, a source of growth for Northern Virginia and 
Hampton Roads.
The good news is that as vaccinations increase in the Commonwealth, 
nation and globally, it is reasonable to expect that flows of tourists and 
migrants will return in 2022. Vacation tourism has already rebounded 
off its lows and should continue to increase in the coming year. However, 
as services increasingly dominate the state’s economy and agriculture 
and mining wane in importance, the economic base of some metro areas 
continues to shrink. Creating equitable growth that benefits all Virginians 
while remaining a business-friendly state that attracts investment is a 
difficult balancing act. These challenges await the new Virginia General 
Assembly and lawmakers at the local government level.
To explore how Virginia is faring at the metropolitan level, we examine 
a number of economic performance measures: median household income, 
poverty, employment, wages and population. Each of these measures is 
available on a more frequent basis than gross domestic product (GDP), 
and they provide a more current picture of the economic activity in each 
metro area. We also present the most recent (but significantly lagged) 
data for metro-area GDP. From these measures, we work to construct as 
clear a picture as possible of the health of Virginia’s metropolitan-area 
economies.
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One difficulty in comparing metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) is 
that different government agencies and departments use different 
definitions for these areas. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
for example, has some data available for Northern Virginia, which 
is the Virginia portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-
VA-MD-WV MSA. Other data from the BLS are only available for the 
entire Washington-Arlington-Alexandria MSA. The U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) provides economic data on the performance 
of MSAs. However, the BLS, BEA and U.S. Census Bureau may use a 
different basis to define which counties and independent cities are in 
specific MSAs. Individual MSAs also see the addition and subtraction 
of counties and cities over time. In 2018, for example, the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) added Camden County in North 
Carolina, and Southampton County and the city of Franklin in Virginia, 
to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA.1 The reader should 
be aware of these geographical differences and exercise care when 
examining data from different sources, even if those sources are from 
the same department or agency. For comparability across different 
sources, we will use metropolitan-level data even if the metropolitan 
area crosses a state line, such as in the cases of Kingsport-Bristol, 




From 2000 to 2020, Virginia’s population increased at a faster rate 
than that of the nation. As illustrated in Graph 1, Virginia’s total 
population increased by 7.1%, 0.6 percentage points more than the United 
States. Among Virginia’s metropolitan areas, population growth varied 
significantly, from a 0.4% contraction in Kingsport-Bristol to an 11.4% 
increase in the Washington, D.C., metro area.
Population growth in six metro areas was slower than the state or the 
nation. Five of the six were smaller metros – Kingsport-Bristol (-0.4%), 
Roanoke (1.7%), Blacksburg-Christiansburg (2.5%), Lynchburg (4.5%) and 
Staunton (5.2%). Hampton Roads, with a population of 1.7 million in 2010, 
grew only by 3.7% to a population of 1.8 million in 2020. 
How then did the population of Virginia grow faster than the nation? 
First, while relatively small in population when compared to Richmond 
or Hampton Roads, the metros of Harrisonburg (8.1%), Charlottesville 
(8.9%) and Winchester (10.4%) grew more rapidly than the state or nation 
from 2010 to 2020. Second, the other two largest metro areas, Richmond 
and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, grew by 9.7% and 11.4%, 
respectively. 
Table 1 displays the components of population change for Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas, Virginia and the United States from 2010 to 2020. 
The U.S. Census breaks population change into two broad components: the 
natural increase in the population and net migration. The natural increase 
in the population is equal to births minus deaths. Net migration, on the 
other hand, consists of domestic migration and international migration. 
For example, if more people move into a metro area from overseas 
countries than depart the metro area for overseas destinations, then net 
international migration is positive (and vice versa). Turning first to the 
Commonwealth, the natural increase in the population from 2010 to 2020 
was positive, indicating more Virginians were born than died during this 
period. Even though net domestic migration was negative, it was more 
than compensated by net positive international migration.
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Graph 2 displays the annual level of net domestic and international 
migration from 2010 to 2020, as well as net migration, for the state. 
Net international migration peaked in 2015 at 39,097 individuals 
and then declined through 2020. Net domestic migration, on the 
other hand, was positive at the beginning of the previous decade, 
signaling that residents of other states sought better fortunes in the 
Commonwealth. Net domestic migration turned negative in 2014 
and bottomed out at -25,347 in 2015. While net domestic migration 
remained negative through 2020, the outflow of Virginians to other 
states ebbed somewhat. Although international migration more than 
offset domestic outmigration, negative domestic migration is not a 
positive signal of the Commonwealth’s attractiveness. However, when 
we examine the metropolitan-level data, we find that two regions 
were responsible for Virginia’s negative net domestic migration levels: 
Hampton Roads and the Washington, D.C., metro region.
Graph 3 displays the components of population change and the change in 
total population for the Virginia portion of Hampton Roads from 2010 to 
2020. While the population of Hampton Roads increased every year, the 
population grew only by 3.7% over this period. The natural increase in the 
population (births minus deaths) peaked at 10,175 in 2012 and declined 
to slightly less than 5,000 in 2020. Net domestic migration was negative 
every year and, in seven of the 11 years, net migration (international 
migration plus domestic migration) was also negative. In other words, 
Hampton Roads residents were “voting with their feet” with regard to 
economic conditions in the region.
Graph 4 displays a similar story for the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA (of which Northern Virginia is the largest entity). 
The natural increase in the population peaked at 49,161 in 2012 and was 
34,171 in 2020. While net domestic migration was positive from 2010 to 
2013, it turned negative in 2014 and has remained negative since. In 2020, 
about 31,000 more residents left this metro area than relocated to the 
region. Net migration, which was positive for most of the previous decade, 
was negative in 2018 and 2020. 
We must be careful to avoid painting the Hampton Roads and 
Washington, D.C., metros with the same brush. Hampton Roads’ 
economic growth over the previous decade was paltry at best, and the 
region has struggled to diversify its economic base from a dependence 
on federal government spending. While economic growth in the 
Washington, D.C., metro has not exactly been stellar, the region 
continues to attract private firms. In some aspects, the metro area’s 
success has led to a downside: higher than average cost of living. It 
should be no surprise that suburban areas of the Washington metro 
area have seen an influx of new residents who then commute to work 
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TABLE 1
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE:  
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
2010-2020
Natural Increase Net Domestic Migration Net International Migration Population Change
United States 12,257,668 -- 8,468,350 20,726,018
Virginia 366,671 -80,255 302,228 589,517
Blacksburg-Christiansburg 488 -1,925 5,736 4,285
Charlottesville 6,074 4,977 7,373 18,331
Harrisonburg 4,479 764 5,105 10,324
Kingsport-Bristol -10,468 8,928 467 -1,310
Lynchburg 1,634 5,799 4,395 11,732
Richmond 41,339 42,783 32,866 116,858
Roanoke -2,812 1,702 6,427 5,116
Staunton -889 5,340 1,564 5,977
Hampton Roads 83,925 -61,337 43,388 65,869
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria
463,701 -156,947 366,096 674,931
Winchester 3,444 7,962 2,194 13,568
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Vintage 2020 Population Estimates. National, state, and metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and were created 
without incorporation or consideration of the 2020 Census results. Population change includes a statistical residual and components may not sum to total population change as a result.
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GRAPH 2
NET DOMESTIC MIGRATION, NET INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION: 
VIRGINIA, 2010-2020
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Vintage 2020 Population Estimates. National, state, and metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and were created without 
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GRAPH 3
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE AND CHANGE IN TOTAL POPULATION: 
HAMPTON ROADS METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 2010-2020
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Vintage 2020 Population Estimates. National, state, and metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and were created without 
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GRAPH 4
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE AND CHANGE IN TOTAL POPULATION: 
WASHINGTON-ARLINGTON-ALEXANDRIA, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA, 2010-2020
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Vintage 2020 Population Estimates. National, state, and metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and were created without 
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Real Gross Domestic 
Product: New Data 
That’s Old
Table 2 presents real (inflation-adjusted) rates of growth for GDP, a 
measure of economic activity. The BEA produces the national, state, 
metropolitan area and county estimates of GDP, which provide a 
benchmark for economic activity over time. The metro-area estimates, 
especially those for 2020, should be viewed with an abundance of 
caution. The BEA released “advance” estimates for metro-area GDP 
for 2020 in December 2021. The advance estimates for 2020 are likely 
to be significantly revised (in light of the pandemic economic shock) in 
December 2022. With such a lag, we advise the reader to examine the 
underlying trends and focus less on the estimates for a specific year, which 
are likely to change in the next release. 
The real GDP data illustrate how economic performance lagged in the 
Commonwealth and among its metropolitan areas in the wake of the Great 
Recession and in the midst of budget sequestration and caps on federal 
discretionary spending. If anything, the initial years of the decade could 
be characterized as a “one step forward, one step back” recovery. What 
should be clear from the data is that a number of metro areas in the 
Commonwealth struggled to generate consistent growth over the decade 
and these woes are likely to persist in the coming years. The past may 
indeed be a prologue.
From 2010 to 2020, there was not a single year when all the metro areas 
in the Commonwealth experienced economic growth. More recently, in 
2016, all the metros except Staunton saw an increase in real GDP. In 2017, 
it was all the metros except Roanoke. In 2018, we see the same story: all 
the metros experiencing growth except for Hampton Roads. It should be 
no surprise that Virginia’s real GDP growth lagged behind the nation’s 
over the last decade.
The advance estimates of metro GDP also highlight the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Among the smaller metros, Lynchburg’s real GDP 
contracted by 5.6% from 2019 to 2020. Among the larger metros, the 
largest decline was observed in Hampton Roads, even though defense 
spending in the region increased in 2020. Only Winchester appeared to 
escape a significant contraction in metro GDP, with only a 0.1% decline 
from 2019 to 2020.
In all likelihood, the advance estimates are likely to change significantly 
in the coming years. We suspect that these estimates will be revised 
downward, especially given the impact of the pandemic on employment. 
The larger story, however, is that the pandemic wiped away the gains 
in real GDP over the last decade for a number of metros. Anemic pre-
pandemic growth coupled with the pandemic’s economic shock meant that, 
in some cases, metro GDP contracted for these regions over the recently 
concluded decade.
How we recover from this economic shock is one of the most significant 
policy questions facing Virginia in the coming years. The increasing 
concentration of population and economic activity in the urban crescent 
and, in particular, Northern Virginia and Richmond, is creating “two 
Virginias.” Political and economic divisions will only sharpen in the coming 
years unless we have honest discussions about how to improve growth 
across Virginia over the coming decades. 
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TABLE 2
REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: 
YEAR-ON-YEAR RATES OF GROWTH, 2010-2020
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CAGR 
2010-2020
United States 2.7% 1.5% 2.3% 1.8% 2.3% 2.7% 1.7% 2.3% 2.9% 2.3% -3.4% 1.6%
Virginia 3.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% -0.3% 1.7% 1.1% 1.5% 2.4% 2.0% -2.8% 0.7%
Blacksburg-Christiansburg 1.5% 3.3% -1.6% 0.6% 0.5% 3.1% -0.1% 2.3% 5.1% -1.9% -3.2% 0.8%
Charlottesville 5.5% 0.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 3.0% 1.7% 5.1% 2.6% 0.2% -4.1% 1.0%
Harrisonburg 6.4% 0.5% 1.1% 2.2% -4.6% -3.1% -3.7% 2.3% 2.5% 2.1% -0.9% -0.2%
Kingsport-Bristol -0.4% 2.4% 0.6% -2.1% -3.5% 1.7% 1.2% 3.5% 0.9% -2.9% -4.0% -0.3%
Lynchburg 4.7% -2.1% -2.8% 0.0% -1.1% 0.2% -1.2% 1.1% 4.8% -0.2% -5.6% -0.7%
Richmond 2.6% 2.5% 1.8% 2.3% 0.8% 3.6% 1.4% 1.5% 2.0% 2.0% -2.5% 1.5%
Roanoke 1.6% -0.4% -0.5% 1.8% 1.4% 1.9% -1.7% -1.1% 1.5% -1.3% -3.0% -0.1%
Staunton 1.6% -3.2% -4.4% 3.0% -1.0% -0.2% -0.5% 0.6% 1.1% 0.8% -2.1% -0.6%
Hampton Roads 0.4% -0.6% -1.2% 0.7% -1.3% 1.4% 0.6% 0.0% -0.8% 1.2% -3.9% -0.4%
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria
4.7% 1.8% 0.5% -0.1% 1.0% 2.0% 2.6% 1.8% 2.1% 1.4% -2.8% 1.0%
Winchester 3.6% 0.3% -0.1% 2.8% -0.7% 4.1% 1.7% 0.1% 2.4% 2.1% -0.1% 1.2%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2021. Base year for real GDP is 2012. Year-on-year rate of growth is the compound annual growth rate (CAGR).
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Personal Incomes Rise 
(Slowly) Across The 
Commonwealth
Personal income measures the income that residents of a geographical 
area receive from paychecks, employer-provided benefits such as 
insurance, business ownership, rental properties, Social Security and other 
public benefits, interest and dividends.2 At the state and metropolitan-
area level, personal income captures the combined personal incomes of 
residents, including those who work outside the geographical boundaries 
of the metro area or state. To compare personal income per capita across 
geographical regions and time, we need to not only adjust for the influence 
of inflation in general, but also differences in regional prices relative to the 
national average. 
Table 3 presents real (inflation-adjusted) personal income per capita that 
is also adjusted for regional price differences for the Commonwealth’s 
metropolitan areas, Virginia and the United States from 2010 to 2019. 
Over this period, real personal income per capita grew at an annual 
average of 2% in the United States, 0.5 percentage points higher than 
Virginia. Among Virginia’s metro areas, only Charlottesville (2.7%) had a 
higher annual average rate of growth than the nation. Richmond (1.9%), 
Blacksburg-Christiansburg (1.7%), Harrisonburg (1.7%) and Winchester 
(1.6%) all grew faster than the state average of 1.5%. Hampton Roads and 
the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria metro area grew at approximately 
the state average. As the Commonwealth lagged the nation, this 
performance was nothing to write home about.
2 Bureau of Economic Analysis (2021), https://www.bea.gov/resources/learning-center/what-to-know-income-saving.
TABLE 3
REAL PERSONAL INCOME PER CAPITA AND COMPOUND 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, VIRGINIA AND 





United States $42,367 $51,424 2.0%




Charlottesville $49,082 $64,141 2.7%




Lynchburg $38,319 $41,994 0.9%
Richmond $46,601 $56,181 1.9%
Roanoke $43,107 $48,710 1.2%
Staunton $43,419 $47,545 0.9%





Winchester $41,878 $49,271 1.6%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old 
Dominion University. Real personal income is personal income divided by regional price parities and the 
national Personal Consumption Expenditures price index. Real personal income per capita is equal to total 
real personal income divided by total midyear population, expressed in chained 2012 dollars.
53
More troubling from an economic development perspective is the lack 
of personal income per capita growth among some of the smaller 
metropolitan areas in the Commonwealth. These metros are growing 
slower in terms of population and income – not a winning combination 
in the long run. As the last decade has shown, moving the needle on 
this situation has inspired a great deal of rhetoric but little in the 
way of measurable progress. The variation in real per capita growth 
rates highlights the challenge facing the new governor and General 
Assembly: Can the Commonwealth spur economic growth outside the 
urban crescent? We continue to argue for investments in improving 
primary and secondary education, providing access to broadband 
and addressing infrastructure issues to lay the foundation for more 
equitable growth throughout the state.
We caution to avoid expansions of entitlement programs or significant 
new tax expenditures. While these may produce short-term benefits, 
we point to success stories in other states that have taken a longer 
view. Virginia is well positioned to continue to improve its workforce 
and to reduce administrative and regulatory burdens to improve 
private-sector job creation. The challenge is to avoid the temptations 
of the moment and focus on those efforts whose rewards are further in 
the future.
3  The Current Population Survey (CPS) covers households and asks whether an individual was employed or actively seeking employment. The Current Establishment Survey (CES) covers businesses and reports the number of jobs. An 
individual who is employed with two jobs would be counted once in the CPS and twice in the CES.
4  The civilian labor force consists of employed persons and unemployed persons. The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines employed persons as “persons who did any work for pay or profit during the survey reference week; persons 
who did at least 15 hours of unpaid work in a family-operated enterprise; and persons who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, bad weather, industrial dispute, or various personal reasons.” 
The BLS classifies persons as unemployed “if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not working and were waiting to be recalled to a job 
from which they had been temporarily laid off are also included as unemployed.” For more information, see https://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm.
Civilian Labor Force: 
Where Is Everyone?
How has the pandemic affected the number of people working in Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas? There are two broad measures we can examine to 
answer this question: individual employment and nonfarm payrolls (jobs). 
Employment data capture responses by individuals to the questions of 
whether they are employed, looking for work or have abandoned attempts 
at finding employment. Nonfarm payroll data measure the number of 
jobs in an economy. A person who has two jobs would appear once in the 
employment data but twice in the jobs data.3 One of the advantages of 
labor market data is that that these numbers are more current than many 
other measures of economic activity.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics asks people about their employment status. 
If an individual is employed or looking for work, the BLS reports that he 
or she is in the civilian labor force.4 An expanding labor force is a sign 
that more people are available for work or working in a geographical area 
and is typically correlated with economic growth. A stagnant or declining 
labor force may be a signal that a region is struggling to attract and retain 
labor; simply put, workers are seeking better fortunes elsewhere.
Graph 5 displays the growth in the civilian labor force for Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas, Virginia and the United States from January 2010 
to February 2020. Virginia’s civilian labor force grew by 7.5% over this 
period, 0.4 percentage points higher than the nation. This growth was 
powered, in part, by two of the three largest metro areas: Richmond 
(11.6%) and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria (13.5%). For the second-
largest area in the Commonwealth, the Hampton Roads region, the civilian 
labor force grew by 5.6%, 1.9 percentage points lower than the state.  
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Among Virginia’s smaller metropolitan areas, Winchester (17.6%), 
Charlottesville (12.1%) and Harrisonburg (8.4%) outperformed the state 
average. However, three metro areas – Blacksburg (4.6%), Staunton 
(3.9%) and Roanoke (1.5%) – grew slower than the state. Further, two 
metros, Lynchburg (-0.3%) and Kingsport-Bristol (-4.9%), saw their labor 
forces contract over the January 2010 to February 2020 period. 
Graph 6 reflects the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the civilian 
labor force in Virginia’s metro areas, Virginia and the United States 
from February 2020 to October 2021. It is immediately apparent that the 
labor force has contracted more in the Commonwealth than the nation. 
Winchester was the only metro area to outperform the nation in terms of 
the recovery of its labor force relative to February 2020. 
The departure of workers from the civilian labor force in Virginia is a 
puzzle that has generated much discussion but little resolution. People 
who have left the labor force entirely do not qualify for unemployment 
benefits. Virginia’s COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations and deaths 
are lower on a per capita basis than many Southern states, and 
vaccination rates are, on average, higher. The “fear of COVID-19” 
hypothesis seems to have little weight in the face of these data. 
National data suggest that women have left the labor force at greater 
rates than their male counterparts, so it is likely we are witnessing a 
similar impact in the Commonwealth. We suspect it is a confluence of 
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GRAPH 6
PERCENT CHANGE IN THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
FEBRUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey and Local Area Unemployment Statistics, seasonally adjusted data. Hampton Roads refers to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. 
(NOTE: Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol has 
not used the second Bristol in previous 
references in the chapter)
Need linked Excel file to fix
Graph 6 
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Virginia’s Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Virginia, and the United States 
February 20  – October 2 1 
 




































Graph 7 illustrates the change in individual employment among Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas from January 2010 to February 2020. This time period 
approximates the post-Great Recession trough and the prepandemic 
peak. A familiar story emerges from this data. Two of the largest metro 
areas, Richmond and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, saw individual 
employment grow faster than the state or the nation. Winchester, 
Charlottesville and Harrisonburg also outperformed the state and nation. 
Blacksburg-Christiansburg, Hampton Roads and Staunton were relatively 
close to the Commonwealth’s performance, with double-digit growth over 
the period. The Roanoke, Lynchburg and Kingsport-Bristol metro areas 
lagged much further behind, reinforcing the perception that economic 
prospects were lacking in these regions.
Graph 8 shows the percentage change in individual employment from 
the prepandemic peak in February 2020 to October 2021. Two regions, 
Winchester and Kingsport-Bristol, fared better than the nation. The rest 
of Virginia’s metropolitan areas lagged behind the nation in recovering 
from the pandemic’s shock to individual employment. 
In February 2020, the unemployment rate in Virginia’s metropolitan 
areas was below 4% and, in the majority of metros, below 3% (Graph 9). 
The discussion in early 2020 centered on how employers would grapple 
with increasingly scarce labor and whether labor scarcity would slow 
Virginia’s economic expansion. The pandemic’s economic shock turned 
this discussion on its proverbial head, with unemployment rates spiking 
into the double digits in the spring of 2020. Fortunately, a reopening 
and recovery brought unemployment rates down into the single digits in 
the summer of 2020. Graph 10 displays the unemployment rate among 
Virginia’s metros in October 2021.
While unemployment rates have not returned to prepandemic levels, 
one could say that, in some cases, they are within shouting distance. 
However, given that the labor force has declined among Virginia’s 
metros, we should caution that the unemployment rates are biased 
downward. If one were to treat those who have left the labor force 
as unemployed, unemployment rates across the Commonwealth would 
be closer to 8% than 4%. The challenge over the coming months is 
to sustain the recovery in individual employment and to induce those 
who have left the labor force to return. Failing that, the recovery may 
plateau in Virginia in 2022 as workers become increasingly scarce.
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GRAPH 7
PERCENT CHANGE IN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
JANUARY 2010-FEBRUARY 2020
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GRAPH 8
PERCENT CHANGE IN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
FEBRUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey and Local Area Unemployment Statistics, seasonally adjusted data. Hampton Roads refers to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. 
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GRAPH 9
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 
FEBRUARY 2020 






































VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 
OCTOBER 2021
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey and Local Area Unemployment Statistics, seasonally adjusted data. Hampton Roads refers to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. 
Graph 10 
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We first present the percentage change in nonfarm payrolls (jobs) from 
January 2010 to February 2020 for Virginia’s metropolitan areas, Virginia 
and the United States (Graph 11). Over this period, the number of jobs in 
the Commonwealth increased by 13.1%, 4.4 percentage points below that 
of the United States. The lingering effects of the Great Recession were 
compounded by the effects of federal budget sequestration and subsequent 
caps on federal discretionary spending. As the decade wound on, Virginia’s 
job growth picked up, but it remained behind that of the nation.
At the metro level, Richmond (17.7%), Charlottesville (20.2%) and 
Winchester (25.2%) outpaced the nation in terms of job creation 
over the period. Washington-Arlington-Alexandria (14.4%) and 
Harrisonburg (14.6%) saw larger increases in the number of jobs than 
the Commonwealth but lagged the performance of the United States. 
More troubling was the performance of some of the smaller metro areas. 
Lynchburg (3.5%), Kingsport-Bristol (4.3%) and Roanoke (6.6%) saw 
increases in jobs, but the pace of job creation lagged considerably behind 
the state. Staunton (9.1%), Hampton Roads (9.3%) and Blacksburg-
Christiansburg (10.9%) were closer to the state average, but their 
performances were nothing to brag about.
Graph 12 examines the percentage change in jobs from February 2020 
to October 2021. What is immediately apparent is that two metro areas, 
Winchester and Blacksburg-Christiansburg, have not only recovered 
all the jobs lost during the pandemic, but also created additional jobs. 
Staunton (-0.4%) had almost recovered its lost jobs in October 2021, 
followed by Harrisonburg (-1.9%). Kingsport-Bristol and Roanoke 
outperformed the nation and the state but were still 3% (or more) 
below February 2020 job levels. For some smaller metros, the recovery 
in jobs has been more robust than one might have expected, given their 
performance over the previous decade. 
The three largest metropolitan areas in the Commonwealth have 
struggled to regain all the jobs they lost during the pandemic. 
Richmond (-6.2%), Hampton Roads (-4.8%) and Washington-
Arlington-Alexandria (-3.7%) have all suffered significant job losses 
in the leisure and hospitality industry as well as education and health 
services. If there is a modicum of good news it is that increasing 
vaccination rates should lead to higher levels of domestic and 
international travel in 2022. Until these metro areas pick up the pace 
of recovery, the Commonwealth will continue to lag behind the nation 
in terms of job recovery.
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GRAPH 11
PERCENT CHANGE IN NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
JANUARY 2010-FEBRUARY 2020
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GRAPH 12
PERCENT CHANGE IN NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
FEBRUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Establishment Survey and State Employment and Unemployment, seasonally adjusted data 
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Final Thoughts
Thinking of Virginia’s metropolitan areas as race cars can be helpful in 
visualizing a major challenge facing the Commonwealth. Some metro 
areas are trying to race but lack a pit crew and trained driver, and, at 
times, must pull into the economic garage. Other metros, with a talented 
team and veteran driver, have built a car that is firing on all cylinders and 
lapping other competitors. If the Commonwealth is to share a destiny, the 
challenge will be not only to get all the metros in the proverbial economic 
race, but also to equip them with the resources necessary to “go fast.”
In the coming year, increases in defense spending are likely to drive 
economic growth in Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia. Rebounds 
in domestic and international tourism will benefit these metro areas as 
well. Some of the smaller metros are exhibiting signs of a robust economic 
recovery. In these areas, employment is nearing the prepandemic high, 
and jobs are almost completely recovered. In Winchester’s case, a new 
expansion appears to have begun. However, we must not forget that some 
metro areas struggled to generate jobs prior to the pandemic, and their 
prospects for a sustained recovery are not as bright in 2022.
Virginia can act to improve regional outcomes if it chooses to do so. 
We continue to offer the following suggestions. Targeted investments 
in infrastructure are necessary to promote economic development and 
attract new businesses. Improving the quality of education, including 
investments in physical infrastructure, is necessary to produce a 
workforce that can compete in an increasingly globalized economy. 
Virginia’s antiquated tax structure must be reformed to compete with 
neighboring states. Regulatory relief, or at least regulatory clarity, 
is also a necessary component of economic growth. Lastly, regional 
collaboration should be more than a slogan. The Commonwealth 
should continue to promote regional collaborations through efforts 
like GO Virginia. These recommendations are not new, but until 
Virginia acts, they bear repeating.
BOUNCE BACK? 
THE PANDEMIC AND 
TOURISM IN VIRGINIA
All was black, gloomy and awful. There was 
no light at the end of the tunnel – or if there 
was, it was an oncoming train.




or the hotel industry in Virginia, the 
last 24 months have been a period that 
many will not look upon nostalgically 
in future years. Prior to those two years, 
however, it was a different story. In 2019, 
traditional hotels reported a record $4.1 billion 
in revenue. The longest economic expansion 
since World War II, February 2010 to February 
2020, continued to power increasing levels of 
tourism, business travel and large conventions 
throughout many of Virginia’s metropolitan 
areas. The entry of short-term rentals in 
the previous decade, led by Airbnb, posed a 
challenge to the traditional hotel industry and 
local policymakers, but hoteliers remained 
optimistic for their prospects in 2020 and 
beyond. 
By now, the tale of spring 2020 is familiar to 
the reader. The COVID-19 pandemic led to 
dramatic declines in economic activity in the 
Commonwealth and the nation beginning in 
March and April 2020. Hotel revenue in April 
2020 was $75.1 million in Virginia, 80% less 
than the $378.5 million recorded the previous 
year. Northern Virginia observed some of the 
most significant declines in hotel traffic, with 
revenue falling from $175.7 million in April 
2019 to $23.1 million in April 2020. Throughout 
the Commonwealth, hotel occupancy rates 
dropped below 32% in April 2020 as domestic 
and international travel fell to record lows. 
Hotels had to furlough staff, reduce room 
inventories and, in some cases, close altogether. 
The proverbial economic tunnel was dark, and 
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the sense of optimism from just a year ago was replaced with a grim hope 
that things could not get any worse.
Yet, for all the darkness of spring 2020, we now stand in a different place. 
The Emergency Use Authorization of COVID-19 vaccines in late 2020 
and early 2021 has led to a marked reduction in the rates of infection, 
hospitalization and death among the fully vaccinated when compared to 
the unvaccinated. While the rise of the COVID-19 delta variant in the 
summer of 2021 dampened consumer sentiment, the 2021 summer surge 
predominantly affected the unvaccinated, increasing confidence in the 
efficacy of the vaccines. And new evidence indicates that an additional 
booster shot of the COVID-19 vaccine is over 90% effective for those who 
had previously been fully vaccinated. By fall 2021, over 80% of the U.S. 
population 12 and older had received at least one vaccination dose, and 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration was seeking approval of new anti-
viral treatments. 
The performance of the hotel industry has been closely correlated 
with public perceptions over the course of the pandemic. As consumer 
and business sentiment and activity have improved in 2021, hoteliers 
have observed an uptick in demand. In September 2021, hotel revenue 
in Virginia was 8% lower than September 2019, but there was 
substantial regional variation. Hotel revenue eclipsed 2019 levels 
in Hampton Roads, even in the face of reported labor shortages in 
the industry. Northern Virginia remains below its 2019 levels, but 
it has improved from the lows of 2020. With continued increases 
in vaccinations nationally and globally, expectations for 2021 are 
improving, especially in areas dependent on business- and convention-
oriented travel. Barring an unexpected economic shock or a COVID-19 
variant that renders vaccines largely ineffective, there is indeed a light 
at the end of the tunnel.
In this chapter, we explore the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
hotel industry in the Commonwealth of Virginia. We delve into the impact 
on traditional hotels and compare their performance with that of short-
term rental properties (Airbnb, Vrbo and others). While there is much to 
be optimistic about for 2022, there are long-term challenges that must be 
1 We use the compound annual growth rate, which is equal to ((end value/beginning value)^(1/number of periods))-1 to estimate the annual average growth in hotel revenues.
addressed to complete the recovery and start a new expansion of Virginia’s 
hotel industry.
2019: A Year To Remember
2019 and 2020 were years for the history books for the tourism industry 
in the Commonwealth, albeit for dramatically different reasons. 2019 
was a year in which hotel revenue set a new record and traditional hotels 
continued to move upscale. The following year was one that many in the 
hotel industry would like to forget, marked by record declines in revenue, 
occupancy and staffing.
Graph 1 displays nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) hotel revenue for 
the Commonwealth from 2000 to 2019. Nominal hotel revenue peaked at 
$3.1 billion prior to the Great Recession of 2007-2009, but did not recover 
from the recession until 2013. From 2013 to 2019, nominal hotel revenue 
increased from $3.1 billion to $4.1 billion. After adjusting for inflation, 
hotel revenue in Virginia grew at an annual average rate of 3.1% from 
2013 to 2019.1
Graph 2 presents the shares of major markets in the Commonwealth in 
2019. Not surprisingly, three areas – Hampton Roads, Northern Virginia 
and Richmond – generated the largest levels of hotel revenue in 2019. 
Northern Virginia accounted for 43.2% of hotel revenue in Virginia, 
followed by Hampton Roads (21.9%) and Richmond (12.2%). The next-
largest market area in 2019 was Charlottesville, which accounted for 
3.2% of hotel revenue. Markets outside the urban crescent collectively 
accounted for approximately 23% of hotel revenue statewide in the year 
prior to the pandemic.
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GRAPH 1
NOMINAL AND REAL HOTEL REVENUE: 
VIRGINIA, 2000-2019
Sources: STR Trend Reports, January 2017 and January 2021; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Base years for the consumer price index are 1982-1984.
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GRAPH 2
ESTIMATED SHARES OF HOTEL ROOM REVENUE: 
VIRGINIA, 2019









Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR considers 






























































































2020: A Year To Forget
To say the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the hotel 
industry in Virginia would be an understatement. Annual hotel 
revenue declined from $4.1 billion in 2019 to $2.1 billion in 2020, a 
drop of approximately 47.9%, mirroring that of the nation (49.4%). 
However, much of this decline was driven by Northern Virginia. From 
2019 to 2020, annual hotel revenue in Northern Virginia declined 
by 62.1% (Graph 3). Richmond, the third-largest market in Virginia, 
saw annual revenue fall by 41.2%, while revenue in Hampton Roads 
declined only 35.2%. Times were indeed bleak when one considered a 
35%-plus decline in hotel revenue as better-than-average performance.
The annual data mask the extent to which hotel revenue collapsed in 
Northern Virginia during the depths of the pandemic. Monthly hotel 
revenue declined from $109.6 million in February 2020 to $23.1 million in 
April 2020 (Graph 4). In other words, in the span of two months, hotel 
revenue dropped 78.9% in Northern Virginia. While hotel revenue has 
rebounded from the 2020 lows, the industry has not completely recovered 
from the pandemic. September 2021 revenue was 83.8% higher than 
September 2020, but also was 38.8% percent lower than the same month 
in 2019. One has reason to be optimistic for the continued recovery in 
Northern Virginia, but there still is a hill to climb before the recovery is 
complete.
Why did many of the markets in the Commonwealth fare relatively 
better in 2020 than the nation, and why did Northern Virginia fare 
significantly worse? While the number of hotel rooms rented fell 
across the Commonwealth, the declines were not as bad as elsewhere, 
with the exceptions of Northern Virginia and Charlottesville (Graph 
5). In Northern Virginia, hotel rooms rented in 2020 fell by nearly 
50% when compared to 2019 and, for most of 2020, occupancy rates 
were below 40%. Hotels in Northern Virginia rely more on business 
traffic, international tourism and conventions than those in other 
areas of the Commonwealth. If there is a modicum of good news, it is 
that we expect these types of travel to continue to recover in 2022, a 
projection which bodes well for Northern Virginia hotels.
RevPAR is a key measure of performance in the hotel industry as it 
represents both the demand (revenue) and supply (available rooms) 
sides of the market. As displayed in Graph 6, RevPAR declined by almost 
47% from 2019 to 2020 in Virginia. It must be pointed out that the 
actual declines in RevPAR were likely higher, since many hotels either 
significantly reduced the supply of rooms or closed temporarily during the 
depths of the pandemic. In any case, hotel rooms in the Commonwealth 
earned about 50% less in 2020 than they did in 2019. 
Yet, we would be remiss if we did not point out the large and 
negative downward influence of the Northern Virginia market on 
this measure. RevPAR in Northern Virginia declined an astonishing 
59.5% from 2019 to 2020. Given that Northern Virginia accounted 
for approximately 43.2% of hotel revenue in the Commonwealth prior 
to the pandemic, its lagging performance in 2020 impacted Virginia’s 
overall negative performance. 
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GRAPH 3
PERCENT CHANGE IN HOTEL REVENUE IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
VIRGINIA METROS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2019-2020





Percent Change in Hotel Revenue in Selected Markets: 
Virginia Metros, Virginia and the United States, 2019-2020 
 
 
Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR considers 


























NOMINAL MONTHLY HOTEL REVENUE: 
NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2019-SEPTEMBER 2021
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GRAPH 5
PERCENT CHANGE IN HOTEL ROOMS RENTED IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
VIRGINIA METROS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2019-2020





Percent Change in otel Rooms ented in Selected arkets: 
Virginia Metros, Virginia and the United States, 2019-2020 
 
 
Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR considers 
these metros representing one market.   

























PERCENT CHANGE IN REVENUE PER AVAILABLE ROOM IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
VIRGINIA METROS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2019-2020
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2021: A Recovery Underway
Virginia hotels fared better than most of their counterparts in major U.S. 
markets this year. Graph 7 highlights the percentage change in monthly 
hotel revenue for selected months and markets from 2019 to 2021. We 
choose 2019 as the basis of comparison because the shock in 2020 would 
bias our conclusions about the progress of the recovery. Hotel revenue for 
Virginia was 8% lower in September 2021 than the same month in 2019. 
However, the statewide data obscure the performance of the Richmond 
and Hampton Roads markets. In Richmond, hotel revenue was 11% higher 
in September 2021 when compared to September 2019. In Hampton 
Roads, revenue was up 21% in September 2021 relative to the same month 
in 2019. Richmond and Hampton Roads had not only recovered from the 
pandemic economic shock, but they were also setting new records in the 
summer and fall of 2021.
Why did the markets in Richmond and Hampton Roads, and others in 
the Commonwealth, fare better than the markets in Northern Virginia 
and Charlottesville? Some insight can be gained by examining the 
distribution of hotel rooms according to class. More than half of the hotel 
rooms in Northern Virginia and Charlottesville are upscale, compared to 
approximately a third in Hampton Roads and Richmond. As displayed in 
Graph 8, economy and midscale hotels have outperformed upscale hotels 
in 2021. Economy and midscale hotels typically cater to leisure travelers 
rather than business or convention travelers. As such, it should be no 
surprise that these hotels recovered faster than upscale hotels as we 
progressed further into 2021.
How has the recovery been in 2021? By September, many of the 
hotel industry markets in Virginia had either completely recovered 
or a recovery was in sight. We can compare year-to-date revenue 
per available room in 2019 and 2021 to gain more insight into this 
recovery (Graph 9). Nationally, RevPAR from January to September 
2021 was 21.1% lower than for the same period in 2019. In Virginia, 
year-to-date RevPAR was 47.5% lower in Northern Virginia. On 
the other hand, RevPAR in Richmond was down 13.6% and up 
6.7% in Hampton Roads. In this one industry, Hampton Roads was 
outperforming the state and the nation. That, in itself, is a measure 
of good news for a region that struggled to generate economic growth 
over the previous decade.
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GRAPH 7
PERCENT CHANGE IN MONTHLY HOTEL REVENUE:  
UNITED STATES, VIRGINIA, NORTHERN VIRGINIA, RICHMOND AND HAMPTON ROADS, 
2019-2021





Percent Change in Monthly Hotel Revenue:  
United States, Virginia, Northern Virginia, Richmond and Hampton Roads, 
 2019-2021 
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GRAPH 8
PERCENT CHANGE IN MONTHLY HOTEL REVENUE IN UNITED STATES 
UPPER UPSCALE, MIDSCALE AND ECONOMY CHAIN HOTELS, 2019-2021
Sources: STR Monthly Trend Reports and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
HOTELS CHAPTER GRAPHS 
Graph 8 
Percent Change in Monthly Hotel Revenue in United States 
































Percent Change in Monthly U.S. Hotel Revenue: 
Upscale, Midscale and Economy Chain Hotels, 2019-2021 
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GRAPH 9 
PERCENT CHANGE IN REVENUE PER AVAILABLE ROOM IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
VIRGINIA METROS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
YEAR-TO-DATE SEPTEMBER 2019 - YEAR-TO-DATE SEPTEMBER 2021
Sources: STR Monthly Trend Report for September 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR considers these metros 
representing one market.  
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GRAPH 9  
Percent Change in Revenue Per Available Room in Selected Markets: 
Virginia Metros, Virginia and the United States, 
Year-to-Date September 2019 to Year-to-Date September 2021 
 
Sources: STR Monthly Trend Report for September 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, 
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Airbnb Makes Its Way 
Through The Pandemic
The rise of Airbnb from its humble beginnings is a remarkable story. 
Starting with the rental of an air mattress in San Francisco in 2008, 
Airbnb is now one of the largest (if not the largest) short-term rental 
companies in terms of listings, funding and name recognition. Airbnb 
continues to expand its business model, offering “experiences” (hosted 
tours) and an increasing number of connections to travel websites. To 
track Airbnb’s activities in Hampton Roads, we use data from AirDNA, a 
private company not associated with Airbnb, to examine listings, revenue 
and occupancy of Airbnb-hosted properties.2
Graph 10 illustrates the meteoric rise of Airbnb in Virginia. In October 
2014, the first month for which data are available, Airbnb revenue was 
approximately $1.5 million. By 2016, peak monthly revenue had reached 
$9.3 million, jumping to $32.6 million by 2018. In 2019, peak monthly 
revenue climbed to $43.8 million. Airbnb revenue in July 2020 set yet 
another record, $47.4 million, coinciding with the “reopening” of Virginia’s 
economy. One year later, Airbnb revenue reached $59.2 million.
We can further visualize the growth of Airbnb in Virginia when we look at 
the ratio of Airbnb revenue to the traditional hotel industry (Graph 11). 
In October 2014, Airbnb revenue was equal to only 0.5% of the traditional 
hotel industry. By August 2019, Airbnb revenue was equivalent to 11.1% of 
hotel industry revenue. The sharp increase in the ratio of Airbnb’s revenue 
to traditional hotel revenue in the first half 2020 was not driven by an 
expansion of Airbnb properties. The sudden collapse of hotel occupancy 
and revenue in the spring of 2020, while Airbnb revenue remained 
relatively constant, might create the false impression that Airbnb revenue 
increased markedly in the initial months of the pandemic. As the hotel 
industry in the Commonwealth has continued to recover, the ratio of 
Airbnb revenue to traditional hotel revenue has returned to more typical 
levels.
Graph 12 presents the shares of Airbnb revenue for major metropolitan 
areas in Virginia for 2019. Hampton Roads dominated Airbnb listings 
2 As Airbnb does not provide open access to its data, AirDNA tracks the performance of listings and predicts whether properties are booked or not. For more information, see www.airdna.co/methodology.
and revenue, accounting for 29.2% of Airbnb revenue in 2019. Northern 
Virginia (21.3%) and Charlottesville (13.4%) were the next two largest 
markets in the Commonwealth for that year, followed by Richmond (5.7%), 
Blacksburg (4.9%), Lynchburg (4.8%) and Staunton/Harrisonburg (3.9%). 
The other areas of Virginia accounted for about 15.2% of Airbnb revenue 
in 2019.    
From 2019 to 2020, Airbnb revenue increased by 4.4% in the 
Commonwealth but, as with the hotel data, there is substantial 
variation at the regional market level (Graph 13). Hampton Roads, 
the largest Airbnb market in Virginia, saw revenue decline by 7.3%, 
far less than the traditional hotel industry. In Richmond and Northern 
Virginia, Airbnb revenue declined 7.4% and 14.2%, respectively. 
Some markets, on the other hand (Lynchburg, Roanoke, Staunton/
Harrisonburg), saw double-digit increases in revenue even as 
traditional hotels struggled in these markets. If there is one conclusion 
to draw, it is that Airbnb properties outperformed traditional hotel 
properties in 2020.
Accounting for approximately 5 of every 10 dollars in Airbnb revenue 
in 2019, Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia were the focal points of 
Airbnb activity in the state. In Hampton Roads, Airbnb revenue fell by 
$7.4 million in 2020 when compared to 2019, but declines were not spread 
evenly throughout the year. As illustrated in Graph 14, peak revenues 
in 2019 and 2020 were essentially the same, at $16.7 million and $16.9 
million, respectively. However, monthly revenues were lower in the fall 
of 2020 and winter of 2021, declining to $2.3 million in February 2021. 
The good news is that Airbnb revenue recovered sharply, reaching a new 
record of $19 million in Hampton Roads in July 2021. 
In Northern Virginia, Airbnb revenue declined by $10.4 million in 2020 
when compared to 2019. Comparing the first nine months of the year for 
Airbnb in Northern Virginia, revenue declined from $55.2 million in 2019 
to $45.7 million in 2020. As shown in Graph 15, peak monthly revenue 
declined from $7.2 million in 2019 to $6.4 million in July 2020. However, 
monthly Airbnb revenue for Northern Virginia bounced back in the spring 
of 2021. Monthly revenue set a new record at $9.1 million in July 2021 and 
remained above 2020 levels through September 2021.  
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GRAPH 10
MONTHLY AIRBNB REVENUE IN VIRGINIA, 
OCTOBER 2014-SEPTEMBER 2021




Monthly Airbnb Revenue in Virginia, 
October 2014-September 1 
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GRAPH 11
AIRBNB REVENUE AS A PERCENT OF HOTEL REVENUE: 
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014-SEPTEMBER 2021




Airbnb Revenue as a Percent of Hotel Revenue: 
Virginia, October 201 - eptember 2021 
 
 














































































































































































































VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN AREAS’ SHARE OF AIRBNB REVENUE, 2019
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR considers these metros representing one 




Airbnb Revenue as a Percent of Hotel Revenue: 
Virginia’s Metropolitan Areas, 2019 
 
 
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR 
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GRAPH 13
CHANGE IN AIRBNB REVENUE: 
VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN AREAS AND VIRGINIA, 2019-2020
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR considers these metros representing one 




Change in Airbnb Revenue: 
Virginia’s Metropolitan Areas, 2019-2020 
 
 
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR 


























MONTHLY AIRBNB REVENUE: 
HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2019-SEPTEMBER 2021
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data exclude shared rooms.
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Graph 14  
onthly irbnb Revenue: 
Hampton Roads, January 2019-September 2021 
 
 
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data exclude shared rooms. 
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GRAPH 15
MONTHLY AIRBNB REVENUE: 
NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2019-SEPTEMBER 2021




Monthly Airbnb Revenue: 
Northern Virginia, January 2019-September 2021 
 
 
















































































































































































When we dive into the data on what types of properties were rented, 
we observe that consumers continue to express a strong preference for 
entire-place rentals as opposed to the rental of rooms in private homes. 
Graph 16 displays Airbnb annual revenue by type of property from 2016 to 
2020. It should be clear that rentals of entire apartments, condominiums 
and homes are driving Airbnb revenue growth in the Commonwealth. 
The aggregate level of revenue from the rental of rooms in private homes 
declined in 2020, and the share of Airbnb revenue from these rooms 
declined as a consequence. 
This point is driven home further by examining the data on the change 
in Airbnb room by type of listing. As shown in Table 1, Airbnb revenue 
from the rental of entire places generally increased in 2020, but revenue 
derived from private rooms declined by double digits in most markets. 
At the metro-area level, we observe that private-room rental revenue 
declined in every metro area. In those metros where entire-place rentals 
also declined, private-room rental revenue fell more steeply in 2020. As 
we discuss in the next section, it should be no surprise that consumers 
preferred entire-place rentals as a risk mitigation measure during the 
initial months of the pandemic.
TABLE 1
PERCENT CHANGE IN AIRBNB REVENUE BY TYPE OF RENTALS: 
VIRGINIA AND ITS MAJOR METRO AREAS, 2019-2020
Percent Change 
in Total Revenue 
Percent Change 




in Revenue from 
Entire-Place 
Rentals
Virginia 4.40% -25.16% 8.48%




Charlottesville 5.70% -14.75% 7.15%
Richmond -7.39% -37.27% 0.24%
Blacksburg -34.75% -44.29% -33.43%




Roanoke 24.71% -14.70% 32.49%
All Other Areas 51.73% 21.59% 54.45%
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old 
Dominion University. Staunton and Harrisonburg MSAs are combined here, as STR considers these metros 
representing one market. Data exclude shared rooms.
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GRAPH 16
ANNUAL REVENUE OF AIRBNB PROPERTIES IN VIRGINIA: 
PRIVATE-ROOMS AND ENTIRE-PLACE RENTALS, 2016-2020 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Sources: AirDNA data received in October 2021 and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data exclude shared rooms.
Graph 16 
Annual Revenue of Airbnb Properties in Virginia 
Private-Rooms and Entire-Place Rentals, 2016 to 2020 
(in Millions of Dollars) 
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Risk, Comfort And Airbnb
Recent research suggests that tourist risk perceptions increased 
significantly during the pandemic. Tourists, hotel staff and short-term 
rental hosts all expressed concerns about the possibility of being infected 
by the COVID-19 virus. As a result, hotels and short-term rental listing 
companies announced new cleaning protocols and other measures to 
mitigate transmission risk.3 These measures, however, imposed additional 
costs at the same time reservations and revenue were under significant 
pressure. Short-term rental hosts noted that, unlike traditional hoteliers, 
they were unlikely to qualify for government aid, and some short-term 
hosts exited the industry entirely.4 As listings and revenues declined 
worldwide, Airbnb laid off 1,900 of its 7,500 employees.5 
Yet, Airbnb revenue increased slightly in 2020 in Virginia. Meanwhile, 
revenue declined by nearly 50% in the traditional hotel sector. What 
factors might explain why the Airbnb sector outperformed its peers in the 
Commonwealth and other markets in the United States?
A possible explanation is that, unlike traditional hotels, Airbnb listings 
offered more opportunities for social distancing. Over time, the 
composition of Airbnb listings has shifted toward multiroom, entire-
place properties. Airbnb no longer can be thought of as grandmothers 
renting spare rooms in the back of their houses (if that ever was the 
case). Airbnb’s share of revenue originating from entire-place properties 
increased from 87.8% in 2019 to 91.3% in 2020. During the pandemic, if 
people were going to travel, they were likely more comfortable with having 
an entire property to themselves than staying at a traditional hotel.
Airbnb supply is also sensitive to market conditions. Unlike traditional 
hotels, Airbnb property owners can bring their properties on market 
(or take them off market) with little notice. Highly desirable properties 
that commanded a premium were more likely to remain listed while less-
desirable properties that may have been listed during large events fell 




command a premium for their properties during the pandemic, unlike 
hoteliers, who had to cut room rates in the face of slumping demand.
Final Thoughts
The hotel industry plays an important role in the Virginia economy. As 
we near the end of 2021, we are witnessing a recovery in many of our 
markets. While the tunnel may be long, the light at the end is not a 
train, but the prospect of a continued recovery and new expansion of the 
industry in 2022.
For now, the good news is that vaccinations and improving consumer 
confidence in 2021 have led to the Hampton Roads hotel industry 
recovering from the pandemic. Other markets are not far behind. While 
the Northern Virginia market’s performance has lagged the state and 
the nation, we expect that its rebound will be significant in 2022. As 
international travel picks up and life returns to a semblance of normality, 
Northern Virginia hotels are likely to experience a surge in traffic. This 
bodes well for the region as well as the Virginia economy.
Surprisingly, amid the pandemic, Airbnb fared relatively well in the 
Commonwealth. Explanations abound as to why Airbnb revenue did not 
decline as much as traditional hotel-sector revenue in many of Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas. Perhaps the simplest explanation is best: Airbnb 
listings in the Commonwealth provided a viable option for those who 
traveled during the pandemic. Whether these accommodations were 
“safer” than traditional hotels is a matter of debate. What cannot be 
debated is the performance of these short-term rental properties in 2020. 
Now, with the traditional hotel sector on the rebound, the question is 
whether the short-term rental sector will continue its growth seen in 
earlier years as vaccinations increase and consumer confidence grows. If 
local governments do not fall into the trap of imposing ever-increasing 
regulations, then the answer is, likely, yes. If, on the other hand, local 
governments create ever-higher barriers to entry and operation, how 
Airbnb will fare in Virginia is an open question. Time will tell.
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n 1987, Virginia voters faced a choice: 
approve a public referendum on a state 
lottery or continue to prohibit most forms 
of legal gambling in the Commonwealth. While 
proponents pointed to how a state lottery could 
increase funding for K-12 education, opponents 
argued that a lottery would not only be a 
regressive tax, but also the gateway to other 
forms of gambling.1 With 57% of voters casting 
a “yes” ballot in November that year, Virginia 
joined the growing ranks of other states in 
having a lottery.
In retrospect, the lottery opponents were 
prescient, although it took a while for their 
prophecies to be realized. In 1988, Virginia 
voters approved pari-mutuel betting by a 56% 
to 44% margin. In 1992, local referendums for 
off-track betting parlors passed in Brunswick 
County, Chesapeake, Greensville County, 
Henrico County, Richmond and Virginia 
Beach. In 1993, Hampton voters approved 
an advisory referendum on off-track betting, 
although zoning was not approved until 1997. 
The Colonial Downs Racetrack opened in New 
Kent County in 1997. Over ensuing decades, 
state and local bills and referendums were 
considered by the General Assembly and 
voters, but, until 2015, legal gambling consisted 
primarily of the Virginia Lottery, horse racing 
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Since 2015, the Commonwealth has, in effect, gone “all in” on gambling. 
Virginians can now purchase lottery tickets online as well as play online 
lottery games. They can visit historical horse racing parlors and off-track 
betting sites. If they don’t want to get off the couch, they can wager on 
sporting events through a number of online sportsbooks. The only notable 
exception to this “gold rush” was the narrow defeat in November 2021 of 
the referendum that would have allowed the construction and operation 
of a casino in Richmond. In the coming years, however, Virginians will 
be able to visit commercial casinos in Bristol, Danville, Norfolk and 
Portsmouth. 
The push to expand commercial gambling in the Commonwealth over the 
last decade is a reflection of a continuing shift in public attitudes toward 
gambling as well as the search by state and local legislators for additional 
sources of revenue outside of raising taxes. In the 2021 Gallup survey of 
American moral values, 68% of respondents replied that gambling was 
“morally acceptable” (Graph 1). This represented an 8% increase from 
when the question was first asked in 2003. This gradual shift may also 
reflect the increasing ubiquity of gambling across the United States. In 
other words, as there are more opportunities to gamble legally, Americans 
view it in a more favorable light.
As legal gambling expands in Virginia, the question remains: Who 
benefits and who pays? Is it wise for the state and localities to become 
increasingly dependent on gambling revenue instead of making hard 
choices with respect to reforming the antiquated tax system in the 
Commonwealth? While we project that localities with new casinos will 
see increases in jobs and tax revenues, the net economic impacts of 
the casinos are closely correlated with how many patrons come from 
outside the state. While the casinos in Bristol and Danville are likely 
to attract a majority of their customers from outside Virginia, the 
same cannot be said about the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth. We 
also note that new forms of gambling, especially online gambling, pose 
a threat to the future revenue potential of the commercial casinos. 
Lastly, with an ever-expanding slate of gambling alternatives, we 
argue that Virginia needs to prepare for the increasing social toll of 
gambling.
In this chapter, we examine the evolution of gambling in the United States 
and the Commonwealth, and estimate the impact of introducing four new 
casinos in Bristol, Danville, Norfolk and Portsmouth. We also discuss 
how displacement may alter the projected economic impacts of these new 
venues. We conclude with a look at the social costs of gambling and pay 
particular attention to gambling addiction. 
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GRAPH 1
2021 GALLUP POLL ON MORAL ISSUES, 
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS STATING AN ISSUE IS MORALLY ACCEPTABLE
Source: Gallup (2021), “Moral Issues,” available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/1681/Moral-Issues.aspx 
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Rolling With The Times: 
Gambling Goes Mainstream
When one hears the word “gambling,” thoughts of casinos and horse 
tracks may come to mind. The casino, with its blackjack tables, roulette 
wheels and slot-style machines, has occupied a place in the American 
consciousness for decades. In the United States, casino gambling was 
legal only in Nevada until New Jersey voters approved casino gambling 
for Atlantic City in 1976. Over the next three decades, other states 
approved commercial casinos, and tribal casinos also opened throughout 
the country. As illustrated in Graph 2, the number of commercial casinos 
peaked at 524 in 2016, before falling sharply the following year. The 
number of casinos in operation in 2020 was roughly equivalent to the level 
seen in 2006.
State and local lotteries have grown considerably over the last three 
decades. In the late 1970s, state and local lottery revenue amounted to less 
than $1 billion. By 2019, revenue approached $29 billion.2 Growth in some 
states, however, slowed (if not declined outright) as consumer fatigue set 
in and competition from other sources of gambling intensified over the last 
decade. In Virginia, the launch of the online lottery and larger jackpots 
lifted lottery revenue to $1.43 billion and profits to $350 million (a record) 
in just the second half of 2020.3
Competition is likely to only increase for casinos and lotteries in the 
coming years. In May 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, which effectively 
granted Nevada a monopoly on legal sports betting, was unconstitutional. 
The historic decision legalized sports betting nationwide. A number of 
states, including Virginia, rapidly moved to create the legal and regulatory 
frameworks necessary for residents to place sports bets via computer or 
their phone. Sports betting with full or limited mobile-betting options 
is now offered in 17 states and the District of Columbia, and has been 
2 Statista, E. Duffin (2021), “State and local lottery revenue in the United States from 1977 to 2019,” at https://www.statista.com/statistics/249128/us-state-and-local-lottery-revenue/.
3 https://richmond.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/big-jackpots-online-gambling-lift-virginia-lottery-revenue-37-in-late-2020/article_98743ed5-de36-567a-90e6-22b7fd4033d8.html. 
4 https://www.actionnetwork.com/news/legal-sports-betting-united-states-projections.
5 Statista, S. Lock (2021), “Sports betting revenue in the United States in 2018 and 2019, with a forecast to 2028,” at https://www.statista.com/statistics/1117369/sports-betting-revenue-forecast-us.
6 https://www.sportsbettingdime.com/virginia/sports-betting-revenue/.
approved in another three states.4 While some states require in-person 
registration for mobile betting, this requirement appears to limit revenue 
growth and is likely to fall by the wayside. 
In 2018, total sports betting revenue in the United States amounted to 
$560 million. A year later it nearly doubled, jumping to $1.1 billion. 
Sports betting revenue is likely to top $2 billion in 2021 and approach 
$8 billion by 2025.5 Sports betting became legal in Virginia in January 
2021 and by July, the state had collected over $9.6 million in taxes.6 
Every dollar wagered online is one less dollar that could have been 
spent in a historical horse racing parlor or commercial casino. The 
open question is whether physical gambling establishments will face 
the same disruption that many brick-and-mortar retailers experienced 
(and continue to experience) from online shopping.
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GRAPH 2
NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL CASINOS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005-2020
Source: Statista, S. Lock (2021), “Number of commercial casinos in the United States from 2005 to 2020,” at https://www.statista.com/statistics/187972/number-of-us-commercial-casinos-since-2005/
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Virginia Rolls The Dice
Over the last five years, there has been a rapid shift in public policy 
toward gambling in Virginia. In 2015, legal gambling consisted primarily 
of the Virginia Lottery, historical horse racing and games associated with 
charitable giving. By 2021, Virginians could gamble via online lotteries, 
wager bets with mobile sportsbooks, visit expanded historical horse racing 
sites and look forward to frequenting commercial casinos in the near 
future. Table 1 provides descriptions of the types of gambling that are 
currently legal in Virginia.
One might argue that the demarcation line for this change in public policy 
was drawn in March 2019 when Gov. Ralph Northam signed Senate Bill 
1126, establishing a broad framework for expanding commercial casinos 
and authorizing casino gaming to be regulated by the Virginia Lottery 
Board. The bill included a reenactment clause, which meant it would 
need to be passed again for it to take effect. The clause directed the Joint 
Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) to conduct a review of 
gaming laws in other states and approximate what would occur in Virginia 
if casino gambling were authorized in the Commonwealth. The findings 
from JLARC’s report prompted the re-signing of the bill in 2020. 
The bill authorized casinos in five cities – Bristol, Danville, Norfolk, 
Portsmouth and Richmond – but only if citizens approved the casinos. 
Residents in Bristol (71.1%), Danville (68.7%), Norfolk (65.1%) 
and Portsmouth (66.8%) resoundingly voted in favor of having a 
commercial casino in their cities. In November 2021, however, 
Richmond voters narrowly rejected (51%) a proposal to build and 
operate a commercial casino in south Richmond.
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TABLE 1
GAMBLING BY TYPE IN VIRGINIA, 2021
Type Definition
Casino gaming
Table games (such as craps, roulette, baccarat, poker, etc.) and wagering played with cards and electronic 
gaming devices where players wager money. Video lottery machines (slot machines) have become one of 
the most popular forms of gambling in casinos.
Charitable gaming
Bingo, charity game tickets, raffles and charity fundraising permitted by the Office of Charitable and 
Regulatory Programs throughout Virginia. There were 211 registered gaming activities in Virginia as of 
November 2021.*
Fantasy sports betting
Players create a fantasy sports team and compete against other teams to win money. Virginia introduced 
legal fantasy sports betting regulation in 2016. 
Gray machines and games of skill
Games of skill are slot-like machines that appeared in restaurants, bars and convenience stores. The 
outcome of these games is determined by a player’s mental or physical skills rather than by chance. 
These machines operated in a gray area of the law until they were banned in 2020 but were then granted 
a reprieve in return for tax collections. Skill games were banned again on July 1, 2021.
Historical horse racing machines
Electronic gambling system that allows players to bet on the outcome of horse races that have already 
been run. These machines appear similar to a traditional slot machine. Users can select their horse 
“winners” with each wager or use an auto cap feature for random horse selection. 
Live horse race betting Individuals place in-person bets on the outcome of a live horse race.
Lottery (scratchers, state lottery)
Prize drawings where entrants pay for a chance to win a large jackpot or instant prizes by scratch 
“reveal” tickets.
Online horse race betting
Individuals place bets on live horse races via an online website or a smartphone app from the comfort of 
their own home.
Sports betting
Placing bets on a particular outcome or winner of a domestic or international sports event (including 
straight, total line, money line, parlay and teaser bets).
Sweepstakes sites
A contest in which participants enter for a chance to win a range of prizes (from houses to cars to 
money), and winners are drawn at random. 
Source: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
*Online Directory of Bingo Sessions in Virginia, https://www.vdacs.virginia.gov/pdf/bingo_events.pdf
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The Rise Of Mobile Betting
When Virginia launched, it was our most successful launch to date, with 
more users on the first weekend than any state before it.7
–  Kevin Hennessy, FanDuel 
Director of Publicity
The bet on casinos by Bristol, Danville, Norfolk and Portsmouth is being 
made at a time when the gambling industry is experiencing a period of 
profound change. Two decades ago, the thought of sitting on your couch 
and placing real-time bets via a mobile device on whether the next football 
pass will be completed, a basketball game beats the over/under or an 
MMA fighter lands more punches than an opponent in a particular round 
was just a glimmer in the eyes of entrepreneurs. Today, not only does this 
technology exist, but also consumers are embracing it enthusiastically. 
While the number of casinos remains relatively stable and lottery revenue 
growth has slowed, sports betting revenue nationally is projected to 
increase from $2.1 billion in 2021 to $7.9 billion in 2025.
Virginia legalized sports betting in April 2020 with the passage of Senate 
Bill 384, which allows for up to 12 online sports-betting providers in 
the Commonwealth.8 Table 2 lists the online and mobile sportsbook 
applications that have already launched or will launch in Virginia. 
FanDuel was the first, followed quickly by DraftKings, BetRivers, 
BetMGM and Caesars Sportsbook. Currently, 10 providers are either 
operating or have been approved to operate a mobile sportsbook in the 
state. Physical sportsbook locations are anticipated to open in spring 2022. 
JLARC estimates that the mobile sports-betting market will generate 




9 JLARC, “Gaming in the Commonwealth 2019,” http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt527.pdf.
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Source: Sports Handle, https://sportshandle.com/virginia/, updated as of Nov. 1, 2021
99
Games Of Skill Or 
Games Of Chance?
While Virginia was debating whether to approve commercial casinos, 
gaming machines (often referred to as “gray machines”) began appearing 
in restaurants, bars, convenience stores and truck stops throughout the 
state. These “machines” were electronic, computerized terminals featuring 
games that were played by inserting money in hopes of winning a cash 
prize. On the outside, there appeared to be no fundamental difference 
between a virtual slot machine and these games; however, operators 
argued that these machines required skill, rather than chance, to win. 
The distinction between skill and chance is important from a legal 
perspective. If the outcome of a game is determined by the player’s ability, 
then it is not a random event. A popular game of skill mimics the Simon 
memory game, whereby a player must remember color combinations 
of increasing complexity. Another version requires a player to identify 
patterns among nine different pictures, much like a pictorial tic-tac-toe 
game, but with time limits and “wild cards.” These games of skill differ 
considerably from a slot machine, where the player’s only input is a bet 
and the push of a button to start the gamble.
Games of skill occupied what one could consider an ill-defined legal space. 
The machines were not taxed or regulated and, while some were skill-
based, others appeared to cross the line into games of chance. Virginia 
planned to ban these games in 2020, even though many small-business 
owners argued that the revenue from these machines allowed them to 
make capital investments and expand staff. 
As the COVID-19 pandemic rolled across Virginia in spring 2020, 
however, social distancing and restrictions on economic activity threatened 
to overwhelm many of these same businesses. Legislators, fearing a 
significant downturn in state revenues, decided to allow these machines 
to operate legally in the Commonwealth and to use the tax revenues and 
license fees for COVID-19 relief, problem gambling and local community 
10 https://www.fox5dc.com/news/some-va-business-owners-fight-against-ban-on-skill-games. 
11  Virginia Lottery briefing for House Appropriations and Senate Finance committees, September 2019,  
https://ihodvirginiageneralassembly.s3.amazonaws.com/agenda_block_docs/attaches/000/000/428/original/III_-_Lottery.pdf?1568640091. 
12 https://www.playvirginia.com/virginia-gray-machines-lottery-sales/. 
support. The tax was $1,200 per machine every month it operated, and 
game distributors were subject to the tax. With over 10,000 machines and 
$198.4 million in wagers placed in May 2021 alone, many small-business 
owners and their patrons welcomed the legalization of these machines 
(Table 3). The state collected over $100 million in taxes during the time 
the machines were legal here.10
Even though the machines produced a boon for the state and business 
owners, the Commonwealth banned these games of skill on July 1, 2021. 
One argument was that the games bring gambling and its associated social 
costs into local neighborhoods, though, curiously, the same argument could 
be made about lotteries and mobile betting. In all likelihood, the primary 
rationale was the fear that these machines competed with lottery sales 
and also posed a threat to the state’s nascent casino industry. A 2019 
presentation by the Virginia Lottery Board attributed slowing growth in 
lottery sales to the prevalence of gray machines.11 However, in a December 
2020 presentation to the Virginia House Appropriations Committee, Dan 
Timberlake, director of the Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, 
noted that gray machine revenue had fallen short of expectations. When 
asked why, he replied: “One reason we believe the gray machine revenue 
is not what was originally forecasted is because people weren’t going into 
the stores (to play them). But what they were doing, to our surprise, is 
that they were buying lottery tickets. The lottery is not seeing the loss of 
revenue from the fact that the gray machines are still out there.”12 On Dec. 
6, 2021, a preliminary injunction placed the ban on games of skill on hold 
until full arguments on the constitutionality of the ban could be heard in 
court.
If the state reaped revenue from both games of skill and lottery 
sales, it should have been indifferent to where the money originated. 
The short-lived experiment with games of skill generated revenue 
for businesses and the Commonwealth and was obviously welcomed 
by many Virginians. Arguments that one form of gambling displaces 
another should fall on deaf ears, as it should not be the responsibility 
of the Commonwealth to choose winners and losers.
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TABLE 3
MONTHLY REPORT OF SKILL GAME MACHINES IN THE COMMONWEALTH, MAY 2021 
Region Total Wagered Total Awarded In Play Warehoused Total Machines
Region 1 (Roanoke) $20,697,585 $15,240,639 1,065 13 1,078
Region 2 (Lynchburg) $32,046,065 $26,841,343 1,056 47 1,103
Region 3 (Staunton) $10,660,184 $8,177,235 557 8 565
Region 4 (Alexandria) $24,862,133 $19,137,080 994 38 1,032
Region 5 
(Fredericksburg)
$10,708,016 $7,877,868 542 27 569
Region 6 (Richmond) $40,456,679 $32,056,971 1,666 104 1,770
Region 7 (Hampton) $21,251,730 $17,414,045 922 38 960
Region 8 (Chesapeake) $29,829,243 $22,337,921 1,539 36 1,575
Region 9 
(Charlottesville)
$7,889,460 $5,936,468 369 11 380
Other* $0 $0 18 1,163 1,181
Grand Total $198,401,095 $155,019,571 8,728 1,485 10,213
Source: https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2021/RD274/PDF 
*Eighteen machines were improperly reported by the distributors as being warehoused, but according to ABC’s records they were still subject to the monthly tax. 
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Bright Lights, Big Gamble? 
New Casinos In Virginia
To understand the potential economic impact of the new casinos in 
Virginia, we briefly examine each of the projects, including projected levels 
of employment and revenue. We note that the availability of data varies 
significantly from project to project. In some cases, cities have prepared 
economic analyses that examine the composition of jobs and visitors to the 
new casinos. In other cases, press releases and developer presentations 
are all one can readily find on the projected benefits and costs of the new 
casinos. Given the hundreds of millions of dollars of proposed spending 
on their construction, the lack of publicly available information from 
objective sources on the size, scope and potential impacts of these 
enterprises is, to put it mildly, surprising. It will be much harder 
to hold public officials accountable if there is a lack of specifics 
regarding these casinos prior to their construction.
HARD ROCK HOTEL & CASINO IN BRISTOL
In the 2020 general election, Bristol became one of five Virginia cities 
to authorize a casino in the state. With a 71% approval rating by 
voters, initial plans called for the new Hard Rock Hotel & Casino to 
start construction in 2021, with a hopeful opening in early 2022. In the 
meantime, a temporary gaming facility was to open, which would allow 
access to a limited number of slot machines and table games while the 
main casino was being built.
However, delays and regulations have postponed the opening of both 
the temporary and main casino. Although state legislation allows for a 
temporary gaming facility to operate during the construction of a casino, 
a vetting and licensing process is still required. In May 2021, the Virginia 
Lottery Board announced it was highly unlikely the vetting and licensing 
process would be finished in time for the temporary gaming facility to open 
in 2021. As of October 2021, the temporary casino was slated to open by 
the end of the first quarter in 2022.
13 https://heraldcourier.com/news/local/watch-now-with-the-bristol-casino-s-fate-in-voters-hands-a-deeper-look-into/article_70a97273-6b1f-5ab4-9566-d3edd2df078c.html.
14 The Bristol casino’s nongaming revenue of $106 million is the projected amount for the first year of operation. https://www.casino.org/news/bristol-virginia-casino-developers-donate-310000-to-state-political-campaigns/.
15 Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Bristol, https://www.playvirginia.com/bristol/.
The plans for Bristol’s main casino have seen multiple setbacks as well. 
The $400 million venue was originally scheduled to open in late 2022, but 
construction cannot start until the Virginia Lottery Board approves a 
license. In the board’s latest public announcement, a license is expected to 
be awarded in April 2022, after which construction can begin. Although 
this may seem promising, construction is still expected to last at least 18 
months, so Bristol’s casino will not open until late 2023, assuming no more 
delays or postponements. 
According to publicly available data, the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino 
Bristol will consist of a 100,000-square-foot casino with 2,700 slot 
machines, 100 table games and a sportsbook; a hotel with 750 rooms; 
retail space for up to 50 stores; and a spa, concert venue, sports simulators 
and go-kart track. Although multiple estimates have been cited in local 
media, the most recent estimates state that the casino is expected to 
generate $130 million in annual net gaming revenue13 and $106 million in 
nongaming revenue.14 The Hard Rock Hotel & Casino will offer over 1,000 
construction jobs and employ approximately 2,000 permanent workers 
with an average annual wage of $46,500.15
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CAESARS VIRGINIA IN DANVILLE
About 200 miles to the east of Bristol, the city of Danville is going 
through a similar process. Prior to the November 2020 referendum 
approval by Danville’s residents, the Danville City Council chose Caesars 
Entertainment as its preferred casino partner. As is the case with the 
Bristol enterprise, the construction process is being postponed by the 
Virginia Lottery. While the casino awaits licensing approval, demolition 
and site cleanup have already begun at the 85-acre site. The planned 
$500 million casino is set to be located at the former Dan River Mills 
Schoolfield complex on West Main Street. This site was rezoned in June 
2021 from industrial manufacturing to casino entertainment. Construction 
of Caesars Virginia is expected to begin in winter 2021 with the opening 
anticipated in fall 2023.
The casino will include 1,400 slot machines and table games, a 
sportsbook, a poker room, a hotel with 500 rooms, restaurants and a live 
entertainment theater.16 Danville is projecting annual gaming tax revenue 
will reach $22 million with an additional $4 million in property, meal and 
hotel occupancy tax revenue. The project is estimated to create 1,300 full-
time jobs with annual salaries ranging between $35,000 and $47,000.17 
16 https://cardinalnews.org/2021/09/27/how-big-will-danvilles-casino-be-this-big/.
17 https://pokernewsdesk.com/caesars-virginia-to-hear-public-enter-for-on-line-casino-at-former-textile-mill-website/.
18  The Pamunkey were the first Virginia tribe to receive official sanction from the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs in July 2015. The reservation is located near the Chesapeake Bay on the north side of the James River, approximately 90 
miles northwest of downtown Norfolk. It is one of two original reservation lands assigned from a treaty with the English colonial government.
HEADWATERS RESORT AND CASINO IN NORFOLK
In September 2019, Norfolk City Council initially authorized a land deal 
with the Pamunkey Indian Tribe that included a hotel, restaurants and 
an entertainment venue.18 The proposal would have designated the land 
as sovereign to the Pamunkey, not subject to taxation, and outside the 
jurisdiction of Norfolk. In November 2019, after complaints of a lack 
of transparency, doubts about the benefits of the deal and a signature 
petition that forced the council to schedule public hearings, a new 
vote was scheduled on the proposal. Two months later, Norfolk Mayor 
Kenny Alexander announced the Pamunkey Tribe would go through the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. This change reduced the initial investment 
plans from approximately $700 million to about $500 million, although 
these estimates continue to evolve. Tennessee billionaire and casino-
gaming mogul Jon Yarbrough teamed up with Golden Eagle, the tribe’s 
development partner, on the project.
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In 2020, the city of Norfolk and the Pamunkey Indian Tribe came 
to a final agreement, and the tribe signed a deal to purchase land to 
build the resort casino. The new deal ensures the land will not become 
sovereign land and Norfolk will receive tax revenue. The tribe has also 
been confirmed as a preferred casino partner and will construct the 
HeadWaters Resort and Casino near Harbor Park, home of the Norfolk 
Tides minor league baseball team. 
As of May 2021, the HeadWaters Resort and Casino was projected to have 
3,000 slot machines, 150 table games and a sportsbook. Additionally, it is 
expected to have 300 hotel rooms, live music and entertainment venues, 
bars and restaurants, indoor and outdoor pools, and a spa and fitness 
center. The casino is estimated to create over 2,000 construction jobs and 
approximately 2,500 permanent jobs.19 City officials project total annual 
revenue to be between $415 million and $485 million on a stabilized 
basis, with annual gaming revenue estimated to be between $350 million 
and $400 million. Nongaming revenue, which includes profits from the 
hotel, food and beverage, and other amenities, is estimated to be between 
$65 million and $85 million on a stabilized basis. Payments to the city 
of Norfolk in the form of direct payments and taxes are projected to 
be between $26 million and $31 million annually.20 Press releases from 
Capital Results, the firm that handles media relations for the Pamunkey 
Indian Tribe, suggest the opening could occur as early as 2022.
RIVERS CASINO IN PORTSMOUTH 
On Nov. 3, 2020, Portsmouth residents resoundingly voted in favor of a 
casino – a proposal state Sen. Louise Lucas has supported for more than 
20 years. The hotel-casino will be built by Chicago-based Rush Street 
Gaming, just off Victory Boulevard near Tidewater Community College, 
and eventually grow to include restaurants, a sportsbook and other 
entertainment amenities. “For Portsmouth, this means $16.3 million in 
tax generation … [where] $16.3 million is an additional 7% to our GDP,” 
said Robert Moore, director of economic development for the city of 
19 Source: https://www.allinnorfolk.com/sites/default/files/media/2020-09/General.pdf
20  Projections assume stabilized operations in year three of the project, as well as the third year of operation of all planned properties in the competitive market, https://www.norfolk.gov/DocumentCenter/View/61651/ Criteria-For-
Selection-of-Gaming-Operator.
21 https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/casinos-are-on-their-way-to-norfolk-portsmouth-heres-when-theyll-be-completed/291-58cfae8e-aa50-4617-a1ab-728901d33cad.
Portsmouth. In addition to tax generation, the casino promises to create 
over 1,400 temporary construction jobs and over 1,200 permanent jobs.21
Before work can begin on either the Norfolk or Portsmouth casino, 
licensing must be obtained through the Commonwealth of Virginia, as 
well as the Virginia Lottery Board. Once licenses have been granted, 
construction can begin. Originally, the timeline called for shovels to break 
ground in November 2021 with the Portsmouth casino opening scheduled 
for sometime in 2023. More recently, however, a spokesperson for the 
casino said the plans have been pushed forward. Construction, including 
site clearance, is expected to last 18 to 24 months, with the venue opening 
its doors in late 2022.
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It’s All Good – Until It Isn’t
We caution that survivorship bias tends to cloud the perceptions of casino 
projects. We often hear of success stories but rarely learn about casinos 
that fail to meet expectations or failed entirely. Presentations to city 
councils and state governments highlight jobs and tax revenue, leading 
one to believe that a casino (or most any gambling venture) is a sure bet. 
Experience has shown (repeatedly), however, that as the novelty wears off, 
gambling revenue plateaus, if not declines outright. Graph 3 illustrates 
how, after accounting for inflation, casino revenue in Detroit shrank from 
a peak in 2006 ($1.65 billion) to a prepandemic low in 2019 ($1.41 billion). 
Locally, we need only point to the performance of the Virginia Lottery 
at the end of the most recent decade, and its push to introduce mobile 
betting as a means of addressing the stagnation in sales, to highlight how 
consumer fatigue can lead to an ever-widening search for gambling options 
to sustain revenues.
To gauge the potential economic impact of casinos on Virginia’s economy, 
we first need to ask from whence casino patrons will come. The more 
customers who come from outside the region, the greater the potential 
economic impact of the casinos. Much like tourists visiting the Oceanfront 
who “inject” money into the regional economy, nonresidents traveling to 
Hampton Roads to gamble at the casinos will bring “new money” with 
them, adding to the impact of the gambling establishments. 
Graph 4 illustrates JLARC’s 2019 estimates of the percentage of 
net gaming revenue that will derive from spending by out-of-state 
customers. The casinos in Danville and Bristol are estimated to generate 
approximately three-quarters of their gaming revenue from nonresidents. 
The threat to these casinos, however, is competition brought about by 
potential casino development in neighboring states. If Tennessee or 
northcentral North Carolina were to build casinos in their areas, Danville 
and Bristol’s annual net gaming revenue is estimated to decrease by 36% 
and 13%, respectively. 
These estimates also suggest that the Hampton Roads casinos are 
unlikely to generate a significant amount of revenue from out-of-state 
visitors. However, the defeat of the proposed casino in Richmond 
directly benefits the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth. The proposed 
Richmond casino would have occupied a geographical blocking position 
for travelers from Northern Virginia to Hampton Roads, lowering the 
likelihood of repatriated spending. The Richmond casino’s market also 
would have extended south, constraining the reach of the Norfolk and 
Portsmouth casinos. The defeat of the Richmond referendum presents 
an opportunity for the Hampton Roads region to market itself as a 
vacation and entertainment destination; however, it remains to be 
seen whether the localities in the region can cooperate sufficiently to 
take advantage of the decision of Richmond voters.
When considering the economic impact of a policy, economists focus 
on two broad effects: additionality and displacement. Additionality 
occurs when a policy change causes economic agents to engage in 
behavior that they would not have taken in absence of the policy. If 
a new advertising campaign, for example, influences a family from 
Pennsylvania to come to Virginia Beach for a vacation that they 
otherwise would not have taken, then the expenditures associated 
with the visit and the consequent economic activity are additional 
stimulus to the economy.
Displacement, on the other hand, occurs when a policy change 
causes economic agents to shift their behavior such that they 
reduce spending in one area to increase spending in another area. 
The additional spending as a result of the updated policy must be 
balanced against the reduction in spending elsewhere to determine 
the economic impact. For example, if a couple shifts spending from 
going to a movie theater instead of a concert, they are merely 
“moving” spending from one form of entertainment to another.
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GRAPH 3
REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) DETROIT CASINO REVENUE, 2000-2019
Source: Michigan Gaming Control Board, Revenues and Wagering Tax Information (2021)
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GRAPH 4
PROJECTED PERCENTAGE OF NET GAMING REVENUE FROM OUT-OF-STATE CUSTOMERS, 
VIRGINIA CASINOS















































Estimating The Economic 
Impact Of Casinos 
In Virginia
To estimate the economic impact of each casino, we use projections of two 
economic inputs: capital investment (buildings, furnishings, equipment 
and so on) and annual casino revenue (Table 4). Of course, our estimates 
depend on the accuracy of the projections of these economic inputs. 
Given the continued evolution of the scale and scope of the casinos across 
Virginia, our estimates should be viewed as informative rather than 
authoritative. For these expenditures, we draw upon JLARC’s analysis, 
news reports and staff analyses (where these are publicly available) to 
estimate aggregate economic impact.
TABLE 4
ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS, VIRGINIA CASINOS
Capital Investment Gambling Revenues
Bristol $400 million $130 million
Danville $500 million $190 million
Norfolk $500 million $350 million
Portsmouth $300 million $150 million
Sources: WTOP.com (2021), “Here’s a look at Caesar’s plans for Danville, Va. Casino”; city of Norfolk (2020), 
“Staff Report – Impacts of a Casino Hotel on the City of Norfolk”; and WAVY.com (2021), “Portsmouth Casino 
Developer Commits to Building Hotel, but Won’t Say When”
Analysts’ estimates of economic impact can often seem confusing. We 
explain below some of the more common terms they use:
•  Compensation – the total payroll cost of employees, including 
wages, salaries and all benefits.
•  Employment – the annual average of full-time, part-time and 
seasonal employment in an industry or region.
•  Output – the measure of the total value of goods produced in an 
industry. However, output from one industry utilizes output from 
other industries, so the measure overstates the contribution of an 
industry to GDP.
•  Value Added – the total market value of all final goods and services 
produced in a region in a given period of time. Value added is the 
measure of the increase or decrease in GDP.
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Estimated Impacts Of 
Casino Construction
Unlike some other recent projects in Virginia, the construction of the 
casinos will not receive any state or local government tax incentives or 
grants. Instead, private funds will be used to fund construction. The 
injection of new capital into each region for the building of the casinos 
and associated properties will temporarily boost jobs and output. However, 
one must also recognize that not all the expenditures on these projects 
will stay in the region. Some building supplies, furnishings, machines and 
services will be sourced from vendors outside each metropolitan area, 
thus it is not appropriate to assume all construction dollars will be spent 
entirely within each region. We conservatively estimate that 40% of 
capital investment expenditures will remain in each region. For the casino 
in Danville, for example, total projected construction outlays are $500 
million, of which $200 million will occur in the Danville region. We also 
note that we do not have specific information on when expenditures will 
occur, thus we model the impact of a lump-sum increase in construction 
spending. The reader should interpret these numbers as the estimated 
impact across the construction timeline for each project.
We present the economic impact estimates for casino construction 
spending in Table 5. Undoubtedly, the construction will boost jobs in each 
of the cities. The injection of construction spending will also increase 
local economic activity. These jobs and increases in GDP are transitory; 
that is, once the construction is complete, the jobs and increases in output 
will largely dissipate. We also note that, relative to the size of the local 
economies, these boosts in activity are small. The projected increase in 
local GDP for Norfolk is approximately $139 million, which is roughly 
equivalent to 0.5% of 2019 GDP (assuming that all the construction 
spending occurs in one year).
TABLE 5










Bristol $160 million 2,155 $210.5 $93.5
Danville $200 million 2,694 $263.1 $116.9
Norfolk $200 million 2,120 $270.7 $139.0
Portsmouth $120 million 1,176 $151.3 $80.3
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and IMPLAN Group. 
Estimates reflect the sum of direct, indirect and induced effects. We use 2019 data to avoid the impact of 
COVID-19 on our estimates. Projected economic impacts for each city assume 40% of construction spending 
occurs within city limits.
Impact Of Sustained 
Operations
To estimate the annual economic impact of the fully operational 
casinos, we must first consider the question of displacement. If, as 
noted by JLARC and the consulting firm TIG (The Innovation Group), 
the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth generate about 10% of net gaming 
revenue from out-of-state customers, then the pool from which the casinos 
draw will be limited compared to the casinos in Bristol and Danville. 
Furthermore, the literature and practice show that casinos tend to attract 
customers predominantly from their local market area. If this occurs, then 
the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos will merely “recycle” money within 
the local economies, moving it from established businesses to the casinos. 
On the other hand, if casinos are able to attract visitors from other states 
or regions, then spending at these venues is equivalent to the injection 
of new money into the local economy. While one might quibble about the 
extent of displacement, it will clearly occur, and will invariably reduce the 
overall impact of the casinos on regional economic activity.
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Graphs 5 and 6 illustrate the projected annual economic impact of 
spending in the Virginia casinos. If one completely ignores displacement 
and assumes (unrealistically) that all spending in the casinos comes from 
outside the regions in which the casinos are located, then the new casinos 
would add over $600 million annually to Virginia’s GDP and generate 
about 11,000 new jobs. In this rosy scenario, the new casino in Norfolk 
would add $294.3 million annually in economic activity, while the Bristol 
casino would add about $89 million to local GDP.
We cannot ignore displacement, of course, and studies that shrug 
displacement effects off or provide estimates of economic impact based 
on industry output alone should be viewed with a healthy dose of 
skepticism.22 For example, if a casino generated $300 million annually 
in gambling revenue, but 50% of that revenue originated from outside 
the casino’s local area, then only the impact of the “new” spending 
($150 million) should be considered. To do otherwise ignores the 
impact of patrons shifting money away from local restaurants, bars, 
movie theaters and other establishments to spend it on gambling, 
rooms, and food and drink in the casinos. 
Accounting for displacement changes the picture. The casinos in Bristol 
and Danville are likely to have a higher proportion of out-of-state visitors 
than the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth. As such, the difference 
between the gross and net of displacement is much smaller for the casinos 
in Bristol and Danville. We project the Bristol casino will add about 
$67 million to GDP, while Danville’s casino will lift GDP by over $100 
million. For the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos, on the other hand, the 
relatively high levels of displacement mean that the net economic impacts 
in these cities will be much smaller than the impacts without allowing for 
displacement. We would be happy to be proven wrong on the attraction of 
out-of-state visitors to the Hampton Roads casinos, but we must highlight 
the need to account for the impact of displacement on projections of net 
economic impact.
22  Where displacement occurs and the magnitude of displacement remain matters of debate in the economics literature. Leven and Phares (1998) estimated that about half of casino revenues in Missouri were the result of 
displacement spending. Siegel and Anders (1999) found that casino spending displaced other forms of entertainment spending in 11 Missouri counties. D. Chhabra (2007) estimated that about 30% of Iowa gamblers would have 
participated in other entertainment activities if casinos were not locally available. Wiley and Walker (2009), on the other hand, found a complementary effect between casinos and retail property values in the Detroit urban area.
The fiscal impact of the Virginia casinos depends on one’s perspective. 
The cities of Bristol, Danville, Norfolk and Portsmouth will all 
observe increases in GDP from gambling revenue. The question is 
whether their revenue arises because of “new money” being injected 
into the local economy or “old money” being recycled. As displacement 
rises, the revenue of neighboring cities and counties will be negatively 
affected as people choose to spend some of their money in the casinos. 
If nothing else, our analysis highlights the need to have a high level of 
discernment when considering the net economic impacts of casinos.
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GRAPH 5
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIRGINIA CASINOS ON LOCAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and IMPLAN Group 
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No Displacement With Displacement
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GRAPH 6
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIRGINIA CASINOS ON EMPLOYMENT
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and IMPLAN Group. Estimates may not sum due to rounding.
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Estimated Annual Economic Impact of Virginia Casinos on Employment 
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Problem Gambling
When it comes to gambling, it’s all about winners and losers. Success, 
whether in the lottery or at a gaming establishment, is often celebrated 
in the media, while gambling losses and costs to society are rarely 
mentioned. In December 2020, a Dumfries resident won a jackpot of 
$800,000 in a Virginia Lottery Pick 4 drawing.23 In January 2021, a 
Newport News man hit the highest historical horse racing jackpot in the 
United States at Rosie’s Gaming Emporium in Hampton, a tremendous 
win totaling $914,530.90.24 A September 2021 Virginia Lottery headline 
heralded “Dinwiddie County Man Wins $185,285 While Sitting at Home 
Watching TV” because the winner was playing Virginia Lottery games on 
his personal device from his living room.25 We learned about these lucky 
individuals from TV and newspaper stories.
One is much harder pressed, however, to hear and read stories 
about residents who lose money gambling, who suffer from gambling 
addiction or who are victims of crime due to increased gambling 
activities. The Virginia Council on Problem Gambling reports that the 
Virginia Problem Gambling Helpline has seen a significant increase, 
around 77%, in the number of calls it has received in 2021. Callers 
largely originated from Hampton Roads with Northern Virginia and 





27  The Recovery Village, Gambling Addiction Facts and Statistics, https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/process-addiction/compulsive-gambling/related/gambling-statistics/, and the National Center for Responsible Gaming, 
https://www.icrg.org/sites/default/files/oec/pdfs/ncrg_fact_sheet_gambling_disorders.pdf.
28 https://preventionlane.org/gambling-vulnerable-populations.
29 2016 Survey of Problem Gambling Services in the United States, https://www.apgsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2016_Survey_of_PGS_USA.pdf.
According to The Recovery Village Drug and Alcohol Rehab treatment 
facility, an estimated 10 million Americans struggle with gambling 
addiction in the United States. The social costs attributed to gambling 
vary, depending on the type of gambler. Gambling addiction can affect 
anyone of any age or gender, and it impacts not only the individual 
with the problem but also close family and friends. This addiction is 
more common among adults than adolescents, but the exposure to and 
participation in gambling at a younger age increases the risk of developing 
a gambling problem later in life. Approximately 1 in 20 college students 
are said to exhibit signs of compulsive gambling, a rate that is higher than 
that for the overall adult population.27 Table 6 lists local programs that 
specialize in treating gambling addiction.
For many people, gambling addiction isn’t an isolated problem. Individuals 
who are most at risk of developing gambling problems typically have 
preexisting addictions or disorders. A correlational link exists between 
gambling and depression, and one study found suicidal ideation in nearly 
half of its respondents.28 Substance abuse is also prevalent among these 
individuals, with the connection to alcoholism being most common. A 
2016 survey conducted by the Association of Problem Gambling Service 
Administrators estimated the percentage of Virginia adults with a 
gambling problem to be 2.2%.29 Previous estimates of the general public 
afflicted with a gambling disorder range from approximately 0.5% to 
2%. U.S. Census 2020 figures show that with Virginia’s population of 
approximately 8.6 million people, there may be between 43,000 and 
189,000 problem gamblers in the Commonwealth. Yet, with the advent of 
the mobile lottery, online sportsbooks and games of skill, the argument 
that casinos will be the primary source for problem gambling seems to 
have lost some steam. The challenge for Virginia will likely be meeting the 
rising demand for mental health services due to the increasing range of 
gambling choices available to the public. It may be appropriate to allocate 
more funds to behavioral health services in order to address this demand.
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TABLE 6
SELECTED GAMBLING ADDICTION TREATMENT PROVIDERS: VIRGINIA, 2019
Name Location
A Richards Counseling and Psychotherapy 720 Rodman Ave. 
Portsmouth, VA 23707
Agape Counseling and Therapeutic 106 West 5th Ave. 
Franklin, VA 23851
Colonial Behavioral Health 3804 George Washington Memorial Highway 
Yorktown, VA 23692
Hampton Veterans Affairs Medical Center/Mental Health SATP 100 Emancipation Drive, Unit 116-A 
Hampton, VA 23667
Lighthouse Counseling of Fredericksburg, PLC 420 Hudgins Road, Suite 201 
Fredericksburg, VA 22408
Mental Wellness Now, LLC 1363 North Main St. 
Harrisonburg, VA 22802
New River Valley Community Services 700 University City Blvd. 
Blacksburg, VA 24060
Sentara Norfolk General Hospital 
Gambling Addiction Treatment
600 Gresham Drive 
Norfolk, VA 23507
Williamsville Wellness 10515 Cabaniss Lane 
Hanover, VA 23069
Winchester Addiction Services, PLC 3042 Valley Ave., Suite 110 
Winchester, VA 22601
Source: List of Virginia Gambling Addiction Treatment Centers, https://www.alltreatment.com/va/gambling-addiction-treatment/
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Final Thoughts
Over the last decade, Virginia has doubled down on its bet on legalized 
gambling. Today, residents can place a bet through an online or mobile 
sportsbook, buy a physical or virtual lottery ticket, visit a historical horse 
racing establishment and look forward to gambling at a state casino in the 
near future. This is a marked change from a little over three decades ago, 
when the Commonwealth did not even have a state lottery.
With this in mind, we offer some final observations about the expansion of 
gambling and the opening of casinos across the Commonwealth.
Local governments in Virginia are increasing their reliance on taxes 
that are more sensitive to economic conditions. Proponents of casinos 
and other forms of gambling invariably point to the contributions to 
local and state budgets to support these projects. While we do not deny 
that gambling will enhance the bottom lines of the cities where they are 
located, we also note that casinos are sensitive to changes in economic 
conditions. Casinos are not a “sure bet” and local governments 
should be aware of how survivorship bias may cloud presentations 
on the benefits of casinos. A healthy dose of skepticism is warranted 
to rationally discuss how casinos can help (and hinder) economic 
development.
While the Virginia casinos will create jobs and increase economic output, 
the impact is likely to be small. An increase in the number of jobs in 
the Hampton Roads region would be welcome news, especially given the 
relatively anemic job growth over the decade prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic. However, these jobs are likely to be concentrated in the leisure 
and hospitality sector, which continues to struggle to attract workers in 
the aftermath of the pandemic. Experience in the gambling industry shows 
that, after the novelty has worn off, casino revenue tends to plateau, if 
not outright decline. We caution readers to view promises of sustained, 
fulsome impacts over time with a wary, informed eye.  
Displacement effects should not be cast aside in the conversation about 
casinos. There are likely to be positive spillovers across the region in terms 
of spending and employment. The Virginia cities where the proportion of 
out-of-state visitors is expected to be higher will perform better than those 
with few out-of-area visitors. All these cities need as many visitors as 
possible who expend new dollars rather than substitute casino patronage 
for other forms of leisure activity. One dollar cannot be spent at the same 
time in different places.
Gambling is here in the Commonwealth; thus, we should plan accordingly 
for the social costs. We know that problem gambling and criminal activity 
are likely to occur at higher rates as gambling opportunities increase, 
so we should act now. Enhancing investment in behavioral and mental 
health services is not only a wise course of action to help residents cope 
with gambling addiction, but also to address other economic and social 
shocks. Investing more in policing, including community-based approaches 
to nonviolent crime, appears to be a sensible response to the reality of 
casinos in our midst. It’s time to hedge our bets.
All these cities need as many visitors as possible who expend new 
dollars rather than substitute casino patronage for other forms of 
leisure activity. The recent injunction allowing games of skill back 
into restaurants, bars and other establishments only highlights the 
increasing competition for entertainment dollars. One dollar cannot be 
spent at the same time in different places.
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VIEWED THROUGH 
A DIFFERENT LENS: 
EVALUATING VIRGINIA 
HIGHER EDUCATION
People say I have a distorted lens. I think I 
see things as they really are.
– Nikki Sixx, Musician and Songwriter 
116 ■
I
t may seem odd to some that we begin this 
analysis of Virginia higher education with 
a quote from Nikki Sixx, who plays a very 
loud bass for the heavy metal band Mötley 
Crüe. But his observation is pertinent to our 
task. This chapter looks at Virginia higher 
education through a different lens – one that 
gives minimal attention to highly publicized 
ranking systems, such as that conducted 
annually by U.S. News & World Report, and 
instead focuses on what could be termed higher 
education bread-and-butter issues.     
Whether a resident of Loudoun County or Wise 
County, the representative Virginian wants 
to know if she can afford higher education 
and whether she will need to take on debt 
to earn a bachelor’s degree. And, if she does 
earn that degree, will it serve as an economic 
springboard that vaults her upward in society?  
These are questions that most institutions 
choose not to answer up front. Virtually every 
Virginia college and university has produced 
a carefully nurtured institutional narrative 
that is filled with smiling undergraduates, 
supplemented by grateful alumni who sing 
the praises of their alma mater. It isn’t that 
these presentations are false per se, but rather 
that they are incomplete and omit answering 
the questions we have just posed. When, for 
example, is the last time an institutional video 
included a segment addressing the financial 
challenges faced by a 35-year-old single mother 
of two who is struggling to earn her degree?   
117
2021 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
118 VIEWED THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS: EVALUATING VIRGINIA HIGHER EDUCATION■
Major media outlets focus intently on U.S. News & World Report’s 
annual rankings of the country’s colleges and universities. We are 
told, for example, that Virginia’s Washington and Lee University is 
rated the ninth best liberal arts institution in the nation (in 2021). 
We can and should laud W&L’s achievement even as we note that, 
unfortunately, it is substantially irrelevant to the higher education 
issues that face ordinary Virginians. W&L, after all, enrolls 
only about .5% of Virginia’s college students1 and 79% come from 
outside the state.2 Opportunity Insights, a nonpartisan research and 
policy institute, estimates that 81.3% of students at W&L are from 
households whose incomes place them in the top income quintile 
nationally, while only 1.12% are from households in the bottom income 
quintile.3  
Our focus in this chapter is not upon national rankings and accompanying 
media pizazz but rather on the questions that matter most to everyday 
Virginians: Can they afford to attend college? Will they have to go into 
debt to do so? How likely is it that they will be able to earn a degree? Will 
a degree enable them to improve their economic circumstances?    
Affordability And 
Student Debt
It is critical to understand that there usually is a substantial difference 
between the official “sticker price” that colleges and universities publish 
on their websites and the average net price that students actually end 
up paying after grants and scholarships have been taken into account. 
Readers who have ever purchased a new automobile are familiar with this 
world. The sticker price on the window of a new car seldom is the price 
a customer actually pays. Instead, it is a starting point for negotiations 
between seller and buyer.  
1 U.S. Department of Education, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds. Hereafter, IPEDS.
2 U.S. Department of Education, College Navigator, https://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/. Hereafter, College Navigator.
3 Opportunity Insights, https://opportunityinsights.org/data. Hereafter, Opportunity Insights.
And so it is in American higher education. On some campuses, virtually 
all students receive some form of discount that enables them to pay a net 
price that is less than the posted sticker price. The discount may come in 
the form of scholarships that allow them and their parents to brag a bit. 
The data in columns 2-4 of Table 1 tell us that the average net price paid 
by in-state students at a four-year public college or university in Virginia 
was only 63.2% of the sticker price in 2018-19. In the independent college 
sector, the average campus discount was much larger; the net price there 
constituted only 49.8% of the sticker price.  
The salient point is that posted sticker prices border on irrelevancy for 
those students who can demonstrate financial need, or who possess talents 
that the institution wants to capture (an excellent student, a superb 
athlete, etc.). Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores and high school grade 
point averages often are important determinants of the size of the discount 
a student receives, but a variety of other factors also can come into play, 
including the student’s home town, academic major, gender and race. 
Thus, for the typical student, it is the average net price in column 3 of 
Table 1 that is most important unless the student comes from a lower-
income household. What constitutes a low income? The lowest income 
category reported by the U.S. Department of Education’s College 
Navigator website is for students who come from households with annual 
incomes of $30,000 and below. Column 5 reports the average net price paid 
by individuals in this lowest household income category.
William & Mary’s modest academic year net price of only $4,711 for 
its lowest-income students is an attention grabber and W&L’s $1,612 
price seems amazingly low. These figures make it appear as if the two 
institutions have made strong commitments to helping significant numbers 
of lower-income students matriculate on their campuses. Not so. The 
reality is that neither institution enrolls very many students who come 
from $0 to $30,000 annual income homes – in 2018-19, the number was 
only 1.35% of the undergraduate student body at W&M and it was an even 
smaller 1.12% at W&L.  
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Except for the Commonwealth’s historically black colleges and 
universities (HBCUs) and the University of Virginia’s College at Wise, 
no public four-year institution in Virginia enrolls a high percentage 
of low-income students.  Indeed, the average public four-year campus 
in the Commonwealth enrolls only 6.34% from the lowest-income 
quintile, while 45.69% of the undergraduate student body are from the 
highest-income quintile. When external observers lament that higher 
education is becoming the province of the wealthy, they have Virginia 
data to back up their assertions.  
A perusal of Table 1, however, reveals that substantial variations exist in 
both the public and independent sectors regarding average net prices. In 
the public sector, these prices range from Norfolk State University’s low 
of $12,645 to Christopher Newport University’s twice-as-high $25,443. In 
the independent realm, the lowest average net price is Regent University’s 
$15,062, while the high value is Hampden-Sydney College’s $34,853. It is 
fair to say that the higher education market for undergraduates is highly 
differentiated in Virginia. Many enrollment and pricing models exist.
Independent institutions such as the University of Richmond and W&L 
enroll high proportions of their undergraduate student bodies from 
higher-income households (74.23% of UR undergraduates come from 
the highest-income quintile and it is a highest-in-the-nation 81.34% at 
W&L). However, Table 1 reveals that four of Virginia’s public institutions 
(University of Mary Washington, UVA, James Madison University and 
W&M) draw at least 64% of their student bodies from the upper 20%.  
Indeed, contrary to the expectations of some, the entire public sector 
in Virginia is more heavily tilted toward the highest-income quintile 
than is true at the Commonwealth’s independent institutions. Of 
the undergraduate student bodies at Virginia’s public four-year 
institutions, 45.69% are drawn from the highest-income quintile, 
whereas Virginia’s independent institutions average only 42.49% in 
this regard. One reason for this is that several independent institutions 
that draw their students regionally or locally are situated in rural 
4 Dorothy A. Brown, “College isn’t the solution for the racial wealth gap. It’s part of the problem,” The Washington Post (April 9, 2021), www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/04/09/student-loans-black-wealth-gap.
5 IPEDS.
6 National Student Clearing House, www.studentclearinghouse.org.
7 Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, “Knocking at the College Door,” (December 2020), Table 2, www.wiche.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Knocking-pdf-for-website.pdf.
areas within Virginia where earned incomes are lower. Averett 
University, Ferrum College and Mary Baldwin University provide 
examples. If we set aside the Commonwealth’s two public HBCUs, then 
the remaining dozen public institutions draw an average of more than 
51% of their undergraduate student bodies from the highest 20% of the 
national income distribution. A recent op-ed in The Washington Post 
argued, “College isn’t the solution for the racial wealth gap. It’s part 
of the problem.”4 The author might have had Virginia in mind. 
The data in Table 1 also tell several other interesting stories, one of which 
relates to the extent to which institutions “discount” the tuition and fees 
and other revenues they receive from students. Put bluntly, most campuses 
imitate many businesses by putting some or all of their products “on sale.” 
They discount their sticker prices by offering grants and scholarships. 
Column 4 tells us that the typical public four-year institution in Virginia 
retains only 63.2% of the full-price revenue it collects per student. That 
is, it discounts (gives away) 36.8% of its sticker price revenue in grants 
and scholarships. Independent-sector discounting is even more dramatic 
– private institutions collectively retain only 49.8% of their sticker price 
revenue.  
Revenue discounting has risen in recent years as institutions have 
scrambled to maintain enrollments or to “improve” the makeup of their 
student bodies. At W&M, for example, the real (price-adjusted) revenue 
the institution earns per full-time equivalent student declined from 53.1% 
of its sticker price in FY 2009 to 47.3% in FY 2019. At Virginia Union 
University, the comparable decline was more dramatic, going from 87.5% 
in FY 2009 to 68.3% in FY 2019.5 To some extent these proportionately 
larger price concessions reflect enrollment realities. Headcount college 
enrollments nationally have fallen nine years in a row6 and it does not 
appear as if conditions are going to improve anytime soon. Between 
2019 and 2036, the number of public high school graduates in Virginia is 
forecast to decline by 22%.7  
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The larger proportionate price concessions being made by colleges and 
universities may seem to be good news for Virginia college students, but 
reality is that in absolute terms, even after adjusting for price inflation, 
the net prices paid by Virginia college students have risen steadily. 
Increases at some institutions have been stratospheric. At CNU, price-
adjusted tuition and fees for in-state students rose 55.6% between fall 
2009 and fall 2019, yielding an annual compound rate of increase of 4.5%.8 
Lest someone mistake what this means, this is the rate of increase in 
excess of the increase recorded by the consumer price index.
The pricing story differs substantially in the Virginia Community College 
System (VCCS), where much lower prices prevail. The average VCCS 
institution sticker price is only about one-fifth (22.3%) of that advertised 
by independent-sector institutions and only about three-eighths (37.9%) 
of that published by the average Virginia public-sector institution. These 
numbers have importance because sticker prices usually are the first 
financial number most prospective students encounter when they begin to 
shop higher education institutions.
The average net prices ultimately paid by students, of course, are 
substantially lower. In Virginia, the average net price paid by a community 
college student in 2018-19 was $7,132,9 compared to $18,350 at a 
representative four-year public institution and $24,567 at a representative 
independent-sector institution. Thus, a year’s study at a Virginia 
community college is less than half the cost of the same year at the typical 
Virginia four-year public institution and less than a third of doing the 
same year of study on a typical Virginia independent-sector campus.  
Students sort themselves out accordingly. Table 2 reveals that 16.1% of 
students on Virginia’s community college campuses came from households 
in the lowest-income quintile.10 Compare this to 6.34% at the four-year 
publics and 5.55% at the independent-sector institutions (Table 1). At the 
other end of the spectrum, 15.4% of community college students come from 
the highest-income quintile, compared to 45.69% at the four-year public 
institutions and 42.49% on independent-sector campuses.  
8 Chronicle of Higher Education, “Tuition and Fees, 1998-99 Through 2018-2019,” https://www.chronicle.com/article/tuition-and-fees-1998-99-through-2018-19.
9 This is the net price paid by a community college student who is living with a family.
10 The members of these households might be unsupported by parents or guardians.
11  We would expect, for example, a program in engineering to be more expensive than a program in sociology and for the typical graduate program to be more expensive than the typical undergraduate program. The salient question is 
not about such differentials but instead who gains access to the various programs.
Tidewater Community College has for many years advertised (accurately), 
“From here, go anywhere.” Among the many well-known individuals 
who started their college careers at a community college are astronaut 
Eileen Collins, Walt Disney, Morgan Freeman, Tom Hanks, Steve Jobs 
and Ross Perot. Opportunities abound for the ambitious student at a 
Virginia community college. However, the Commonwealth’s current 
system of funding higher education institutions, its practice of allowing 
each institution freedom to set its own tuition and fees and its inadequate 
funding of financial aid, taken together, effectively restricts the choices 
that many Virginians realistically can make at community colleges or any 
other institution.  
It is readily apparent that today’s Virginia college students are 
distributed across the institutional continuum substantially based upon 
their household incomes. One might accord little importance to this 
phenomenon were it not for three factors. First, the probability of a 
given student eventually earning a baccalaureate degree is higher if 
she enters a four-year institution rather than a community college. 
Second, substantially more money is being spent per student at the 
four-year institutions than in the community college system. Third, the 
subsequent employment and earnings prospects of students typically 
are enhanced (though not always) if they start out traveling the four-
year college route.   
The policy dilemma for Virginia is not that the preceding three conditions 
exist but instead the degrees to which they exist11 and the extent to which 
household incomes dictate student choices. In a democratic, opportunity-
oriented society, family incomes should not decide all issues, especially 
those relating to education. Societal cohesion will diminish and even break 
down if household income levels preordain the opportunities available to 
talented and ambitious citizens.
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TABLE 1
STICKER PRICES, NET PRICES AND STUDENT INCOME PERCENTILES: 
VIRGINIA COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 2018-19































Christopher Newport University $31,102 $25,443 .818 $16,529 .650 4.97% 33.82%
College of William & Mary $39,221 $18,551 .473 $4,711 .254 1.35% 69.82%
George Mason University $30,284 $20,157 .666 $16,204 .804 6.15% 47.92%
James Madison University $27,356 $18,708 .684 $14,196 .759 1.85% 64.48%
Longwood University $27,330 $19,636 .718 $14,704 .749 3.10% 46.59%
Norfolk State University $24,995 $12,645 .506 $11,277 .892 20.61% 10.04%
Old Dominion University $26,456 $16,681 .631 $12,017 .720 8.46% 29.33%
Radford University $24,088 $14,981 .622 $12,071 .806 4.40% 43.10%
University of Mary Washington $28,250 $21,640 .766 $12,988 .600 1.27% 65.29%
University of Virginia $33,493 $17,579 .525 $8,882 .505 2.82% 68.40%
Virginia Commonwealth University $32,041 $20,968 .654 $16,768 .800 7.08% 36.92%
Virginia Military Institute $31,494 $13,428 .426 $8,789 .655 4.60% 53.08%
Virginia Tech $26,834 $18,449 .688 $11,138 .604 2.84% 57.72%
Virginia State University $23,239 $18,034 .776 $15,586 .864 19.24% 13.08%
Averages $29,014 $18,350 .632 $12,561 .690 6.34% 45.69%
INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS
Averett University $47,918 $24,013 .501 $21,385 .891 8.18% 21.13%
Bridgewater College $51,310 $18,727 .365 $14,220 .759 5.96% 32.01%
Eastern Mennonite University $51,500 $24,936 .484 $22,935 .920 5.22% 35.31%
Ferrum College $48,530 $23,010 .474 $19,806 .861 11.28% 23.61%
Hampden-Sydney College $62,304 $34,853 .559 $23,836 .684 1.64% 64.78%
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TABLE 1
STICKER PRICES, NET PRICES AND STUDENT INCOME PERCENTILES: 
VIRGINIA COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 2018-19






























Hampton University $42,380 $27,441 .647 $29,650 1.080 7.96% 31.60%
Hollins University $55,555 $20,457 .368 $15,824 .774 4.69% 49.95%
Liberty University $40,075 $28,881 .721 $27,896 .966 N.A. N.A.
Mary Baldwin University $43,525 $17,879 .441 $15,218 .851 7.33% 27.31%
Marymount University $50,766 $27,843 .548 $22,212 .798 9.58% 39.17%
Randolph-Macon College $55,860 $27,429 .491 $23,012 .839 2.47% 56.20%
Randolph College $57,365 $26,802 .467 $16,205 .605 6.26% 44.54%
Regent University $29,763 $15,062 .506 $15,584 1.035 N.A. N.A.
Roanoke College $61,095 $27,180 .445 $17,473 .643 2.91% 51.46%
Shenandoah University $47,000 $29,311 .624 $25,891 .883 4.81% 42.03%
Southern Virginia University $28,261 $20,816 .737 $16,192 .778 7.66% 40.92%
Sweet Briar College $38,100 $25,859 .679 $20,529 .794 3.09% 49.19%
University of Lynchburg $53,650 $24,987 .466 $19,128 .766 N.A. N.A.
University of Richmond $67,020 $25,282 .377 $9,112 .360 1.74% 74.23%
Virginia Wesleyan University $50,517 $25,000 .495 $20,816 .833 8.10% 37.17%
Virginia Union University $31,358 $21,417 .683 $20,636 .964 N.A. N.A.
Washington and Lee University $70,500 $23,301 .331 $1,612 .069 1.12% 81.34%
Averages $49,289 $24,567 .498 $19,053 .780 5.55% 42.49% 
Sources: College Navigator for sticker prices and average net prices; Opportunity Insights for student income percentiles 
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TABLE 2
STICKER PRICES, NET PRICES AND STUDENT INCOME PERCENTILES: 
VIRGINIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES, 2018-19































Blue Ridge Community College $13,912 $10,534 .757 $9,611 .912 10.35% 20.51%
Central Virginia Community College $9,012 $5,436 .603 $4,679 .861 10.96% 16.52%
Dabney S. Lancaster 
Community College
$10,325 $5,951 .576 $4,958 .833 13.80% 9.23%
Danville Community College $11,110 $7,955 .716 $6,995 .879 16.67% 10.27%
Eastern Shore Community College $10,300 $6,117 .594 $5,530 .904 37.02% 5.48%
Germanna Community College $10,523 $7,271 .691 $5,919 .814 7.30% 26.41%
J. Sargeant Reynolds 
Community College
$9,998 $6,106 .611 $5,107 .836 12.68% 23.12%
John Tyler Community College $10,410 $6,573 .631 $5,442 .828 9.31% 26.31%
Lord Fairfax Community College $10,349 $6,580 .636 $5,517 .838 8.25% 21.36%
Mountain Empire Community College $11,510 $6,427 .558 $5,832 .907 26.34% 5.71%
New River Community College $11,117 $6,907 .621 $5,728 .829 11.66% 19.18%
Northern Virginia Community College $14,370 $9,440 .657 $8,175 .866 9.69% 35.87%
Patrick & Henry Community College $11,400 N.A. N.A N.A. N.A 19.33% 6.35%
Paul D. Camp Community College $8,472 $5,071 .599 $3,601 .710 24.56% 11.01%
Piedmont Virginia Community College $11,190 $6,913 .618 $5,950 .861 10.42% 22.51%
Rappahannock Community College $11,120 $7,740 .696 $6,749 .872 17.20% 12.93%
Richard Bland College $12,300 $12,203 .992 $11,081 .908 6.17% 22.41%
Southside Virginia Community College $12,042 $7,736 .642 $7,203 .931 28.64% 5.24%
Southwest Virginia Community College $13,803 $8,326 .603 $8,137 .977 27.23% 5.73%
Thomas Nelson Community College $10,266 $6,879 .670 $5,696 .828 13.86% 15.15%
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TABLE 2
STICKER PRICES, NET PRICES AND STUDENT INCOME PERCENTILES: 
VIRGINIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES, 2018-19































Tidewater Community College $10,829 $7,943 .733 $6,721 .846 14.85% 16.24%
Virginia Highlands Community College $11,110 $6,493 .584 $5,944 .915 19.29% 8.62%
Virginia Western Community College $10,941 $6,663 .609 $6,179 .927 11.62% 17.26%
Wytheville Community College $7,225 $2,761 .382 $2,057 .745 18.62% 6.09%
Averages $10,985 $7,132 .649 $6,209 .871 16.08% 15.40%
Sources: College Navigator for sticker prices and average net prices; Opportunity Insights for student income percentiles
       
12 Center for Microeconomic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Household Debt and Credit Report,” third quarter, 2021, www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/hhdc.
13  Student Loan Hero, “A Look at Shocking Student Loan Debt Statistics for 2021,” https://studentloanhero.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/#:~:text=88%25%20of%20graduates%20from%20for,class%20of%202018%20
was%20private.
14 Student Loan Hero.
15 Student Loan Hero.
16 State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, “Student Loans: All Institutions,” https://research.schev.edu//studentdebt/DebtProfile_SL021.asp.
17 See James V. Koch, The Impoverishment of the American College Student (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2019), 64-65, for a discussion of the effects of student debt on economic behavior.  
STUDENT DEBT
The rising real price of higher education simultaneously has reduced 
college enrollments and forced students and families to go into debt. 
It has been widely publicized that the student loan debt to the federal 
government now exceeds $1.58 trillion, up from $.81 trillion 10 years 
previously.12 Unfortunately, student debt does not stop there. In addition, 
households borrowed an estimated $132 billion from private lenders.13 
Further, on top of all this, 14% of parents borrowed an additional $100 
billion through the federal government’s Parent PLUS loan program. 
These loans averaged a hardly insignificant $37,000 per borrower.14 
Nationally, 69% of the graduating class of 2019 took out student loans, 
which averaged $29,900.15 In Virginia, SCHEV tells us that the average 
level of student debt in 2020 exceeded $30,000.16   
Students who graduate with debt are less likely to buy a car or purchase 
a home, but more likely live at home with their parents, and less likely 
to get married.17 An estimated 12% of public college attendees who take 
out student loans default on those loans, although creative labeling has 
disguised the reality that perhaps three times as many student debtors 
now are not servicing their debts as required. Ultimately, this behavior 
leads to tragedy. Since student loan debt ordinarily is not dischargeable in 
a bankruptcy proceeding, default on a student loan results in a black mark 
on one’s financial records that will trail her the remainder of her life.  
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There is an additional, more subtle problem with federal student loans 
that often is overlooked. Evidence exists that the flow of federal student 
loan money into institutions results in their charging higher tuition and 
fees.18 This is an example of what economists label a “moral hazard” 
problem. If the federal government is going to pay for some portion of 
every tuition and fee increase, then there is an incentive for an institution 
to make larger increases in these prices than they would have made 
otherwise. 
We will note the obvious: High levels of student debt are bad economic 
news for the individuals who incur this debt, for businesses that hope 
to sell to them and for governments. Thus, public policies aimed at 
restraining college cost increases and/or increasing the availability 
of student financial aid often make good sense.19 Virginia, however, 
generally has soft-pedaled the former and underfunded the latter. 
The Commonwealth’s romance with college ratings, plus centuries of 
tradition, has militated against change. Only very recently has this 
scenario begun to change, primarily because of the ascension of women 
and Black legislators into leadership positions. Their sensitivity to the 
issues we have outlined has begun to influence how public institutions 
are funded and how financial aid dollars are allocated.  
18 James V. Koch, 51-68.
19 Free college for all, however, probably is not among the best solutions.
20 Association of American Colleges & Universities, “Transfer and Mobility: A National View of Student Movements” (August 2015), www.aacu.org.
21 College Navigator, National Center for Education Statistics, “Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions,” Table 303.40, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d19/tables/dt19_303.40.asp.  
22 College Navigator, Table 303.40.
First-Time, Full-Time 
Six-Year Graduation Rates
One of the most commonly cited measures of an institution’s productivity 
is its graduation rate, and the most commonly cited graduation rate is 
the one that measures the percentage of first-time, full-time students 
who earn a baccalaureate degree in six or fewer years. Despite many 
acknowledged deficiencies, graduation rates continue to be widely used and 
cited. Thus, like it or not, they become part of the discussion.
The major problem with the six-year graduation rate for first-time, full-
time freshmen is that it’s not clear it is a good descriptor of a modern 
institution of higher education. The Association of American Colleges & 
Universities reports that 37% of all undergraduate students transferred at 
least once between 2008 and 2014.20 How does one assign credit or blame 
to the institutions in question? Further, in fall 2020, 35.3% of students at 
public four-year institutions were enrolled part time.21 In addition, more 
than 40% of students attending public institutions today are age 25 or 
older.22  
The upshot is that the first-time, full-time graduation rates are a 
performance measure that focuses on what happens to individuals who 
enter college as full-time students after receiving their high school 
diplomas. This is interesting information to have available, but hardly 
definitive. First-time, full-time six-year graduation rates don’t include 
approximately half of all undergraduate students today.  
And yet the U.S. Department of Education’s highly touted College 
Navigator website reports first-time, full-time six-year graduation rates 
without commenting on, or compensating for, their problematic nature. 
Further, the “What are we really measuring here?” status of these rates 
has not discouraged widely cited institutional rating systems, such as the 
rankings published annually by U.S. News & World Report, from using 
them as an input in their calculations.  
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These reservations notwithstanding, six-year graduation rates for first-
time, full-time freshmen are frequently cited and we cannot change this 
practice. We can, however, provide context for those rates here. We will 
sensitize our interpretation of them by recognizing the most important 
factors that influence them. We take six factors into account:
HHINC = Median household income of students at the institution (higher 
incomes ordinarily mean higher graduation rates)
SAT = Midpoint summary SAT score of an institution’s students (higher 
SAT scores usually mean higher graduation rates)
NETPRICE = Average net price of attendance after grants and 
scholarships have been taken into account (higher net prices discourage 
attendance and reduce graduation rates)
PCTFT = Percentage of students who are full time (when more students 
attend full time, graduation rates are likely to rise)
PCTTRANS = Percentage of undergraduate students who transferred 
to an institution from a community college (transfer students can lose 
both academic credits and a sense of belonging, which results in lower 
graduation rates)
IND = Whether the institution is public or private/independent (private 
institutions do not receive much, if any, state funding and by itself this 
bodes to decrease graduation rates)
Using a statistical technique known as multiple linear regression, we 
generate estimated graduation rates for each institution based upon these 
six factors. The estimated graduation rates tell us what we should expect 
from a college or university in terms of graduation rates if it operates 
similarly to other four-year institutions in Virginia. We have 36 four-year 
Commonwealth campuses in our sample (14 public, 22 independent) and 
our analysis sifts the data from each.  
Our analysis enables us to determine how specific variables influence 
graduation rates. Consider the role that household incomes play. In our 
23  Among many, see Jillian Berman, “Higher education essentially preserves intergenerational racial and class inequality: How coronavirus could make it worse,” MarketWatch (June 12, 2020), www.marketwatch.com/story/how-the-
coronavirus-pandemic-could-create-a-ticking-time-bomb-that-worsens-racial-and-income-inequality-in-higher-education-2020-06-11.
Virginia sample, every one percentile upward movement by the student 
body in the national income distribution increases an institution’s expected 
graduation rate by .75% (holding other things constant). This makes sense 
because students coming from upper-income households have a greater 
ability to pay for higher education. Thus, if a student body becomes 
wealthier (as indicated by the incomes of students’ home households 
rising) and collectively moves up 10 percentiles in the national income 
distribution (say, from the 50th percentile to the 60th percentile), then we 
predict a 7.5% increase in that school’s graduation rate.  
Analogously, a 100-point increase in the midpoint SAT average on a 
campus translates to a 5.7% increase in that campus’s graduation rate. We 
also can predict that a 5% absolute increase in the number of community 
college transfers coming to a four-year institution will reduce that 
campus’s graduation rate by 1.69%.  
It should come as no surprise that just two factors (SAT and HHINC) by 
themselves explain about three-quarters of the variability in graduation 
rates at Virginia’s four-year colleges and universities. Put differently, if 
we know the average academic preparation of students as a group, and 
we also know the annual income level of the average student household, 
then we can explain about 75% of the ups and downs in graduation rates 
for first-time, full-time students within six years after they initially 
matriculated. The tendency for this to hold true has caused some 
to argue that American higher education no longer is a vehicle that 
reduces inequality within our society, but rather has shifted to become a 
mechanism by which inequalities are accentuated.23   
Table 3 presents data showing the actual graduation rates of Virginia 
colleges and universities and in parentheses any difference between that 
rate and our predicted rate. Thus, for Virginia Commonwealth University, 
its actual graduation rate (67%) and our predicted rate are identical.  
One should not make too much of small differences between our predicted 
graduation rates and the institutions’ actual graduation rates. However, 
Southern Virginia University, an independent institution located in 
Buena Vista that enrolls about 1,000 students, reports a graduation rate 
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of 31%, a massive 25% below the value we predict based on the incomes 
and SAT scores of its students, its proportion of full-time students, 
etc. Quite simply, by our metric, SVU is underperforming and should 
investigate why this is true. Mary Washington’s -13% and Ferrum’s -11% 
underperformances also should be matters of concern to those campuses.  
In Mary Washington’s case, a substantial 29% of each entering class 
transfers out of the institution (the highest rate among the public 
institutions in our sample).24 It behooves UMW to find out why. Students 
entering UMW emanate from households whose incomes rank on average 
in the 79.6th percentile nationally25 and their SAT midpoint score was 
a very respectable 1,174 in 2018-19.26 Ordinarily, such data translate to 
much higher graduation rates. If we knew nothing other than the income 
percentile and SAT midpoint score for UMW, already we predict a 
graduation rate of 72 for it, rather than its actual 65.  
At the other end of the spectrum, Regent University’s +11% performance, 
Virginia Tech’s +10% showing, Longwood University’s +9% performance 
and Marymount University’s +8% achievement should prompt other 
schools to attempt to ascertain what these institutions are doing right. Not 
all “best practices” are transferable from one campus to another, but many 
are.  
Regent University provides an interesting and probably distinct 
example. The institution’s student body does not reflect either especially 
high household incomes or lofty SAT scores. Four things stand out at 
Regent, however. First, it is an inexpensive institution whose net cost of 
attendance is the second lowest among accredited four-year independent 
institutions in Virginia. Second, 61% of its undergraduate enrollees 
are 25 or older; the average in our 36-institution sample is only 10.9%. 
Presumably these more mature individuals have made firm life choices 
and also have the ability to pay for college. Third, Regent advertises 
that it is a “Christ-centered” institution.27 Those who do not find this 





28 National Association of College and University Business Officers, “2020 NACUBO-TIAA Study of Endowments” (April 22, 2021), 2020 NACUBO-TIAA Study of Endowments.
29 This evidence is summarized and extended in James V. Koch and Omari H. Swinton, Pulling Back the Veil: Assessing the Performance of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).  
have firm career plans in mind and might choose to pursue, for example, 
a B.A. degree in Christian ministry or a degree in a discipline such as 
psychology or government that is tailored to enable them to exercise their 
faith. Regent students are motivated toward a goal. Fourth, Regent has 
made a strong commitment to distance learning. This helps students who 
otherwise might choose to drop out for family reasons to continue through 
to graduation.  
Finally, let us focus our attention on the four HBCUs in our sample: 
Hampton University, Norfolk State University, Virginia State University 
and Virginia Union University. Though the average graduation rate at 
NSU, VSU and VUU collectively is only 34.3%, none of their performances 
can be labeled as disappointing given the six factors previously outlined. 
Indeed, VUU exceeds its expected graduation rate by 5%.  
Hampton University represents a different situation. Along with HBCUs 
such as Howard University, Morehouse University and Spelman University, 
HU is considered among the HBCU elite. Its 66% graduation rate, which 
compares favorably to Virginia’s non-HBCU institutions, signals one of 
the reasons why. HU, however, also enjoys a $280 million endowment 
thanks to the fundraising prowess of its soon to retire president, William 
Harvey.28 By itself, this places HU in a different class from all but a few 
other HBCUs in terms of the resources available to it.
Beyond higher incomes and SAT scores, there does not appear to be a 
magic elixir that consistently generates high graduation rates. There is 
modest evidence that institutions that spend proportionately more on 
instruction enjoy higher graduation rates and also that Black students 
in particular benefit from having Black role models on their campuses. 
Increased levels of state appropriations per full-time equivalent student do 
not appear to be related to graduation rates. Higher levels of expenditures 
on intercollegiate athletics act as a drag on graduation rates, as do 
increasing proportions of expenditures on student services.29      
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TABLE 3
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED FIRST-TIME, FULL-TIME SIX-YEAR GRADUATION RATES 
FOR 36 VIRGINIA COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 2019
Public Institutions
2018-19 First-Time, Full-Time Six-Year 
Graduation Rate (Over/Underperform 
Predicted Value)
Independent Institutions
2018-19 First-Time, Full-Time Six-Year 
Graduation Rate (Over/Underperform 
Predicted Value)
Christopher Newport University 78   (+5) Averett University 42   (-4)
College of William & Mary 90   (-5) Bridgewater College 59   (+7)
George Mason University 71   (+0) Eastern Mennonite University 58   (+1)
James Madison University 84   (+3) Ferrum College 29   (-11)
Longwood University 75   (+9) Hampden-Sydney College 68   (-4)
Norfolk State University 36   (-1) Hampton University 66   (+2)
Old Dominion University 53   (-5) Hollins University 66   (+2)
Radford University 55   (-5) Liberty University 47   (-5)
University of Mary Washington 65   (-13) Mary Baldwin University 38   (-5)
University of Virginia 95   (+1) Marymount University 58   (+8)
Virginia Commonwealth University 67   (0) Randolph-Macon College 68   (+1)
Virginia Military Institute 79   (+2) Randolph College 51  (-6)
Virginia Tech 86   (+10) Regent University 57   (+11)
Virginia State University 38   (-1) Roanoke College 70   (+5)
Shenandoah University 60   (+2)
Southern Virginia University 31   (-25)
Sweet Briar College 65  (+3)
University of Lynchburg 58   (-1)
University of Richmond 89   (-1)
Virginia Wesleyan University 48   (-5)
Virginia Union University 29   (+5)
Washington and Lee University 94  (+2)
Notes: Because these are six-year graduation rates for 2019, this means that the students being measured began their studies as first-time, full-time students in fall 2013. UVA Wise is not included because data were not available. 
First-time, full-time graduation rates come from the U.S. Department of Education’s College Navigator. The data for the predictive model come from the College Navigator (percent full-time and average net price), Opportunity 
Insights (household incomes), the U.S. Department of Education’s College Scorecard (SAT scores) and the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (community college transfer rates).
129
Economic Mobility
Institutions of higher education have long prided themselves on the vital 
roles they play in increasing the economic and social mobility of their 
students. Metaphorically, colleges and universities are said to open doors 
of opportunity and enable their graduates to climb the ladder of success. 
Valid or not, these notions have become important building blocks that 
help define how most Americans believe this segment of their society 
should operate.  
Historically, there has been more than fluff attached to these metaphors. 
The City College of New York alone, for example, can boast such esteemed 
graduates as Colin Powell, Jonas Salk, Woody Allen, Henry Kissinger, 
Felix Frankfurter, Andy Grove, Ed Koch, Eli Wallach, Alfred Stieglitz, 
Faith Ringgold, Edward G. Robinson, Bernard Baruch, Ira Gershwin, 
Upton Sinclair, Kenneth Arrow, Abraham Maslow, A. Philip Randolph 
and Alan Dershowitz.  
A single flagship state university, the University of California, Berkeley, 
boasts 29 Nobel Prize winners among its alumni, who include Steve 
Wozniak, Earl Warren, Gregory Peck, Jerry Brown, Daniel Kahneman, 
Robert McNamara, Jack London, Betty Friedan and Michio Kaku.  
America’s HBCUs have served as a wellspring for many individuals who 
have helped shape society. HBCU graduates include Martin Luther King 
Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Oprah Winfrey, Spike Lee, Toni Morrison, Alice 
Walker, Samuel L. Jackson, Marion Wright Edelman, Langston Hughes, 
Ralph Ellison and Booker T. Washington.    
These are impressive lists, but the individuals on them are either old or 
deceased. Thus, it is legitimate to ask: Do institutions of higher education 
still provide the means to move upward in society? Are some institutions 
better at this than others? How do Virginia colleges and universities fare 
in this regard?  
Opportunity Insights, which we mentioned earlier, has assembled an 
impressive database that tracks the earnings of individuals who attended 
30  Opportunity Insights.
most colleges and universities in the United States. It is, however, limited 
to those born in the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, who subsequently attended 
college (presumably beginning about 1998 and extending through 2013). 
The focus is on the income such individuals earned in 2014. The earnings 
of any other persons in these individuals’ households are not counted.30   
PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR INSTITUTIONS
Let’s begin by examining the economic mobility performances of Virginia’s 
four-year public institutions. Opportunity Insights uses the terminology 
“kids” to refer to former students in order to distinguish them from their 
parents. We will follow suit even though many hardly qualify as kids.  
Column 2 of Table 4 displays the income percentiles in 2014 of kids who 
were born in 1980, 1981 and 1982. They may or may not have graduated 
and they may have earned subsequent academic degrees. They are 
assigned to the institution where they were registered the greatest number 
of years. One can see that the income percentiles range from 56.7 at NSU 
to 78.0 at Virginia Military Institute. The median value is the 64.5th 
percentile ranking for Old Dominion University and Radford University. 
Thus, by 2014, departing students at these two institutions had ensconced 
themselves within the fourth income quintile and had average individual 
incomes exceeding 64.5% of households.  
However, as column 4 in Table 4 reveals, in only 6 of 15 possible cases was 
the income percentile of the kids higher than that of their parents when 
they entered college. NSU’s 1.304 bulge of kids’ incomes over parents’ 
incomes means that by 2014, former NSU students were earning 30.4% 
more (in real terms) than their parents were earning years earlier when 
the students entered the university. VSU, with a kids/parents ratio of 
1.249, also stands out in this regard.
The data in Table 4 appropriately might be construed as an advertisement 
for the transformative economic prowess of HBCUs. Both Norfolk State 
and Virginia State exhibit considerably more effectiveness in raising 
the relative economic status of their students than does the typical PWI 
(predominantly white institution) in the remainder of the population. The 
two HBCUs may indeed be doing a very good job in this regard; however, 
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when incomes are scaled 0 to 100 as we have done, it is a much easier 
task to achieve relative success if one starts at the lower end of that 
scale. Mathematically, it is difficult for W&M (where the parental income 
percentile was 81.4) to achieve large proportional gains.  
Nevertheless, excepting VMI, the largest relative upward movements 
in the income distribution are found at the somewhat less selective 
institutions rather than at those institutions ranked among U.S. News & 
World Report’s elite.  
There is a racial context to this circumstance. Enrollment of minority 
students, especially Blacks, is far higher at the somewhat less selective 
institutions than at the elite. In 2018-19, the percentages of Black 
undergraduate students at W&M, UVA and Virginia Tech were 7%, 7% 
and 4%, respectively. At George Mason University, ODU and VCU, the 
respective percentages were 11%, 32% and 28%.31 Thus, far more Black 
students achieve their relative income gains at the somewhat less selective 
institutions.32  
The policy moral to this story is that the relative contributions of 
somewhat less selective institutions to the economic mobility of their 
former students usually are higher than those from more selective 
institutions. Further, since the less selective institutions admit far 
more students from lower-income households than the selective 
institutions, their total impact on economic mobility far exceeds that 
of the more selective institutions. The more selective institutions may 
do wonders for a small number of lower-income and some minority 
students, but as column 3 of Table 4 reveals, the representative 
undergraduate at these institutions comes to campus from an upper-
income household. Contrast the 80.9th household income percentile of 
UVA students to the 61.4th income percentile of ODU students. This 
difference between the two is an entire income quintile and its impact 
is readily evident when one steps foot on these campuses and observes 
the students as they walk to and from classes.  
31 College Navigator.
32 In absolute terms, however, their 2014 salary may be higher if they attended a more selective institution.  
33 College Navigator.
34 College Navigator.
An additional way to frame the economic mobility analysis is to ask what 
happens to students who come to Virginia institutions from households 
in the bottom quintile (lowest 20%) of the income distribution. Where 
do they end up? Column 5 of Table 4 relies on Opportunity Insights data 
to supply the answer for students attending Virginia’s public four-year 
institutions. At JMU, for example, students who come from the lowest 
20% of the income distribution ended up in 2014 in the 64.8th percentile 
of the income distribution. At UMW, the leader in this regard, the 
comparable metric was 70.2%. These would be entirely praiseworthy 
performances if they applied to very many students on these campuses. 
In fact, a mere 1.27% of UMW’s undergraduates come from the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution, while it is 1.85% at JMU.33 Thus, few 
students actually benefit from these institutions’ proficiency in moving 
them upward. By contrast, 7.1% of undergraduates at VCU emanated from 
the lowest 20% of the income distribution, while the number was 20.65% 
at NSU.34 This means that the overall impact of institutions such as VCU 
and NSU on economic mobility is much larger than that at either UMW 
or JMU.
INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS
How do private (independent) institutions of higher education in Virginia 
fit into this picture? Table 5 tackles this issue by means of a sample 
that consists of 19 not-for-profit institutions and four for-profit private 
institutions.    
Where the not-for-profit independents are concerned, in general the 
students come from families that have less income than those attending 
the publics (the 63rd percentile of the income distribution for the publics, 
but only the 56th percentile for the independents). This is a reality 
contrary to the expectations of casual observers. 
Years later, students who attended Virginia’s four-year public institutions 
were earning incomes that placed them in the 66.5th percentile nationally 
versus only the 62.7th percentile for the not-for-profit independents. The 
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differences are starker with respect to the for-profit institutions; their 
students subsequently earned incomes that placed them only in the 48.6th 
percentile. A representative four-year public institution, then, is more 
effective in providing an economic lift to its students than the typical 
independent institution, and the gap between the two is especially large 
when the comparison is with for-profit campuses.    
To the extent that a sample of four for-profit institutions allows us to 
make any useful generalizations, we note that they tend to enroll lower-
income students who subsequently do not rise as far upward in the income 
distribution as students attending either a public or an independent four-
year institution. We will defer any discussions of federal student loan 
policies concerning for-profit institutions to another day.   
COMMUNITY COLLEGES
Opportunity Insights publishes comparable data for community colleges, 
although the income connection between community colleges and their 
students is less firm because large numbers of these students ultimately 
transfer to four-year institutions. This means that either community 
college students end up being counted at the four-year institution, or the 
impacts of the four-year institution and the “transfer from” institution 
are mixed together. Hence, we have a lower level of confidence in the data 
reported in Table 6 than the data found in Tables 4 and 5.
Community colleges offer a badly needed low-cost alternative to the 
four-year institutions we have just profiled. Community colleges appeal 
to the income segments that most four-year institutions downplay or 
ignore. This is, however, a relative consideration. The average income 
percentile of the households of students attending Virginia’s community 
colleges is 50.7 – in other words, the middle of the income distribution. 
The comparable percentile for the four-year public institutions is 67.9, 
while it is 68.9 for the not-for-profit institutions. These percentile 
rankings underscore the fact that Virginia higher education leans in 
the direction of servicing those better off financially than those on the 
lower end of the scale.    
Note that 16.1% of the student body of the representative Virginia 
community college come from households in the lowest quintile of the 
income distribution, while another 19.5% emanate from the second 
income quintile. If there are citizens who are neglected or left out in 
American society, it is likely that these individuals are among them. It is 
at community colleges where the rubber meets the road in terms of society 
providing hope and opportunity. And, it is precisely such lower-income 
students who are being largely ignored by Virginia’s most prestigious 
institutions.     
Even so, the community college alternative is not perfect. Community 
college students on average do not end up with earned incomes comparable 
to those enjoyed by students from the four-year institutions. Further, if 
they came to their community college campus from a household in the 
lowest 20% of the income distribution, their incomes do not increase to the 
same level as would be true at either the four-year public or independent 
colleges and universities.  
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TABLE 4
MEASURING THE INCOME MOBILITY PROVIDED BY PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN VIRGINIA: 
OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS DATA, 1980-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institution Kids’ Income Percentile Parents’ Income Percentile
Kids’ Percentile Divided by 
Parents’ Percentile
Kids’ Percentile if Parents 




61.8 66.6 .928 55.9
College of William & Mary 72.1 81.8 .881 66.9
George Mason University 69.4 69.4 1.000 68.4
James Madison University 70.5 79.5 .886 64.8
Longwood University 62.6 71.6 .875 59.8
Norfolk State University 56.7 43.5 1.304 54.3
Old Dominion University 64.5 61.4 1.050 62.7
Radford University 64.5 69.4 .929 59.1
University of Mary 
Washington
67.4 79.6 .846 70.2
University of Virginia 75.7 80.9 .936 69.5
University of Virginia’s 
College at Wise
62.2 54.4 1.143 57.2
Virginia Commonwealth 
University
61.0 64.7 .942 58.9
Virginia Military Institute 78.0 74.1 1.053 67.4
Virginia Tech 73.2 76.4 .959 69.6
Virginia State University 57.2 45.8 1.249 53.6
Averages 66.5 67.9 .999 62.6
Sources: Opportunity Insights and author calculations
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TABLE 5
MEASURING THE INCOME MOBILITY PROVIDED BY INDEPENDENT FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN VIRGINIA: 
OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS DATA, 1980-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Kids’ Percentile Divided by 
Parents’ Percentile
Kids’ Percentile if Parents Were 
in the Lowest-Income Quintile
NOT-FOR-PROFIT
Averett University 58.5 54.4 1.07 54.9
Bridgewater College 64.1 65.4 .98 52.2
Eastern Mennonite University 60.1 66.1 .91 44.8
Emory and Henry College 62.1 62.5 .99 52.3
Ferrum College 59.1 56.9 1.04 51.1
Hampden-Sydney College 72.8 79.4 .92 68.2
Hampton University 65.3 61.6 1.06 60.6
Hollins University 56.7 71.1 .80 59.2
Mary Baldwin University 57.8 61.0 .95 57.0
Marymount University 64.0 64.0 1.00 56.8
Randolph-Macon College 68.9 78.0 .88 58.9
Randolph College 58.7 69.2 .85 48.8
Roanoke College 64.6 73.9 .88 65.2
Shenandoah University 60.5 68.8 .88 54.7
Southern Virginia University 45.9 65.1 .71 40.9
Sweet Briar College 60.2 72.6 .83 65.1
University of Richmond 75.3 84.6 .89 56.9
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TABLE 5
MEASURING THE INCOME MOBILITY PROVIDED BY INDEPENDENT FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN VIRGINIA: 
OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS DATA, 1980-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Kids’ Percentile Divided by 
Parents’ Percentile
Kids’ Percentile if Parents Were 
in the Lowest-Income Quintile
Virginia Wesleyan University 59.8 64.9 .92 56.8
Washington and Lee University 76.9 88.8 .87 60.2
Averages 62.7 68.9 .92 56.0
FOR-PROFIT 
American National University 39.5 37.0 1.07 37.4
ECPI University 52.7 46.3 1.14 48.1
Sanford-Brown College 47.6 41.6 1.15 44.0
Strayer University 54.4 48.0 1.16 50.7
Averages 48.6 43.2 1.13 45.0
Sources: Opportunity Insights and author calculations
TABLE 6
MEASURING THE INCOME MOBILITY PROVIDED BY VIRGINIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES: 
OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS DATA, 1980-2014






Kids’ Income Percentile 
Divided by Parents’ Income 
Percentile
Kids’ Income Percentile if 
Parents Were in Lowest-Income 
Quintile
Blue Ridge Community College 52.5 56.3 .932 51.1
Central Virginia Community College 51.3 54.5 .942 50.0
Dabney S. Lancaster Community College 52.8 50.2 1.053 54.0
Danville Community College 50.4 47.8 1.055 48.5
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TABLE 6
MEASURING THE INCOME MOBILITY PROVIDED BY VIRGINIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES: 
OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS DATA, 1980-2014






Kids’ Income Percentile 
Divided by Parents’ Income 
Percentile
Kids’ Income Percentile if 
Parents Were in Lowest-Income 
Quintile
Eastern Shore Community College 47.0 33.8 1.388 47.4
Germanna Community College 54.0 62.1 .869 52.4
J. Sargeant Reynolds Community College 51.1 55.5 .921 48.9
John Tyler Community College 52.1 59.4 .876 49.0
Lord Fairfax Community College 54.0 57.9 .932 51.6
Mountain Empire Community College 42.2 39.7 1.065 42.2
New River Community College 51.2 55.3 .925 46.9
Northern Virginia Community College 57.5 62.1 .926 56.3
Patrick & Henry Community College 46.7 42.9 1.093 44.0
Paul D. Camp Community College 48.5 46.3 1.047 48.9
Piedmont Virginia Community College 52.3 55.8 .936 50.7
Rappahannock Community College 51.0 49.0 1.041 50.8
Richard Bland College 53.7 62.9 .853 54.6
Southside Virginia Community College 46.2 37.9 1.219 44.0
Southwest Virginia Community College 45.1 40.1 1.124 43.9
Thomas Nelson Community College 50.1 52.1 .962 48.6
Tidewater Community College 51.0 52.2 .976 49.5
Virginia Highlands Community College 47.1 45.2 1.043 46.3
Virginia Western Community College 49.7 54.0 .921 48.7
Wytheville Community College 47.9 44.6 1.075 42.4
Averages 50.2 50.7 1.01 48.8
Sources: Opportunity Insights and author calculations
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Policy Considerations
Disparities among the institutions outlined in this chapter have caused 
more than a few observers to conclude that American higher education 
in general and its elite institutions are now the source of “the problem” 
rather than part of the solution. The problem we highlight here is one that 
involves increased economic inequality and reduced economic mobility. 
Georgetown University’s oft-cited Center on Education and the Workforce 
labels the failure of some to understand what has been going on in higher 
education as the “Merit Myth” and presents data to argue that today 
“our colleges favor the rich and divide America.”35 While we agree with 
this general critique, a less strident reading of the evidence is that most 
highly ranked campuses today gradually have become more economically 
and racially segregated due to a combination of federal and state policies, 
coupled with certain societal changes.  
With respect to state policies, in states such as Virginia the existence 
of independent governing boards for each public institution of higher 
education has allowed these institutions to go their own way with respect 
to admission policies, financial aid, the self-describing narrative they 
present to the public and, sometimes, even their mission. This has resulted 
in some campuses becoming substantially segregated in terms of student 
income levels and race. This evolution elicited a harsh critique in a recent 
report by the Education Reform Now think tank.36  
By way of illustration, the Education Reform Now report noted that five of 
the 15 public universities in the United States with the lowest percentage 
enrollments of Pell Grant students are located in Virginia – JMU, VMI, 
CNU, UVA and W&M. On the other hand, in terms of the percentage 
of students who come from households in the highest-income quintile, 
W&L leads the nation at 81.34%. W&M has the highest percentage of 
any four-year public institution, at 69.82%. UVA is second among the 
publics at 68.39%, while UMW ranks third at 65.29% and JMU is fourth 
at 64.48%.37 Virginia is distinctive among the states for the economic (and 
35 Anthony P. Carnevale, Peter Schmidt and Jeff Strohl, The Merit Myth: How Our Colleges Favor the Rich and Divide America (New York: The New Press), 2020.
36 Michael Dannenberg, “De Facto Segregation in Virginia Higher Ed,” Education Reform Now (April 12, 2021), https://edreformnow.org/blog/de-facto-segregation-in-virginias-higher-ed-system.
37 Opportunity Insights.
often racial) stratification it has allowed to occur in its public system of 
higher education.   
Whatever the causes of this stratification nationally and in Virginia, 
the traditional higher education task of providing opportunities for 
economic mobility has been largely forfeited by the elite and now 
falls substantially within the provinces of the community colleges and 
larger public urban institutions (GMU, ODU and VCU fill this bill in 
the Commonwealth). It is they who effectively now carry the economic 
mobility torch. If Virginia hopes to skirt destructive class and racial 
conflicts in the future, then it will be its community colleges and large 
urban institutions that will have to carry the proverbial ball forward. 
This does not preclude changes in behavior on the part of other 
institutions, but most have exhibited only marginal interest in doing so. 
But what if the Commonwealth of Virginia dispensed state appropriations 
more visibly based on which institutions are at the forefront of fighting 
economic inequality? What if SCHEV annually published data showing 
both the relative and absolute contributions to reducing economic 
inequality made by each institution? What if the current batch of 
remarkably amorphous portions of the Code of Virginia that are supposed 
to guide Virginia’s colleges and universities were amended to make the 
restoration of economic mobility an identified higher education priority? 
What if boards of visitors then began to evaluate and compensate 
presidents at least partially on the basis of their success in mobilizing 
their campuses to be part of the emerging solution instead of a recurrent 
source of the problem? Rather than something new and daring, properly 
interpreted, these developments would constitute a clear-headed return to 
once cherished values. 







Well I was born in a small town 
And I can breathe in a small town 
Gonna die in this small town 
And that’s probably where they’ll bury me
–  John Mellencamp, American musician, 
“Small Town”  
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C
onversations about growth in Virginia 
often center on the larger metropolitan 
areas of Northern Virginia, Richmond 
and Hampton Roads. Yet, there is another 
story to be told about Virginia, a story about 
its smaller, more rural, metropolitan areas. 
Some Virginians are choosing to trade the 
hustle and bustle of the big urban-centered 
metros by moving to more rural regions in 
search of a higher quality of life. Many of these 
new residents commute to work in another 
region. The phenomenon is not unique to the 
Commonwealth, as we are witnessing the rise 
of exurban (outside a city’s suburbs) regions in 
the United States.
The Winchester, Virginia-West Virginia 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), 
hereafter referred to as the Winchester 
metro area, appears poised to benefit from the 
continued growth of the Northern Virginia 
economy. Over the past decade, the influx of 
new residents from Northern Virginia has 
proven to be a boon (sparking growth in 
incomes and jobs) to the regional economy. 
On the flip side, however, it also has been 
somewhat of a bane (in terms of increasing 
traffic, population density and demand for 
public services).
The Winchester metro area, which 
encompasses the city of Winchester, Frederick 
County, Virginia, and Hampshire County, 
West Virginia, had a total population of over 
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142,000 in 2020.1 The principal city in the metro area, Winchester, is 
also the oldest Virginia city west of the Blue Ridge Mountains.2 Located 
at the northern entrance of the Shenandoah Valley, the city’s population 
reached 27,700 in 2020. Other notable Virginia cities and towns within 
the metro area are Lake Holiday, Middleton and Stephens City. In West 
Virginia, only the small town of Springfield is part of the metro area. The 
remainder of the Winchester MSA consists of census-designated areas 
and unincorporated areas in Virginia and West Virginia.
CITY OF WINCHESTER, VIRGINIA
In broad strokes, residents of the Winchester metro area are slightly 
older, less educated, whiter and travel farther for work when compared 
to fellow Virginians (Table 1). In 2019, the median age in the Winchester 
MSA was 41.3 years, 2.8 years older than Virginia and the United States. 
The region was predominately white, with 82% of its residents identifying 
as such in 2019, 21 percentage points higher than the Commonwealth 
average. Almost 9 in 10 residents held a high school degree or higher in 
2019, slightly less than Virginia and the nation. On the other hand, only 
26.7% of Winchester residents had earned a bachelor’s degree or higher 
in 2019, less than Virginia or the United States. Median household income 
in 2019 was approximately the same in the Winchester region and the 
Commonwealth and almost $11,000 higher than the nation. This may be 
explained, in part, by the fact that average commuting times were higher 
for the residents of the Winchester metro area, as some residents live in 
the region and work in Northern Virginia.
1 We use the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2020 vintage population estimates, which were based on the 2010 Census. New population estimates based on the 2020 decennial census will become available in 2022.
2  Col. James Wood Sr., lieutenant in the Royal Navy, colonel in the Frederick County (Virginia) Militia and Oxford University alumnus, founded Winchester in 1744 on an acquired tract of land and named it after his hometown: 
Winchester, Hampshire, England.
TABLE 1 
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: WINCHESTER MSA, VIRGINIA AND 







Median Age 41.3 38.5 38.5
Under 18 22% 22% 22%
18 to 64 60% 62% 61%
65 and Over 18% 16% 16%
RACE/ETHNICITY
White 82% 61% 60%
Black or African 
American
5% 19% 12%
Asian 1% 7% 6%
Hispanic 9% 10% 18%
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT













Travel Time to Work 
(minutes)
31.8 29.1 27.6
Sources: Census Reporter and U.S. Census Bureau (2019) American Community Survey 1-year estimates. 
Data for Winchester MSA race categories are ACS 2019 5-year data. Hispanic includes respondents of any 
race. Other race categories are non-Hispanic.
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Winchester may be small, but it has outperformed many of the larger 
metropolitan areas in the Commonwealth during the COVID-19 
pandemic. While Hampton Roads struggles to regain the jobs it 
lost in 2020, the Winchester region has not only regained the jobs 
lost there in 2020, but it has also added new jobs. Median housing 
prices continue to increase in the Winchester metro area as median 
household incomes have risen sharply over the last decade. Winchester 
may be tied to the fortunes of the Washington, D.C., metro area, but 
it has also managed to attract and retain new employers. Winchester 
packs a proverbial economic punch well above its weight class.
In this chapter, we delve into economic conditions in the Winchester metro 
area.  We first discuss how the MSA’s population has changed over time 
and how commuting has contributed to population growth. We examine 
how the Winchester region moved from an area that was relatively poor 
when compared to Virginia and the nation to one that is equal in income 
to the Commonwealth and richer than the U.S. We also dive into the 
question of housing values and how rising values may affect the quality of 
life of residents. Lastly, we discuss the impact of COVID-19 on the labor 
force, employment and jobs in the region. We conclude with a discussion 
of the challenges facing the Winchester metro area over the coming 
decade, including whether it can retain its character while welcoming an 
increasing number of expatriates from the Washington, D.C., metro area.
3 The compound annual growth rate is equal to (end value/beginning value)^(1/number of periods)-1.
Population Growth Powers 
Change In Winchester
To understand where Winchester may go in the coming decade, we must 
understand where it has been. Whether population growth has been 
positive or negative is more than just an academic curiosity. A region that 
is losing residents will, inevitably, lose businesses as residents “vote with 
their feet” in reaction to economic conditions. On the other hand, a region 
that is growing will attract businesses and spur job creation. Let’s look at 
how Winchester has fared in growing its population.
From 2000 to 2020, the Winchester metro area added more than 38,000 
new residents (Graph 1), an estimated annual average increase of 1.6%.3 
Examining the largest localities within the region, we find that population 
growth was driven by Frederick County, Virginia, for which Winchester is 
the county seat. From 2000 to 2020, the population of Frederick County 
grew from 59,639 to 91,119, an annual average increase of 2.1% (Table 
2). The population growth rate in the county eclipsed that of the city of 
Winchester (0.8%) and Hampshire County, West Virginia (0.7%). Given 
that Winchester’s annual average population growth rate was not even 
half that of the metropolitan area of which it is a part, it is apparent that 
Frederick County’s population growth was driven largely by the smaller 
towns and unincorporated areas in the county.
Graph 2 displays the components of population change in the Winchester 
metro area from 2010 to 2020. Over this span, the natural increase in the 
population (births minus deaths) was positive. While there were only an 
estimated 17 net international migrants into the region in 2010, by 2016 
net international migration peaked at 353 individuals. Net international 
migration then fell from its 2016 peak to an estimated 171 arrivals in 
2020. An influx of international migrants is typically a signal of improving 
economic prospects in a region. While international migration in 2020 was 
less than in 2016, it was markedly better than at the start of the decade, 
even amid the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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TABLE 2
POPULATION GROWTH: 
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA AND LARGEST 
LOCALITIES IN THE MSA, 
2000-2020














Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Annual Intercensal Resident Population Estimates: 2000-2009; and Metropolitan and Micropolitan 
Statistical Area Totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and were created 
without incorporation or consideration of the 2020 Census results.
People come, and people go. Where they come from and where they 
go is revealing, as we tend to vote with our feet. Whether it is for 
jobs, quality of life or affordability, migration implicitly reveals 
the attractiveness of a region. By far, the largest component of 
population change for the Winchester metro area from 2010 to 2020 
was net domestic migration (arrivals minus departures). In 2010, 
in the aftermath of the Great Recession, net domestic migration was 
estimated to be only 81 individuals. Net domestic migration peaked 
at 1,689 in 2017 and was 985 in 2020. Clearly, Winchester has been 
attracting new residents from other parts of the Commonwealth and 
the nation in recent years.
Comparing the Winchester metro area’s average annual population 
growth from 2000 to 2020 with that of the other metropolitan areas 
in Virginia yields an interesting observation: Population growth in the 
Winchester region was higher than any other metropolitan area in 
the Commonwealth this century (Table 3). Of course, it may be harder 
for larger metros to grow faster, but we can compare the Winchester 
metro with Virginia’s smaller metro areas. Here, Winchester grew by 1.1 
percentage points faster than the Blacksburg-Christiansburg metro, 0.8 
points faster than Roanoke, 0.7 points faster than Lynchburg, 0.5 points 
faster than Harrisonburg and 0.4 points faster than Charlottesville. As 
we shall see in the next section, one of the major reasons for Winchester’s 
more rapid growth is the influx of commuters from the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan region.
TABLE 3















Charlottesville 174,979 219,910 1.20%
Harrisonburg 108,414 135,550 1.10%
Richmond 1,043,450 1,303,469 1.10%
Lynchburg 222,430 264,386 0.90%
Roanoke 288,699 313,784 0.80%




Hampton Roads 1,617,490 1,779,824 0.50%
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Annual Intercensal Resident Population Estimates: 2000-2009; and Metropolitan and Micropolitan 
Statistical Area Totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and were created 




WINCHESTER, VA-WV METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 2000-2020
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Intercensal Resident Population Estimates: 2000-2009; and Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area Totals: 2010-









Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Intercensal Resident Population Estimates: 2000-2009; and Metropolitan and 
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GRAPH 2
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE: 
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA,  
2010-2020
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau; and Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area Totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 estimates are based on the 2010 Census and 




Components of Population Change: 
Winchester Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
2010-2020 
 
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau; and Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area Totals: 2010-2020. Vintage 2020 
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On The Road Again: 
Commuters And The 
Winchester Metro Area
The Winchester metro area defies the stereotypical perception of a 
small town that award-winning young-adult fiction author Courtney 
Summers once described as “a place that’s only good for leaving.” Instead 
of residents leaving, Winchester has attracted new residents, drawn in 
by a lower cost of living and a perceived higher quality of life. Given the 
geographical proximity of Winchester to Washington, D.C. (75 miles by 
car), it should be no surprise that some residents of the D.C. metro area 
have traded the hustle and bustle (and traffic) for the lower population 
density of the Winchester region.
The 2015-2019 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates from the 
U.S. Census Bureau provide insight into who is coming to and who is 
leaving from the Winchester metro area. As illustrated in Table 4, the 
largest flows were from the Washington, D.C., metro area. While 1,610 
residents of the Winchester area departed for the Washington, D.C., area 
during this period, 3,614 residents flowed in the opposite direction. Net 
migration flows from the Washington, D.C., region into the Winchester 
metro area were almost eight times larger than the next highest region, 
Hampton Roads. 
Some regions have migration flows in their favor. Net migration to the 
Hagerstown, Maryland, metro area was 409 individuals from Winchester 
in the most recent data. Richmond was the next highest in terms of net 
outmigration, gaining 154 individuals. However, it should be clear from the 
data that the net movement of people into Winchester was positive and 
contributed to the overall population gain in the region.
Where people go to work has changed over time. In 2002, 39.3% of 
employed individuals who lived in the Winchester metro area worked 
in another metro area (Graph 3). By 2019, the latest data available, 
50.7% of employed individuals lived in Winchester but worked in 
another metro area. Most of Winchester’s commuters were bound for 
one destination: the Washington, D.C., metro area. In 2019, 59.9% of 
residents who worked outside the Winchester metro area did so in the 
Washington, D.C., metro area.
TABLE 4
TOP AND BOTTOM FIVE CONTRIBUTORS OF NET MIGRATION TO 
WINCHESTER, VA-WV: 
ACS FIVE-YEAR ESTIMATES, 2015-2019









within U.S. or Puerto Rico
1,016 774 242
Johnson City, Tennessee 140 0 140















Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2015-2019 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, and the Dragas 
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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Among Virginia’s metropolitan areas, Winchester had the largest 
percentage of residents who worked outside the metro area in 2019 (Graph 
4). As the share of workers has risen over time, the economic linkages 
between the Winchester and Washington, D.C., metro areas have deepened 
as well. As we discuss in the next section, one visible impact of this 
synergistic relationship has been the remarkable rise in median household 
income in the Winchester metro area over the past decade.
147
GRAPH 3
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 
2002-2019
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau; and OnTheMap, Work Destination Analysis by Metropolitan/Micropolitan Areas, 2021. Data are for all public- and private-sector 




Percentage of Workers Employed Outside the Winchester Metropolitan Statistical Area, 






Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau; and OnTheMap, Work Destination Analysis by Metropolitan/Micropolitan Areas, 2021. Data are for all 
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GRAPH 4
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS 
VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 2019
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau; and OnTheMap, Work Destination Analysis by Metropolitan/Micropolitan Areas, 2021. Data are for all public- and private-sector 
jobs in each metropolitan statistical area.
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Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; U.S. Census Bureau; and OnTheMap, Work Destination Analysis by Metropolitan/Micropolitan Areas, 2021. Data are for all 






































































































Median Household Income 
Rises In Winchester
In 2010, median (50th percentile) household income in the Winchester 
metro area was $46,626, approximately 6.8% lower than the nation and 
23.2% lower than the Commonwealth (Graph 5). Since 2010, median 
household income has grown more rapidly in the Winchester metro area 
than Virginia or the United States. By 2015, median household income 
in the Winchester region eclipsed that of the nation. By 2019, median 
household income in Winchester and Virginia was about equal and 14.2% 
higher than the nation. 
2021 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
150 THE WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN AREA OUTPERFORMS THE COMMONWEALTH■
GRAPH 5
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN NOMINAL DOLLARS: 
WINCHESTER MSA, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2010-2019
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, ACS 1-year estimates (2010 to 2019), and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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Prices And Housing 
In Winchester
Regional price parities (RPPs) are regional price levels expressed as 
a percentage of the national price level for a given year. Estimated 
by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the RPPs provide 
insight into whether a metropolitan area is cheaper or more expensive 
than the national average. As illustrated in Graph 6, the average price 
level in Winchester is approximately 7.5% cheaper than the national 
average, while the average price level in the Washington, D.C., metro 
area is 17.4% higher. Incentives matter, and some people, facing higher 
prices in the D.C. area, have traded distance for affordability.
While the cost of living in the Winchester metro area is cheaper than the 
national average, a combination of population growth, higher incomes and 
low interest rates have pushed median housing values higher in the region. 
As illustrated in Graph 7, the estimated median housing value increased 
from $119,031 in January 2000 to a prerecessionary peak of $275,166 in 
May 2006, an increase of 131.2%. The Great Recession of 2007-2009 did 
not leave the Winchester region untouched, with the estimated median 
housing value falling to $188,881 in November 2011. The 31.3% decline in 
median housing values was not long lasting, as prices started to recover in 
2012.
From the trough in November 2011 to February 2020, the median housing 
value in the Winchester metro area rose by 31.2% to $247,871. The 
COVID-19 pandemic did not dampen the housing market in the region, 
with prices climbing another 23.5% by October 2021. During that month, 
the median housing value in the Winchester region was $306,084. In the 
Washington, D.C., metro area, the median housing value in October 2021 
was $547,223, approximately 1.8 times higher than the Winchester area. 
This is not surprising, given that a majority of those who work outside 
the Winchester metro area do so in the Washington, D.C., metro area. 
Many federal employees and employees whose jobs support the federal 
government transitioned to remote work and were largely unaffected by 
the turbulence in labor markets.
If we examine how housing values have changed over time, we can observe 
how the two housing markets are tightly correlated. In Graph 8, we 
index housing prices in each region so that January 2000 is equal to 100. 
Housing prices in both regions peaked prior to the Great Recession and 
have steadily climbed over the last eight years. The recent acceleration 
in housing values is readily apparent, as prices in October 2021 were 
2.7 and 2.5 times higher than in January 2000 in Washington, D.C., and 
Winchester, respectively.
Rising home values and lower inventories of single-family residences 
are creating price pressures in the multifamily housing market. As 
housing values and rents increase, the lack of affordable housing in 
the Winchester metro area has become a significant issue of concern. 
Shawn Hershberger, Development Services Director for the city of 
Winchester, illustrates the burdens of a tight residential housing 
market. “A recent situation that occurred, as an example, was where 
a storm caused significant damage to a multifamily development, 
causing several families to be displaced. Despite their ability to 
pay reasonable rents, nonprofits working on relocation have had 
no success in finding them housing. Today (September 2021), they 
are still living in a hotel; this is a direct result of the extremely tight 
housing market in our region.” Hershberger contends that housing 
production in the city is not only an issue now, but also one for the 
foreseeable future. 
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GRAPH 6
REGIONAL PRICE PARITIES FOR ALL ITEMS: 
WINCHESTER AND WASHINGTON, D.C., METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 2008-2019
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University and Bureau of Economic Analysis
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GRAPH 6 
Regional Price Parities for All Items: 
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GRAPH 7
ZILLOW HOME VALUE INDEX OF SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL HOMES: 
WINCHESTER MSA, JANUARY 2000-OCTOBER 2021
Source: Zillow Home Value Index. Data are seasonally adjusted and reflect the typical home values in the 35th to 65th percentile range.
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GRAPH 7 
Zillow Home Value Index of Single-Family Residential Homes: 
Winchester MSA, January 2000-October 2021 
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 5 
Index of Zillow Median Housing Values for Single-Family Residential Homes: 
Winchester and Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 
January 2000-October 2021 
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GRAPH 8
INDEX OF ZILLOW MEDIAN HOUSING VALUES FOR SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL HOMES: 
WINCHESTER AND WASHINGTON, D.C., METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 
JANUARY 2000-OCTOBER 2021
Source: Zillow Home Value Index. Data are seasonally adjusted and reflect the typical home values in the 35th to 65th percentile range.
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Labor Force And 
Employment Weather 
The COVID-19 Shock
The civilian labor force comprises those working (full time and part time) 
and those actively seeking work. Individual employment reflects those who 
are working in the civilian labor force. The gap between the civilian labor 
force and individual employment represents the level of unemployment 
in a geographical area. As illustrated in Graph 9, the civilian labor 
force in the Winchester metro area increased from 55,074 in 2000 to a 
prerecessionary peak of 65,136 in 2008. After a slight decline in 2009, the 
civilian labor force continued to expand, reaching an annual average of 
74,479 in 2019. 
While the civilian labor force was largely unaffected by the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009, individual employment declined from an average 
of 62,912 in 2007 to 59,477 in 2009. As a result, the annual average 
unemployment rate in the Winchester metro area increased from a 
prerecession low of 3.1% in 2006 to a postrecession peak of 8% in 2009 and 
2010 (Graph 10). Individual employment rebounded from its lows in 2010 
and surpassed the pre-Great Recession peak in 2012. By 2019, individual 
employment reached an annual average of 72,527, and the average 
unemployment rate in the Winchester region had declined to 2.6%.
Graph 11 illustrates the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic on the civilian 
labor force and individual employment in the Winchester metro area. As 
with the Commonwealth, the emergence of the pandemic and associated 
social distancing measures led to a contraction in the number of people 
working or looking for work in March and April 2020. Individual 
employment fell sharply as well, declining by almost 7,700 individuals from 
February 2020 to April 2020. Since the depths of the pandemic shock in 
April 2020, however, Winchester’s labor force not only rebounded, but it 
exceeded the prepandemic peak in October 2021. Individual employment, 
for all intents and purposes, recovered as well, with the employment level 
in October 2021 almost equaling the level observed in February 2020.
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GRAPH 9
ANNUAL AVERAGE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 
2000-2019
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GRAPH 10
ANNUAL AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE:  
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 2000-2019




Annual Average Unemployment Rate: 
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GRAPH 11
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, JANUARY 2019-OCTOBER 2021
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.
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GRAPH 11 
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Where Are The Jobs 
In Winchester?
Winchester has become an appealing location for businesses. In 2019, for 
example, more than half of all jobs in the Winchester metro area were 
in three major industries: trade, transportation and utilities (22.1%); 
education and health services (17.5%); and manufacturing (11.9%) (Graph 
12). It should be no surprise that these sectors accounted for the majority 
of job growth in the region in the previous decade.
Amazon’s distribution center in Frederick County accounts for more than 
1,000 employees and is the fourth-largest employment provider in the 
Winchester metro area.4 Walmart and Home Depot employ more than 500 
people each in Winchester. 
Valley Health System, a regional health care network, employs well 
over 1,000 people and serves as the largest source of jobs in the region. 
Frederick County Public Schools is the second-largest employer in 
Winchester. With more than 13,000 students, the school system has 
approximately 1,000 employees to help facilitate their education. It should 
come as no surprise that nearly 1 in 6 jobs in the Winchester region is 
from health services and education.
With large amounts of plastic, rubber and food being produced in 
Winchester, employers such as Trex Co., Rubbermaid, HP Hood and 
Kraft Heinz Co. employ hundreds of people each. Trex, the world’s largest 
manufacturer of wood-alternative decking products, purchased eight 
acres of land in Winchester in June 2021 for its new global headquarters.5 
Winchester is more than a bedroom community; private-sector job growth 
has also contributed to the increasing vitality of the region. 
4  “Amazon distribution center opens, seeks more employees,” The Winchester Star, June 30, 2018, https://www.winchesterstar.com/news/frederick/amazon-distribution-center-opens-seeks-more-employees/article_6b4dd206-6873-
50de-92a8-8c959e7cc2ca.html.
5  “Trex buys land in Winchester for new global headquarters,” The Winchester Star, June 12, 2021, https://www.winchesterstar.com/winchester_star/trex-buys-land-in-winchester-for-new-global-headquarters/article_b7f78e4f-b593-
5e40-b32d-57a1436f8197.html.
TREX CO.’S NEW WINCHESTER CAMPUS
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GRAPH 12
INDUSTRY SHARE OF AVERAGE ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 2019
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Excludes four North American 
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Sources: Virginia Employment Commission; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion 
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Jobs In Winchester Rebound 
During The Pandemic
Graph 13 illustrates the growth in nonfarm payrolls (jobs) in the 
Winchester metro area from 2000 to 2019. As with individual employment, 
the economic impact of the Great Recession took a toll on the number of 
jobs in the region, with average annual payrolls declining from 58,042 in 
2007 to 53,842 in 2009. By 2013, the number of jobs in the metro area had 
exceeded the prerecession peak. In 2019, there were approximately 65,875 
jobs in the Winchester region. 
In Graph 14, we compare the growth in jobs for the Winchester metro 
area with Virginia and the United States. We select February 2010, the 
trough of nonfarm payrolls in the United States and Virginia following the 
Great Recession, as the starting point for our comparison. Job growth in 
the Winchester region outpaced that of the Commonwealth and the nation 
over the decade. By February 2020, the number of jobs in the region had 
increased by 25.7%, 8.1 percentage points more than the United States, 
and a full 12 percentage points higher than the Commonwealth. Unlike 
many other metropolitan areas in the Commonwealth, Winchester had a 
job creation record worth highlighting.
Graph 15 illustrates the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on nonfarm 
payrolls in the Winchester metro area, Virginia and United States. We 
index job levels to February 2020, the prepandemic peak for jobs in each 
of the geographical areas. Here again, we witness a familiar story. While 
jobs fell 10% by April 2020 in Winchester, this decline was not as steep as 
Virginia or the United States. Furthermore, Winchester has recovered its 
jobs quicker than the Commonwealth or nation. By October 2021, nonfarm 
payrolls were 0.7% higher than the prepandemic record in the Winchester 
metro area. Simply put, the COVID-19 pandemic was shallower in the 
Winchester area, and it recovered more quickly than Virginia or the 
nation.
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GRAPH 13
AVERAGE NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 2000-2019
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Winchester Metropolitan Statistical Area, 2000-2019 
 
 



























































































CUMULATIVE GROWTH IN NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
WINCHESTER MSA, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
FEBRUARY 2010-FEBRUARY 2020




Cumulative Growth in Nonfarm Payrolls (Jobs): 
Winchester MSA, Virginia and the United States, 
February 2010-February 2020 
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GRAPH 15
CUMULATIVE GROWTH IN NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
WINCHESTER MSA, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
FEBRUARY 2020-OCTOBER 2021




Cumulative Growth in Nonfarm Payrolls (Jobs): 
Winchester MSA, Virginia and the United States, 
ebruary 20-October 2021 
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Final Thoughts
The Winchester metropolitan area may be relatively small when compared 
to the Richmond or Hampton Roads regions (let alone the Washington, 
D.C., metro area), but its story is worth telling. Over the past decade, 
the Winchester region outpaced both the state and nation in terms of job 
growth. Median household income rose more rapidly in the Winchester 
metro area than any other metropolitan region in the Commonwealth and 
the nation as a whole. While Winchester may be thought of as an exurban 
region of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, it has experienced 
private-sector growth in retail trade, transportation and warehousing, 
manufacturing, and education and health services. 
We would be remiss, however, if we did not note that the region’s growth 
has also created challenges. In recent years, housing values have increased 
as rapidly as those in the Washington, D.C., metro area. There are 
numerous reports that multifamily housing demand is outstripping supply 
(in part due to increasing single-family housing prices) and thus rents 
are rising rapidly as well. Winchester needs to look west to the exurban 
areas outside Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle to see 
one possibility for its future. The exurban areas of these metropolitan 
regions have been largely transformed from agricultural communities with 
relatively low population density into bedroom communities. As incomes 
and population have increased, so has the demand for public services, 
affordable housing and a reasonable cost of living. Whether the quality of 
life has improved or not remains a matter of fierce debate.
Given its geographical proximity to and interdependence with the 
Washington, D.C., region, it is safe to assume that inflows into the 
Winchester metro area will continue over the coming years. Now is 
the time for the region to engage in discussions of expanding public 
infrastructure, planning for increases in housing stock and thinking about 
how to continue its historical performance in terms of job creation. None 
of these challenges has an easy solution, but a number of other regions in 
the Commonwealth might gladly trade for these circumstances, given their 
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Sunset on the James River


